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ABSTRACT
BUILDING THE PETRO-POLIS
OIL CAPITALISM, IMPERIALISM, AND THE MAKING OF ABADAN,
1908-1933
by
Reza Mortaheb
Abadan is the most prominent of all the oil company towns the British Petroleum Company
built in Southwest Iran. Located at the border of Iran and present-day Iraq, by the mid
twentieth century Abadan not only accommodated the world’s largest refinery, it had also
become Iran’s most populous industrial city. This dissertation focuses on the process of
urban development on Abadan Island between 1908 and 1933. Drawing on primary
archival documents and secondary sources, this dissertation discusses how Abadan’s
establishment and its changing urban form and spatial organization were the product of
broader historical processes. Imperial intelligence and practical requirements of the oil
industry helped determine the location of the refinery in 1908. Abadan was initially
designed in 1909 as a fenced-in oil camp, its urban form representing the vernacular
expression of industrial needs. The rapid growth of the refinery, particularly after WWI,
turned the company town into a sprawling industrial landscape, with three separate
residential quarters, where British employees resided in spacious residences on one end,
international migrant laborers overcrowded barrack-type shacks in the middle, and local
workmen lived in indigenous compounds on the other end. Driven by economic rationality,
industrial order, and colonial ideology, the spatial structure of the Abadan refinery was
engineered to accomplish the Company’s larger economic, social, and political goals. This
pattern continued until 1924 when the Company management adopted a comprehensive

plan and incorporated some elements of model company towns into Abadan’s spatialphysical structure to ameliorate the difficulties and inequalities created by rapid
industrialization. The dissertation shows how urban reformation as well as town planning
and design practices implemented between 1924 and 1933 aimed to boost industrial
efficiency and prevent labor militancy by increasing the Company’s control over space and
populations, while also addressing pressing urban issues, such as housing and public health.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This study explores the process of urban development on Abadan Island in Southwest Iran
from 1908 through 1933. Urban growth in Abadan was largely the outcome of the
discovery of oilfields and the subsequent introduction of the oil industry into the region,
which triggered a series of economic, societal, political, and cultural transformations at the
local and national levels. The capitalist exploitation of the “black gold,” in the hands of the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company (A.P.O.C), gave rise to the emergence of a number of
industrial company towns in Khuzestan Province, the most prominent of which was
Abadan. Thanks to the construction of a refinery, Abadan became the country's major
industrial city, and by mid-century turned into the largest oil city in the world.1 As a pioneer
oil city in the region, Abadan acted as a role model for oil company towns and labor camps
that proliferated in the neighboring countries in the 1930s and 1940s. Populated by local
and international laborers, contractors, and petroleum technicians and engineers, Abadan
also functioned as a major port city and a regional hub for commercial transportation of oil
and various petroleum products to global markets. Backed by the imperial power of Britain,
the A.P.O.C2 succeeded in turning an oil concession into one of the major global petroleum
enterprises, and Abadan into a gateway through which the concepts of modern urban life
and capitalist industrial culture found their way to Iran.

1

James H. Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, Volume 2, The Anglo-Iranian Years,
1928–1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 384.
2
The enterprise was renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1935 and the British Petroleum in 1954.

1

1.1 Research Objectives
This dissertation analyzes the urban development of Abadan through the examination of
its master plans, design of city quarters for different social sectors (and the boundaries
between them), infrastructure, public spaces and institutions, and architecture. The time
bracket of this study extends from 1908 — when a systematic search began to locate a
suitable site for the oil establishment in Southern Iran— through 1933 — when a new Oil
Concession was signed between the Iranian Government and the oil company.
This research applies three levels of analysis. At the macro-level, the study aims to
put oil at the center of social and cultural formations in Iran in the first decades of the
twentieth century. In so doing, it defies the history of invisibility and hyper-materiality of
oil, recognizes its material agency and, grants it “the visibility it deserves.”3 In this sense,
this dissertation contributes to the emerging trends in the cultural history of oil, which strive
to analyze, interpret, and explicate oil's presence in various historical processes.
Conceptualizing oil not only as an extractive commodity but also as a substance with much
broader sphere of action, this study seeks to resituate petroleum into the center of social
and cultural restructuring of Iranian society in the early twentieth century— part of a
process which may be referred to as oil modernization.
At the intermediate level, this work examines Abadan’s built form and spatial
structure from a critical perspective and unravels the nexus of historical currents, forces,
and players that triggered Abadan’s urban development. The major actors consisted of the
British oil company, the local chieftain, the Iranian Government, oil workmen, and local
inhabitants of Abadan. Employing the concept of company town as a theoretical
3

Allan Stoekl, “Forward,” in R. Barrett and D. Worden (eds.), Oil Culture (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2014), p.xii

2

framework, this study traces the urban evolution of Abadan from an “oil enclave” to an
“industrial landscape” to an agglomeration of “model towns” and shows how Abadan’s
built environment was the product of the interplay of such determinants as racial divisions,
colonial practices, technical requirements, capitalist logic, vernacular construction
techniques, climatic conditions, political circumstances, and public health. In other words,
the study situates Abadan’s physical-spatial form within broader contexts where factors
such as industrial restructuring, immigration, ethnic divisions, imperialism, labor
processes, and class struggles are as significant as architectural design, economic
pragmatism, reform, and aesthetics.
At the micro-level, this research sheds light on the ways in which oil modernity
unfolded in Abadan. This research conceives of oil modernity as a set of day-to-day
practices of urban experience framed by the interactions between the apparatus of oil
capitalism and the economic, cultural, social, and intellectual systems of the locality.
Exploring oil modernity is crucial because, as historian Nelida Fuccaro argues, the aspects
of “macro-politics” of oil development—represented by planning, architecture,
paternalism, and infrastructural development— cannot be fully understood without
contextualizing them within a system of “relational processes” that caused “new social and
cultural realities for oil on the ground.”4 To unravel these “realities,” this dissertation
explores the adjacent, yet “immiscible,” life-worlds in Abadan by delving into the manner
in which various socio-occupational and ethnic groups experienced the atmosphere of oil
and played an active role in determining their living and working conditions. The
dissertation examines not only the intermediary role of the built environment in framing
4

Nelida Fuccaro, “Introduction: Histories of Oil and Urban Modernity in the Middle East,” Comparative
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 33, no. 1 (2013), p.5

3

social relations and power structures, but also the spatial experience of inhabitants within
the dynamic of capitalist oil development— the process that created, altered, destroyed,
and rebuilt different parts of Abadan.

1.2 Significance of the Study
While major cities in the Iranian plateau— such as Isfahan, Tehran, and Shiraz— have
been extensively researched, provincial cities on the Persian Gulf, such as Abadan, have
received little attention from urban and architectural scholars. Moreover, most textual
accounts on Abadan focus primarily on the discovery of oil and the city's early
development. Such narratives were largely constructed by British subjects whose
relationship to the topic was either distorted by orientalist/imperialist tropes or mediated
by the British Petroleum. This dissertation challenges the rhetoric that underlay the grand
narratives of Abadan and offers equally significant vantage points from which the city was
viewed and lived. In other words, this research aims to revisit the history of oil development
in Abadan by “listening” to and empowering marginal voices. In an attempt to offer
historically specific experiences of Abadan, the study aims to complicate the conventional
urban image of the city as simply represented by a duality, characterized by two contrasting
socio-spatial worlds. Although Abadan lacked a unitary character and represented certain
qualities of a colonial city, this study shows that it was a tripartite city and its social
structure consisted of a mosaic of socio-occupational and ethnic groups rather than a
simplified dyad of the European quarter versus the native town.
This dissertation consists of four main chapters. The remainder of Chapter 1
describes the methodology employed and the archival sources consulted to collect

4

“evidence” for this study. At the end, it provides a brief overview of the existing oil
literature and discusses where this research would land. Studies of the history of urban
spaces, societies, and culture under the shadow of oil in the oil-region of the Middle East
are scarce. The existing oil literature, imbued with the paradigm of the rentier state and the
notion of petro-modernity, tends to focus on the macro-economic and political aspects of
oil modernization at the expense of the micro-level indigenous socio-political forces and
the historical process of modernity. This study contributes to the growing body of scholarly
work that regards urban milieus not only as a historical, spatial, social, cultural, and
political context of oil, but also as the pivotal nodes of the architecture of early oil life. This
scholarship will be discussed at length in the Literature Review section.
Chapter 2 depicts the political, social, economic, and ecological conditions of
southwestern Iran on the eve of oil development and discusses how the combination of
imperial intelligence and practical requirements of the oil industry determined the future
location of the oil refinery on Abadan Island. Chapter 3 gives an account of early stages of
oil urbanism in Abadan and traces its evolution from an oil enclave to a petro-scape.
Chapter 3 also illustrates the manner in which the class-based, three-tiered labor hierarchy
crafted by the Company formed the socio-spatial structure of Abadan as well as its public
spaces and institutions and demonstrates how oil workers defied the Company’s control
and spatial coercion through spaces of resistance and confrontation. Finally, Chapter 4
details the transformation of Abadan into a polycentric settlement with fractured urban
space and unravels the historical forces that pushed the Company to reorganize Abadan’s
spatial-physical structure through urban reforms and model villages. Chapter 4 also shows
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how various factors including the agency of oil workmen forced the Company to revise its
social welfare policy.
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Interdisciplinarity
The topic of this study calls for an interdisciplinary methodology which will examine urban
change in Abadan from the standpoint of urban and architectural history in reference to
social and cultural history, literature, oil studies, economics, planning history, urban
geography, labor studies, public health, and anthropology. This approach to urban research
deserves further elaboration. Architectural historians have shown that, for instance, the
analysis of “social use” in architectural history — that is the role played by specific groups
of people in the shaping and use of space — will broaden the scope of inquiry in this field.5
The following questions epitomize how social history could serve as a “context” for
“settings and rituals”— to borrow Spiro Kostof's words6— in the context of the
Iranianization of the workforce in the late 1920s, which gave rise to the emergence of an
Iranian industrial proletariat in Abadan: How did the Iranian working class affect the
structure of public realm and the use of public spaces? What were the spatial and
architectural characteristics of working-class quarters? Were oil workers' needs
incorporated into the design of “planned” housing projects? How did “designed” spaces
change the cultural norms and lifestyle of this social class? Did this community modify the
environment to satisfy their values and interests? What were the working-class leisure
activities? Where were the corresponding spaces of entertainment? How did this social
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group experience oil modernity in Abadan? This study hence conceptualizes Abadan as a
complex web of spatial, material, political, economic, social, environmental, and cultural
terrains encompassing the lives of different social groups. First, it investigates how the
interplay between extraneous forces and Abadan's multi-layered urban system shaped the
physical structure and spatial organization of the city at every stage of its development;
and secondly, it sheds light on the ways in which the resulting built space mediated the
interaction between the built forms and diverse aspects of human life, such as selfhood and
social/ideological/power relations.
Interdisciplinary approach to urban history originates in the conceptual and
methodological breakthroughs of the 1960s in the field itself as well as in the neighboring
discipline of social history. Social issues expanded the subject matter of urban history in
the same way as did the disciplines of geography and anthropology in social sciences. As
a result of the process of interdisciplinary cross-fertilization, the scope of urban history
transcended the study of architecture and physical configuration of cities, taking account
of social, cultural, political, and economic dimensions of urban life.7 Intellectual
developments in the humanistic sciences in the last decades of the twentieth century also
made intriguing contributions to the field. For instance, post-orientalism discourse led to
the emergence of a new sub-field of “non-Western” cities in urban history. Moreover,
researchers began to tap into new archival sources that hitherto were neglected, including
government and municipal documents, property deeds, travelers' accounts, and poems and
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songs.8 To Gwendolyn Wright, urban history, as a “complex and ongoing enterprise,” is
not just a synthesis of “priorities and disciplinary techniques,” but also a combination of
“experiences and visions.” In Wright's view, urban history entails the integration of formal
and social analyses as well as the exploration of “intricate webs of power and meaning.”9
Interdisciplinarity, hence, will broaden the scope of inquiry in this research. However, I am
also aware of the challenges it simultaneously poses. As urban scholars have noted,
interdisciplinary approach entails “methodological pluralism” which may weaken the
field's theoretical concentration and obscure its evaluation standards.10 Furthermore, as a
result of the blurring of disciplinary boundaries, urban history has become a truly contested
terrain whose definition depends on the perspective from which it is viewed.11
Cross-disciplinary reciprocity also altered the dynamics of the discipline of
architectural history. Similar to the rise of the importance of space in social sciences in the
1970s and 1980s, in the field of architectural history, there has been a growing recognition
of the “instrumentality” of built space (buildings, cities, landscape) in such diverse aspects
of human life as recognition, subjectivity, social and ideological relations, economy,
politics, and power.12 While architectural historians have taken inspiration from other
disciplines' conceptual frameworks and methodological techniques, the main task of the
field has remained unchanged: to analyze the material world —as spatially conceived— by
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engaging the historical narratives with social, economic, and political world,13 and to
examine the manner in which the built environment interacts with other systems of
meaning and social discourses.14 Therefore, urban and architectural history is more
concerned with buildings' embeddedness in a larger urban fabric, including mundane traces
of social attitudes and ideology, than mere accounts of monuments and prominent buildings
as self-contained facts.15 Following this system of thought, this research makes connections
between urban and architectural history of Abadan and the economic, political, social, and
cultural contexts which circumscribed the process of urban development of the city in the
first decades of the twentieth century.
Working on the margins of urban and architectural history, this dissertation
employs different strategies—suggested by scholars in the field— to harness the
“remarkable field of energy”16 generated by interdisciplinarity. For instance, Diane Harris,
argues for situating the broadly defined notion of identity, performance, and their spatiopolitical ramifications at the center of a social history of the built environment.17
Gwendolyn Wright urges architectural historians to learn from cultural historians the
knowledge and techniques of unearthing the meanings embedded in public places. Wright
also advocates for the application of more forceful linguistic expressions – for instance, to
use such terms as reinforce, mediate, and articulate rather than document or reflect- when
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describing the influence of the built environment on culture and society.18 John Archer
calls for scrutinizing the capacity of built space in sustaining cultural beliefs, in the
articulation or negation of human difference, and in the furtherance of economy, power,
and community.19 Underscoring the importance of integrating social and economic history
into architectural history, Ballantyne argues that the politics behind the production of
buildings should be regarded as significant as the aesthetic characteristics. Ballantyne
stipulates that buildings are shaped in an “ethical milieu,” where many forces operate
including those determining the distribution of resources. In other words, buildings are
good manifestations of “value systems” in a society, as they are a form of “cultural capital”
intertwined with “physical capital.”20 Jane Rendell observes that architectural history, as a
spatialized practice, is constructed by the changing position of the researcher, who should
not remain a disinterested observer. In Rendell's view, multidisciplinary research is
different from interdisciplinary study in that in the former academics are locked within the
disciplinary boundaries of their field, while in the latter researchers operate at the edge of,
and between, disciplines and in so doing question the conventional methodologies of their
own field. In other words, interdisciplinary research is predicated upon a desire to develop
political critique, challenging the “ideological apparatus” that constructs the terms and
methods of specific “disciplinary practices.”21
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1.3.2 Evidence
As the cross-disciplinary approach to urban research would entail, the methods employed
in this study build on extensive archival work. It also draws on both tangible and intangible
bodies of evidence including official documents, urban plans, maps and images, pictorial
and textual representations of Iranian oil and Abadan, British and Iranian magazines and
daily newspapers, as well as oral histories, memoirs and diaries of oilmen, workers,
residents, and visitors to the city. All pieces of evidence were contextualized within the
larger economic, political, cultural, and social settings within which they were produced.
Moreover, two analytic strategies were employed when dealing with historical documents.
First, the author carefully analyzed the social standings and political orientations of the
individual writers, journalists, and administrators to see how individual narratives
incorporated both subjective dispositions as well as larger ideological, political and cultural
currents. Secondly, the narrative itself was also scrutinized to decode the rhetorical devices
used to communicate cultural attributes and socio-political distinctions. For instance, the
rhetoric of “oil pioneer” and the rhetoric of “oil exploiter” underlay two contrasting
accounts of oil development in Abadan from the perspectives of British and Iranian
subjects, respectively.
The primary research started at the Iranian National Archives and the National
Library in Tehran in summer 2015. The National Archives and the Library hold a wealth
of historical documents, including newspapers, correspondence among Iranian Ministries,
government officials, and Company representatives, as well as letters and petitions from
Iranian workmen and inhabitants of Abadan during the period under study. In summer
2016, the author visited the archives of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (the present-day
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British Petroleum), housed at the University of Warwick in Coventry in the U.K. The BP
Archives contain an abundance of data, including official, demi-officials, and informal
correspondence, memos, and letters exchanged among Company officials, British
diplomats, and Iranian officials, as well as maps, master plans, and photographic
representation of Abadan during this period. The archives also include the full collection
of The Naft, the internal magazine of the A.P.O.C, which was published for the staff and
employees between 1924 and 1951. This journal provides invaluable information on the
architecture and the urban development of Abadan. The BP Archives also holds a very rare
and valuable source: Lindsey Smith's JM: the story of an architect (1976). This privately
published book documents the career of James Mollison Wilson (1887-1965), the
A.P.O.C.'s architect, who designed numerous buildings and residential quarters in Abadan.
BP-sponsored petro-movies, featuring the oil industry in Iran, also provided important
cinematographic, pictorial, and textual data for this research. BP Video Library holds a
number of oil-films exemplifying the company's promotional practices designed primarily
for western audiences, including Persian Oil Industry (1925), In the Land of the Shah
(1926), Dawn of Iran (1938), AIOC's Operations in South-West Iran (1921) & (1938), Oil
from Khuzestan (1948), and Persian Story (1952).
After archival work in Warwick was completed, the author spent several weeks at
the British Library and the British National Archives in London. The British Library’s rich
sources on the topic consist of detailed official documents and correspondence of Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf and British Consul-Generals— representatives of the
Government of British India in Southwest Iran— regarding the political conditions and
various issues circumscribing Iranian oil and the urban development of Abadan. The
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British library also holds a rich collection of maps, prepared by the British Admiralty and
the Basra Port Authority, showing the transformation of Abadan and its environs during
the time period under study. The maps, in particular, are untapped primary sources
providing detailed cartographic data on the early stages of oil urbanism in Abadan, spatial
organization of the city, and different elements of its urban fabric. The National Archives
contain correspondence of diplomatic representatives of the Foreign office on the topic.
The other valuable source used in this study is the Qatar Digital Library’s free online
platform which contains the digitized documents of the India Office archives. During the
archival work in the UK and in Iran, the author complied thousands of pages of historical
documents which shaped the foundation on which this study rests. The data collected from
different archival centers usually complemented each other. When possible, the data was
triangulated to verify the authenticity of the information.

1.4 Literature Review
1.4.1 Abadan
Architecture and Urbanism
Laurence Lockhart's account of Abadan in Persian Cities (1960) is among the first
endeavors to briefly narrate the development of Abadan – albeit from the vantage point of
an orientalist/company historian – before and after the emergence of the oil industry.
Lockhart's narrative is primarily built on his first-hand experiences as well as the
documents of the British oil company. The short chapter “Abadan: an industrial company
town,” which appears in Vincent F. Costello's Urbanization in the Middle East (1977), is
another example that draws primarily on the British Admiralty reports in 1945. Along the
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same lines, Xavier de Planhol and Laurence Elwell-Sutton's essay on Abadan, published
in Encyclopedia Iranica in 1982, concisely gives an account of the history of the city in the
medieval and petroleum eras. The essay, which is based on both sociological surveys as
well as statistical figures of the national census data, regards Abadan as an “exceptional
laboratory” for analyzing the contradictions caused by Iran's economic development and
industrialization. Predominately focusing on the second phase of Abadan's urban growth
in the 1960s, Elwell-Sutton and de Planhol discuss issues as diverse as economic activities,
demography, city quarters, urban organization, and social contrasts.
The patterns of urbanization in Abadan were analyzed from a regional perspective
in Ian Seccombe and Richard Lawless's Settlement Patterns and the Gulf Oil industry
(1987). Analyzing oil company towns across the Persian Gulf through the lens of urban
geography, Seccombe and Lawless show how the oil industry, particularly during its
construction phase, triggered a major restructuring across Khuzestan’s urban systems. The
authors also survey the spatial organization of different sections of the company town
through maps and images. Mark Crinson's article “Abadan: planning and architecture under
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company” (1997) and book chapter “Oil and architecture” (2003)
are the only studies that in some detail portray the spatial practices of the British oil
company in Abadan. Analyzing the city from the perspective of urban and architectural
history, Crinson has largely focused on the design of the Bawarda Township, the residential
quarter designed by James Mollison Wilson for Iranian staff to the south of Abadan town
in 1935, and has drawn connections between this project and city planning and architectural
practices in the colonial city of New Delhi under the celebrated British architect Edwin
Landseer Lutyens. Iranian journalist-lawyer-politician Abulfazl Lesani in his book Naft:
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Tala-yi Siya ya Bala-yi Iran (Oil: Black Gold or Curse of Iran) (1950) has dedicated a short
chapter, titled “Oil City of Abadan,” to describe the physical characteristics of different
quarters of the city. Recently, visual representation of Abadan has raised scholarly
attention. Mona Damluji's article “The Oil City in Focus” (2013) examines the
documentary film Persian Story sponsored by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in1953. The
film was shot during the last few months before the Company's staff left Abadan in October
1951 in light of the nationalization of the oil industry. Damluji demonstrates how this oil
propaganda product has implemented cinematic techniques, such as constructed montages
and a dynamic soundtrack, to combine selective fragments of urban landscape, portraying
Abadan as a space of modern everyday life in Iran.

Social History and Daily Life
Social history of oil company towns in Iran—with Abadan as their focal point — has been
the focus of recent scholarly endeavors. Kaveh Ehsani's classic piece “Social Engineering
and the Contradiction of Modernization in Khuzestan’s Company Towns” (2003) provides
critical insights into the dynamics of oil modernity experienced in Abadan as well as the
implications of what he terms “conflicted” modernity for social relations, urbanization, and
citizenship. Rasmus Christian Elling's recent book chapter “On Lines and Fences”, which
appears in Urban Violence in the Middle East (2015), brings to light a neglected case of
urban unrest that broke out in 1942 between Iranians and Indians from two neighboring
working-class quarters of Abadan. Elling's story provides an alternative labor history of
Abadan and challenges the Iranian leftist and nationalist accounts that render urban
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violence in terms of a binary confrontation between the British Oil Company and Iranian
oil workers.
Abadan has also been the topic of memoirs, fictional novels, and poetry. Manucher
Farmanfarmaian, Iranian aristocrat and senior engineer at Abadan refinery, in Blood and
Oil (1997) vividly describes the colonial character of Abadan in the 1940s represented by
its rigid socio-spatial divide. Of significance is his first-hand account of the living
conditions in Abadan's squatter settlement, Kaghazabad. Bryce Cameron's Under Sand,
Ice and Sea (1999) chronicles the memoirs of a Scottish Chemist working for the oil
company in Iran in the 1930s. Cameron provides interesting information on the
development of the oil industry as well as the lifestyle of European expatriates in Abadan
and Masjid-i-Sulaiman. Cameron's account not only casts light on the intra-group dynamics
of the British community, but also recounts the lived experience of a senior bachelor
employee in Abadan. In a similar vein, Anglo and Bungalow at Abadan (2012) narrates the
diaries of Iraj Valizadeh, a native of Abadan, and offers colorful accounts of everyday life
and social relations in the native quarter of the city in the 1940s and 1950s. Valizadeh's
stories unearth social, cultural, and economic life of an Iranian working class family in
terms of education, leisure, housing, and public health.
Yehouda Shenhav's “The Phenomenology of Colonialism and the Politics of
'Difference'“ (2002) analyzes the documents written in the 1940s by polish Jewish
emissaries, who under the pretense of “construction contractors” at the Abadan Refinery,
sought to persuade local Arab and Persian Jewish communities to immigrate to Palestine.
The paper is largely concerned with the politics of difference between European and
Middle Eastern Jews; however, it provides intriguing insights into various dimensions of
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refinery workers' everyday lives as well as the dynamics of social relations among different
grades. Zoya Pirzad's award-winning novel Things we Left Unsaid (2012) portrays the
quotidian life of a middle-class Iranian-Armenian family in the suburb of Bawarda. Pirzad's
fiction drills into the mental life of a “modern” Iranian housewife, narrating her
psychological reactions to Abadan's urban environment, hierarchical social relations, and
consumer culture. Pirzad also depicts the repercussions of oil modernity for social and
cultural life of the middle-class Iranian families in Abadan. Dylan Thomas's poetry “Shame
and Penicillin in Abadan” (1951), followed by his radio talk “Persian Oil” (1951), are the
literary products of the Welsh Poet's visit to Abadan in January 1951. Thomas was
commissioned to compose a script for an oil-film sponsored by the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company in response to the rising political tensions in Iran. The short poetry basically
serves as a love letter to his “Pearl;” however, it describes life in Abadan in an
impressionistic fashion. Employing animal imageries, Thomas portrays the relationship
between the bachelor's quarters and the bazaar as mediated by prostitution. In the second
piece, using a satirical language, Thomas depicts the life in Abadan town and bitterly
criticizes the prevalent poverty and inequality in the city.
1.4.2 Oil industry in Iran
The history of oil and the oil industry in Iran is tightly linked with the operations of the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company in the country. One of the early accounts of the activities of
the British oil company in Iran is Laurence Lockhart's “The Emergence of the AngloPersian Oil Company, 1901-1914,” which appears as a chapter in Charles Issawi's The
Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914 (1971). This concise history was followed by The
History of the British Petroleum Company triad of which Ronald W. Ferrier's Volume 1,
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The Developing Years, 1901-1932 (1982) and James Bamberg's Volume 2, The AngloIranian Years, 1928-1954 (1994) detail the company's activities in Iran. Both books deal
with a wide range of issues, such as the company's internal structure, management
strategies, and the vicissitudes of production in Iran and elsewhere in the face of local and
global challenges. Mustafa Fatih's Panjāh sāl naft-i Īrān (50 Years of Iranian Oil) (1956)
narrates the general economic history of the oil industry– albeit from the perspective of a
former senior Iranian employee. Fatih's account, filled with his own anecdotes as well as
company documents, seeks to provide a fair evaluation of company's policies and
operations in Iran. Abulfazl Lesani's Naft: Tala-yi Siya ya Bala-yi Iran (Oil: Black Gold or
Curse of Iran) (1950) portrays the Iranian side of the politics of oil. Representing a
nationalist perspective, Lesani's work offers a critique of the economic and political
activities of the oil company in Iran. Laurence Elwell-Sutton's Persian Oil (1955) is a
commentary on the social welfare and paternalistic policies of the A.I.O.C in Iran. Baking
up his argument by statistics and personal anecdotes, Elwell-Sutton shows company's
investment in social welfare was absolutely disproportionate to the sheer size of Iranian
employee. Elwell-Sutton also challenges the company's “civilizing missions” and
enumerates the racial-imperial policies that led to discriminatory measures against Iranian
staff.
As the discourse on the application of science to industry became pervasive in
political and academic milieus across the British Empire, the chairman of the AngloPersian Oil Company commissioned the secretary of the British Scientific Instrument
Research Association to measure the company's endeavors in Iran against “scientific
knowledge and methods.” John W. Williamson's In a Persian Oil Field (1927), which
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received the endorsement of the Earl of Balfour, was the outcome of this study. The book,
which turned out to be part of company's oil propaganda schemes in the late 1920s,
intended to outline the industrial, educational, and social “achievements” of the oil
development in Iran. A handful of visitors and travelers also have provided some
representation of the oil industry in Iran. The British “official” artist Donald Maxwell in A
Dweller in Mesopotamia (1921) visually and textually depicts the “Dantesque scenery” of
the Abadan refinery. Using multiple literary and biblical metaphors, Maxwell offers a
historicized imagery of oil and the practice of oil production in Abadan. Victoria SackvilleWest in Twelve Days (1928) presents a psychoanalytic account of the landscape of the oil
industry in Iran. Sackville-West delves into psychological reverberations of the practice of
drilling and the act of traversing from the countryside into Abadan— what Sackville-West
renders as the “hell of civilization.” Sackville-West is probably one of the first to
conceptualize the complexity of the relationship between oil and humanity as well as oil's
mythical characteristics, including its invisibility, its secrecy, and its mystery. While
praising the ingenuity behind the oil industry, Sackville-West laments that the landscape
of Bakhtiari land has been “violently” transfigured by “the enterprise of men from another
continent.” Moreover, she sheds light on a dual world caused by the oil industry in Abadan:
“the one weary, ignorant, and poor; the other energetic, scientific, and prosperous; but both
equally enslaved by the habit of their different modes of thought.”
The discovery of oil and the development of the oil industry in Iran have been
studied from various perspectives in recent scholarly works. For instance, Shahbaz
Shahnnavaz in Britain and South-West Persia, 1880-1914 (2005) touches upon the
dynamics of the early oil development in reference to British Imperial policies and
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economic strategies in the Khuzestan Province. Shahnnavaz argues that the opening of the
Karun River in 1888 followed by the development of the oil industry shifted the political
and economic gravity of the region from the northern part of Khuzestan Province towards
the south and the Persian Gulf. Arash Khazeni in Tribes and Empire on the Margins of
Nineteenth-Century Iran (2009) profiles the economic, social, cultural, and environmental
implications of the oil industry for the local communities, in particular Bakhtiari tribes.
Stephanie Cronin's “Popular Politics, the New State and the Birth of the Iranian Working
Class” (2010) details the early history of labor-capital confrontation in Abadan and other
oil company towns in southwest Iran. Taking the 1929 Abadan refinery strike as the focal
point of her discussion, Cronin meticulously analyzes the political, economic, and social
forces that helped shape the Iranian industrial proletariat in Abadan. Richard A. Steward's
Sunrise at Abadan (1988) recites the political history of Iranian oil industry on the eve of
WWII. Steward tells the story of the occupation of Iran by the Allied forces which led to
the deposition of Reza Shah and the accession of young Mohammad Reza Shah to the
throne. Abadan lies at the center of the story because, as Steward argues, the oil industry
at Abadan, being of great significance to the British economy, was threatened by the
alleged presence of Germans in Iran. The book also narrates the confrontation between
British Indian forces and Iranian army at Abadan.
The oil industry and practices of the British oil company in Iran have been the
subject of numerous Doctoral dissertations in different disciplines. Abdul-Hamid Azami
Zangueneh's Le pétrole en Perse (1933) and Mhammad Nakhai's Le petrole en Iran (1938)
analyze the economic dimensions of the oil industry in the context of national and global
politics prior to and after the 1933 concessionary agreement respectively. Khodad
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Farmanfarmaian's An analysis of the role of the oil industry in the economy of Iran (1955)
presents a quantitative appraisal of the oil industry under the British management.
Employing an econometric model, Farmanfarmaian stipulates that the oil industry to a large
degree was insulated from the Iranian economy; in other words, it didn't have much of
secondary and tertiary effects on the rest of the Iranian national economy. Neveen
Abdelrehim's Oil Nationalization and Managerial Disclosure (2010) analyzes the AngloIranian Oil Company's managerial policies towards its stock-holders as well as the Iranian
employees following the concessionary agreement of 1933. Abdelrehim asserts that the
A.I.O.C. was successful in maintaining the investors' confidence and in defending the
company from the Iranian claims when nationalization crisis had loomed. However, the
company failed to fulfill its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) obligations towards the
Iranian employees. Michael Edward Dobe's A long slow tutelage in western ways of work
(2008) critically examines the pedagogical and managerial policies of the A.I.O.C. and
ARAMCO, maintaining that in both cases the companies' policies were designed not only
to hamper the process of the localization of the industry, but also to prevent the native
employees from ascending through the companies' grading systems. Katayoun Shafiee's
Cracking Petroleum with Politics (2010) traces the socio-technical process that engaged in
the power struggle between the oil company and the Iranian government over the control
and distribution of oil between 1901 and 1954. Employing conceptual frameworks drawn
from science and technology studies and political economy, Shafiee seeks to determine the
mechanisms through which oil revenue affected the local and national politics in Iran and
changed the Iranian society on different levels.
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The political history of the Anglo-Persian oil conflict, 1951 nationalization of the
oil industry, and the ensuing 1953 American-and British-staged coup in Iran – with Abadan
lying at the heart of the turmoil– has also received considerable scholarly attention.
Laurence Lockhart's “The causes of the Anglo-Persian Oil Dispute” (1953) regards the
conflict as a “very complex” and “difficult affair.” Lockhart acknowledges that although
Iranians should have been compensated for certain hardships, they put themselves at
disadvantage by breaking the “sanctity” of contracts and by “refusing to go to arbitration.”
Norman Kemp's Abadan: A Firsthand Account of Persian oil Crisis (1953) is a portrayal
of the political quarrels in Abadan at the height of the Iranian oil dispute in 1951.
Embracing the British version of the story, the book obviously falls short of offering a
balanced account of the oil crisis. Mostafa Elm's Oil, Power, and Principle (1992) situates
the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute within the context of struggle for national independence and
sovereignty during the “twilight era” of British imperial power. Elm also discusses the
geopolitical aftermath of the coup, including the suppression of the Iranian nationalist
movement, reinstating the Shah, and the emergence of an American-dominated oil
consortium in Iran. Stephen Kinzer's All the Shah's Men (2003) recounts the story of 1953
coup from a journalist's perspective. Drawing primarily on American newspaper articles
and declassified reports of CIA, Kinzer strives to identify political forces that set the stage
for the overthrow of the Iranian nationalist government. Ervand Abrahamian's thorough
and well-researched work The Coup (2013) debunks the conventional wisdom about the
1953 coup. Abrahamian claims that Anglo-American interest in oil, rather than the
allegedly rising communist threats, was the real political motivations behind this political
rebellion.
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1.4.3 Oil literature
Oil Capitalism
Oil has long been a hot topic for scholars from economics, energy and environmental
studies, cultural geography, and political sciences. Several categories could be discerned
within the oil literature. A large group of scholarly works seeks to give an account of the
history of the oil industry in different parts of the world. For instance, Arnold Daum and
Harold Francis Williamson's classic books The American Petroleum Industry (1981) tell
the story of the emergence and evolution of American oil capitalism in the second half of
the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, the two periods the authors label
as age of illumination and age of energy respectively. Along the same lines, Thomas
Anthony Buchanan Corley's A History of the Burmah Oil Company, published in two
volumes, details the operations of the British oil company in Burma and also discusses the
company's technical contribution to the development of the oil industry in Iran. Ronald
Ferrier and James Bamberg's trilogy on The History of the British Petroleum Company
(1982, 1994, & 2000) narrates the development of the British firm in the twentieth century.
This genre of scholarly work culminates in Daniel Yergin's best-selling The Prize: The
Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (1991), which charts the evolution of the
international petroleum industry, on the one hand, and lays the groundwork for American
energy discourse on the other hand. Telling the story of the development of global oil
capitalism, this body of literature, as Timothy Mitchell notes, represents the “standard
history” of heroic pioneers discovering oil in remote locations and desolate territories and
of far-sighted statesmen on the eve of WWI acting to secure this strategic prize.22
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Revolving around the notions of “resource curse” and “petro-states,” a genre of
research emerged in the 1970s. This scholarship – of which Michael Ross’s book The Oil
Curse (2012) is an exemplary case – revolves around the notion of oil boom and the
corresponding economic and civic dysfunctions and human developmental failures of
dystopian oil-rich states. This corpus of literature addresses the “petro-state” question by
digging deep into the performance, governance, and politics of the national oil companies
that stand at the heart of the contemporary global oil and gas system. Another line of
inquiry– represented by Michael Klare’s 2011 book The Race for What’s Left– is mainly
focused on the global geo-politics of oil, employing a “Malthusian” logic of scarcity and
aggressive capitalist competition. This literature's main point is twofold: oil is finite and
“non-substitutable,” and industrial capitalism’s voracious desire for acquiring petroleum
resources has led to a frontier of violent accumulation operating together with “militarism”
and “empire”.23
There is another growing genre in the oil literature which straddles the “petro-state”
and the geo-politics of oil capitalism. This scholarship seeks to transcend the rentier-state
paradigm, offering a nuanced analysis of the mechanisms through which oil wealth affects
the economic development of the oil-producing countries and corrupts democratic forms
of politics. Examining the material development of oil, Robert Vitalis's America's Kingdom
(2006) demonstrates how the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) sustained its
exclusive control over the oil reserves in Saudi-Arabia not only by engaging in Saudi
Arabian nation-and frontier-building projects, but also by manipulating the political
relationship between the American and Saudi governments. Vitalis draws parallels
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between Aramco and A.I.O.C with respect to welfare policies--such as housing, wage
systems, and education, among others. Vitalis also casts light on the “panoply” of
institutional and legal mechanisms underpinning “white supremacy” that helped the
American company practice Jim Crow in oil company towns. Timothy Mitchell's Carbon
Democracy (2011) shows how oil in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
played a central role in both facilitating and frustrating democratic claims across the world,
and how transnational oil companies tried to control the establishment of the oil industry
in the Middle-East in order to monopolize petroleum production and distribution on the
one hand, and weaken democratic claims in Europe on the other hand. Toby Jones's Desert
Kingdom (2010) analyzes the role of oil in the project of Saudi nation-building from a novel
perspective. Combining environmental history, science and technology studies, and
political economy, Jones argues that oil wealth enabled the Saudi Kingdom to map, control,
and remake vital natural resources- most notably water and agriculture- thereby
consolidating its authoritarian political power over the Saudi populace. Jones also
documents people's political insurgency against unfair distribution of oil wealth as well as
sectarian discrimination in Saudi Arabia. Myrna I. Santiago's The ecology of oil (2006) also
examines oil development in the Gulf of Mexico through the lens of environmental history.
Santiago discusses the mechanisms through which oil capitalism transformed the oilproducing region's natural environment and social systems. These unsustainable changes,
as Santiago argues, were among the forces that led to political instability in Mexico and
ultimately to nationalization of the industry in 1938.
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Oil Culture
The interest in cultural and material aspects of oil emerged in the 1980's among humanistic
scholars. This body of scholarship, known as oil culture— dealing mainly with oil's
consumption side— analyzes, interprets, and explicates the material, mystical, historical,
geological, and agential presence of petroleum in culture.24 The proponents of this strand
of thought engage with oil as a cultural material. Oil, hence, is conceptualized as a force
not only in economic and political life, but also in everyday experience and aesthetics.25
To cultural analysts of petroleum, oil is ubiquitous, being central to virtually every aspect
of our lives; it also serves as a tangible driving force behind almost all the luxuries of
modern life, although it has been rendered by petro-capitalism as an abstract, infinite, and
“invisible” energy input. As Allan Stoekl suggests, writing the history of oil would enable
humanistic scholars to reify oil, make it visible, and bring to light the cultural dimensions
of oil capitalism. 26
The cultural dynamics of oil-boom development made up the first dominant theme
in this emerging literature, exemplified by Ryszard Kapuściński's evocative chapter in
Shah of Shahs (1982) which portrays the petro-mythologies flourishing during the golden
age of Iranian oil-boom. Building on Kapuściński's ground-breaking approach, scholars
began to examine promotional representations of the oil industry in America and
elsewhere. For instance, Brian Black's Petrolia: The Landscape of America's First Oil
Boom (2000) scrutinizes the “sublime” framework employed by the media to legitimize
the disastrous overproduction that swept the “flush field” in northwestern Pennsylvania.
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Fernando Coronil's The Magical State (1997) examines the ways in which stateadministered spectacles and promotional narratives helped secure popular allegiance to the
Venezuelan oil economy. In a similar fashion, Miguel Tinker Salas's The Enduring Legacy
(2009) highlights the role of oil companies and the emerging middle-class in projecting the
notions of corporate interest and oil development as symbols of nationalism as well as in
promoting the role of oil as the agent of modernization in Venezuela. Along the same lines,
several studies have examined the complex landscape of the oil boom in Nigeria of which
Andrew Apter's The Pan-African Nation: Oil and the Spectacle of Culture in Nigeria
(2008) and Michael Watt's essays on the cultural analysis of Nigeria's booming oil
economy of the 1970's are exemplars. Recently, a group of researchers have begun to
investigate the cultural practices underpinning the petroleum-based life styles in oilconsuming societies. For instance, Cotton Seiler's A Republic of Drivers (2009) or David
Gartman's “Three Ages of the Automobile: The Cultural Logics of the Car” (2004) are
exemplary cases.

Oil Urbanism
There is also a thin but growing sub-field within this scholarship which is focused on the
critical analysis of oil capitalism's spatial and symbolic forms. These studies mainly
examine the socio-spatial characteristics of oil company towns and the distinctive ways of
life that they forged. For instance, Miguel Tinker Salas's The Enduring Legacy (2009)
analyzes the manner in which oil camps in Venezuela functioned as social and cultural
laboratories implanting new models of work, social life, consumerism, leisure, and
citizenship. Salas also shows how the architecture of company towns was used as a tool to
reinforce social division along racial and occupational lines. Reem Alissa's dissertation
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Building for Oil (2012) examines the role of oil as the agent of political, social, and cultural
change at the level of everyday urban life in Kuwait. Alissa maintains that company town,
as a modern architectural and urban planning prototype, along with other actors, helped
nurture urban modernity in Kuwait. Like Salas, Alissa gives an account of planning and
Architectural practices of the British oil company—that mirrored both racist ideologies and
hierarchies of economic and political domination— and shows how socio-spatial
engineering provided new models of family and neighborhood life for the oil company's
Kuwaiti employees. Nelida Fuccaro's “Shaping the Urban Life of Oil in Bahrain” (2013)
offers a micro-level analysis of the social and cultural outcomes of Bahrain's oil boom.
Rendering oil company towns as “harbingers of new leisure and consumer culture,”
Fuccaro shows how the new forms of public communication — such as independent and
government-controlled press, cinema, as well as the oil propaganda practices— created
influential models of urban and suburban life shared by both expatriates and Bahraini
citizens. Farah al-Nakib's “Kuwait’s Modern Spectacle” (2013) sheds light on the
paradoxes of oil modernization in Kuwait between 1950 and the Iraqi invasion of 1990.
Al-Nakib analyzes the contradictions between ambitious state-run mega-urban projects and
the urban experience of everyday life in the capital city of Kuwait. Arbella Bet-Shlimon's
“The Politics and Ideology of Urban Development in Iraq’s Oil City” (2013) also analyzes
the effects of the political and social properties of oil on the trajectory of urban
development in Kirkuk before the 1958 revolution.
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1.4.4 Company Town
The concept of company town was a late nineteenth-century creation, first applied in the
United States to mining camps and smelters in Appalachia. As a by-product of
industrialization and capitalist expansion, company towns appeared between 1830 and
1930 during the early industrial age in Europe and North America.27 In the 1930s, Horace
Davis provided one of the first scholarly definitions of this entity as being a “community”
whose inhabitants are predominantly the employees of a single company, or a group of
companies, that also owns a substantial part of the real estate and houses.28 Company towns
were used as a way to make manufacturing or mineral extraction possible in isolated
regions or in places without easy access to established urban centers, and also as a means
to secure a stable labor force. In most cases, the company played a double role of employer
and landlord. In the former capacity, it hired, fired, and organized personnel for production.
As landlord, it created and managed the company town, controlled housing assignment,
provided medical and sanitary services, supplied water and energy, established company
stores, and in some cases even oversaw workers' leisure and social life. Specific
characteristics varied according to the dominant economic activity, the location of the
industry, the presence of private or state capital, the reliance on local or migrant labor, and
the relative autonomy of company towns from local and national authorities. Working
arrangements and spatial organizations followed the logic of maximizing production but
were also influenced by such factors as power relations, socio-occupational hierarchies,
and the ethnic, racial, and gender composition of the working population. As
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industrialization and capital investment expanded, company towns emerged in other parts
of the world where they often acted as pioneering “devices” in broader westernizing
efforts.29
The literature on company towns is very rich. The rise and decline of these
communities drew the attention of scholars as early as the 1960s. For instance, James Allen
in The Company Town in the American West (1966) provided economic and social histories
of two hundred company-owned towns in eleven states across the western region of the
United States. While making no generalizations about the image of these towns, Allen
stressed company paternalism, in particular the provision of housing and services to
laborers, as a significant characteristic shared by these settlements. Typology of company
towns accounts for another body of scholarship exemplified by the works of urban
geographer John Douglas Porteous. In “The Nature of the company town” (1970), for
instance, Porteous distinguishes between two types of company towns: extractive and
model. The former—used to open up previously unexploited territories— functioned as a
temporary pioneering device, especially suited to the nations undergoing rapid economic
development; whereas model company town was a means of uplifting and molding the
workers through socio-religious ideals or philanthropic desires of the employer. Porteus
also stipulates that extractive company towns are the product of economic pioneering,
while manufacturing towns are the outcome of socioeconomic forces. Providing a detailed
analysis of urban form and planning in his selected case-studies, Porteous sheds light on
the deliberate company policy of residential segregation along occupational classes.
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Socio-spatial organization and architectural characteristics of company towns
became the focus of another line of inquiry. In “Social Class in Atacama Company Towns”
(1974) Porteous delves into the mechanisms of social control in Chilean company towns.
Porteous maintains that American copper companies in the Chilean desert of Atacama,
inspired by company planning policies in Europe and the United States, reinforced labor
control through both physical and social features of company towns, including rigid ground
plan, architectural uniformity, the dominance of the townscape by company institutions,
and strong ethnic and class segregation. John S. Garner's edited book Company Town
(1992) is an anthology of studies on early-industrial-age company towns in west Europe,
Scandinavia, and Americas. John Garner himself provides a historical account of the
evolution of early company towns between 1830 and 1930, discussing issues as diverse as
typology, the characteristics of model company towns, paternalism, social engineering,
garden city prototypes, imagery practices, planning, and housing, among others. Margaret
Crawford's Building the Workingman's Paradise (1996) looks at the gradual development
of American company towns since the late eighteenth century through the lens of urban
and architectural history. Conceptualizing housing as the main bond between employer and
company workers, Crawford shows how the failure of Pullman model company town in
the late nineteenth century gave rise to the emergence of a “new” generation of company
towns designed and planned by architects and planners. Crawford also offers a detailed
analysis of the economic, social, and intellectual contexts within which “new” company
towns were built, discussing such issues as union organization, shifting interpretations of
paternalism and social reforms, and economic fluctuations.
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There is also emerging scholarship within company town literature that moves
beyond the formal analysis of these settlements, rendering them as contested spaces in
which diverse interests, contrasting ideas of community, and unequal power relations coexisted. For instance, Oliver J. Dinius and Angela Vergara's edited volume Company
Towns in the Americas (2011) encompasses a series of essays rethinking the manner in
which company towns were shaped. The studies compiled in this book discuss how social
ideology and economic rationale, as the main forces behind the creation of company towns,
were overshadowed by local culture and contextual variables, such as national politics and
social protest. The book also examines the mechanisms through which American
multinational corporations exported American ideals of work discipline, race, and gender
to Latin America. Marcelo J. Borges and Susana B. Torres's edited book Company Towns
(2012) is a collection of studies approaching the concept of company town from an
international and comparative perspective. The contributions of the book recognize the
common patterns of company towns across time and space, while stressing their adjustment
to specific historical, cultural, and political contexts.
1.4.5 British Imperial urbanism
The literature on architecture and urbanism in the context of the British Empire is pretty
rich. A strand of thought in this vast scholarship focuses on the relationship between the
process of colonialism and the resulting urban form in the “colonial cities” – or what is
known as colonial urbanism. This field of research which expanded in the last decades of
the twentieth century drew primarily on “dependency theory,” which portrayed the new
phases of imperialism, assuming that overseas economic expansion were crucial for the
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new phases of capitalism.30 This theory led to “dependent urbanism” school of thought,
which analyzed urban patterns in terms of a general process of resource exploitation and
emphasized the changing modes of production and accumulation of surplus. David Harvey,
the leading exponent of this movement, in Social Justice and the City (1973)
conceptualizes urbanism as a mirror that reflects different aspects of society.31 Building on
this system of thinking, Anthony King in Colonial Urban Development (1976) examines
the effects of three variables of British colonialism – culture, technology, and powerstructure – on urbanization and urban development. In King's view, colonial urban
development is the outcome of the interplay between urban form of an industrializing
western power and the urban fabric of a “pre-industrial” foreign society. The “colonial
city” is the urban area in the colonial society most typically characterized by the physical
segregation of its ethnic and socio-cultural groups. By urbanization, King alludes to the
“unplanned” or “organic” urban growth, a process “whereby the proportion of a given
population living in places, defined as urban, increases at the expense of those living in
non-urban areas.” King conceptualizes urban development as the more limited process of
“directed growth” of the existing or new urban centers. King in The Bungalow (1995)
examines one of the most complicated colonial artifacts in a global context. King maintains
that the diffusion of this housing type across the world is a reflection of the socio-spatial
division of labor within the system of colonial urban development. King stresses the
nebulous character of bungalow and its myriad forms and meanings which transcend
period, place, function, and even the realm of ideas.
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Robert K. Home in Of Planting and Planning (1997) explores some of the ideas
and policies applied to the creation of colonial towns and cities and their underlying
“power-knowledge relationships.” Home enumerates the three co-existing, yet competing,
ideological positions that exerted a continuing influence over the British colonial urban
landscape. The first principle was the desire for state control articulated through the
physical form of ports and towns, and the civic design language of baroque avenues,
esplanades, and public buildings. The second ideology was the implementation of capitalist
policies aiming to achieve the maximum accumulation of wealth from trade, extraction of
resources, and production. A third ideal was utopianism which included the
experimentation with urban form and social organizations that were less achievable at the
metropole. Home also discusses the political and colonial symbolism conveyed by colonial
building types. For instance, the clock tower signified the western time disciplines, or the
post office symbolized the world-wide network of communications that Empire helped to
foster. Home argues that colonial building regulations discriminated against vernacular
design solutions, such as Indian court yards and Chinese air wells, which had evolved over
time to address local climatic concerns. Rather, the British opted for bungalow designs
with plot ratios that prevented “over-development.” The bungalow was usually enveloped
by a veranda which functioned not only as a climatic regulator but also as a smooth
transitional space between interior and exterior. When located on the outside of the
dwelling rather than in a courtyard, veranda allowed for the surveillance of the surrounding
landscape, and therefore functioned as an important feature for planters and colonial
officials. Discriminatory zoning and racial segregation in the British colonial context
account for another sub-topic in this literature. For instance, A. J. Christopher's “Urban
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segregation levels in the British overseas Empire and its successors, in the twentieth
century” (1992) shows that the most severe examples of structural segregation were
exercised in South Africa, while in the tropics European populations were largely transitory
and structural segregation was only loosely enforced. Christopher stipulates that the
evolution of segregation in the British colonial city was complex, and rarely was there rigid
enforcement of legalized segregation.
The relationship between modernism and architectural practices across the British
Empire has also drawn the attention of urban and architectural historians. Mark Crinson,
for example, in Modern Architecture and the End of Empire (2003) shows that the
relationship between imperialism and modernism is far more complicated than has often
been assumed. Crinson maintains that architecture— as a mode of representation— works
as a cultural, economic, and spatial medium through which to apprehend the ideologically
constructed notion of empire. “Architecture of empire,” however, includes not only the
canonical imperial architecture in early twentieth-century London or the regionalist
architecture in New Delhi, but also other spatial practices in remote locations across the
empire. The image of empire, as Crinson explains, was mutable but everywhere it
appropriated the past in order to establish its hold on time; it also concealed empire's
transience, its dynamic of exploitation, and its contingent modes of control. Crinson'a
critical point is that the architectural and city planning features of New Delhi set standards
for urban and architectural practices across the empire by offering a coherent empirepervading style. Its urban form was a grandiose choreography of monuments expressing
the primacy of executive over representative power; residential layouts and locations
reflected hierarchical differences along socio-economic status, occupation, and race; routes
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like the main Raj path featured lavish traffic facilities, ceremonial axialities, and
monumental symmetries; Indian past was relegated to ornaments; and overall, the project
embraced a sense of garden city spaciousness. Crinson notes that the imperial impacts of
New Delhi can be traced across the empire in as widely disparate and distant examples as
the marrying of monuments and graded residences in the planning of Abadan.
There is also a growing literature examining the architecture and urbanism of British
colonial cities through the lens of post-colonial theories. For instance, Swati
Chattopadhyay's Representing Calcutta (2005) rethinks the constructed image of
modernity in colonial Calcutta by delving into British and Bengali portrayals of the city.
Along the same lines, William Glover's Making Lahore Modern (2007) investigates social
and material aspects of modernization in colonial-era Lahore. Glover demonstrates how
the material environments of everyday life were considered to be among the most important
“conditions” retaining “old forms of life,” and their systematic rebuilding was the focus of
a wide range of colonial efforts. Stephen Leg in Spaces of Colonialism (2007) investigates
urban structuring and governance of Delhi under the British Raj by employing a
Foucauldian framework.
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CHAPTER 2
LAND, OIL, AND EMPIRE: THE QUEST FOR THE OIL FRONTIER IN
SOUTHWEST IRAN
This chapter gives an account of the process of identification, delineation, and acquisition
of land for construction of the oil refinery on Abadan Island in 1908. It shows how the
project of land acquisition for the oil infrastructure unfolded against the backdrop of the
British imperial and commercial interests in the Persian Gulf and set in motion novel
political and power dynamics in Khuzestan Province in Southwest Iran. In particular, the
strategic alliance between the British Empire, the nascent oil enterprise, and the local
chieftain helped establish the foundations of the oil frontier in the region. I argue that oil
instituted a complex web of relations among British diplomatic and military agents, oilmen,
the local tribal leader, and the Iranian Government, which circumscribed the politics of
land acquisition. The oil company utilized the imperial intelligence and the British political
capital to acquire the most advantageous land under the most favorable terms; the project
of land acquisition enabled the British Empire to consolidate its power in Southwest Iran;
the local tribal chieftain used the project to advance its claim to the island; and, the land
transaction motivated the Iranian Government to get more actively involved in the
Khuzestan affairs.
2.1 Imperialism, State-Building, and the Oil Concession
Discovery and exploitation of oil in Southwest Iran in May 1908 marks the culmination of
foreign concessionary activities in Khuzestan Province which laid the groundwork for
several historical processes, including expansion of the British imperial networks,
extension of the Iranian Government’s centralization efforts, and integration of the region

37

into the global economy.32 On the eve of the discovery of oil, while the dynamics of the
Great Game—as the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia was termed—created a “semicolonial” situation in Iran,33 the British Empire had become the predominant imperial
power in south Iran.34 The Great Game ended, at least on paper, on August 31, 1907, when
Britain and Russia signed a secret accord on Afghanistan, Tibet, and Iran. With respect to
the latter state, the two imperial powers agreed to partition the country into three zones of
influence.35 According to this agreement, Northern provinces as far interior as Esfahan,
became the Russian territorial sphere. Southeastern provinces as far west as Bandar Abbas
on the Persian Gulf became Britain's zone of influence. Central Iran, including the
Southwestern province of Khuzestan, was regarded as the “Neutral” sphere, where no party
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was supposed to enjoy any predetermined rights. However, this region became a de facto
British sphere.36
Historically, the British Empire had political, commercial, and strategic stakes in
the Persian Gulf.37 Thanks to its strategic location on the high road to India, the Persian
Gulf earned an ever-increasing importance in the eyes of British policymakers in the course
of the nineteenth century and by the early twentieth century it had already become the
“British Lake.”38 Treaties of loyalty and cooperation were forcibly imposed on the
sheikhdoms along the southern littoral of the Gulf from Kuwait to Aden — turning them
into British protectorates.39 On the Turkish and Persian littorals of the Gulf, where the

36

Benoy Kumar Sarkar, “The Reshaping of the Middle East”, The Journal of Race Development 9, no. 4
(1919): 342.
37
The British presence in the Gulf dates back to the seventeenth century. Following the formation of the
East India Company in 1600 and the dispatch of the first English “mission” to Iran in 1615, British fleet
supported King Abbas I in expelling the Portuguese from the Hormuz Island in 1622. In return East India
Company was allowed to establish a trading post at the port town of Bandar Abbas. Later, the post was
transferred to Bushire (Bushehr) which eventually became the main British Residency in the Gulf from
1763 until 1947 when it was relocated to Bahrain on the other side of the Gulf. For a detailed historical
account of the British commercial and political interests in the Persian Gulf and southwest Iran from the
perspective of a British officer in the region, see John Gordon Lorimer, Vol I. Historical. Part IA & IB & Part
II (Calcutta: India Office Press, 1915)
38
By the early twentieth century, the necessity of maintaining a predominant influence across the Gulf
had become an axiom of the British imperial policy to such a degree that the establishment of a naval
base or a fortified station by any foreign power along the Gulf waterways was regarded as a “grave
menace to the British interest.” Los Angeles Herald in 1903 labeled this policy as the British Monroe
Doctrine. The British viewed the 200-by-500-mile sheet of water between Arabia and Iran as one of the
two major routes between India and Britain— the other being the Red Sea and via the Suez Canal. It is not
surprising that Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India (1899-1905), in his address to the House of Lords regarded
the Persian Gulf “as part of the maritime frontier of India.” Lord Curzon to the House of Lords, 22 March
1911. Digitized version of House of Lords Archives.
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1911/mar/22/persia-and-turkey-in-asia#column_588. For
more information see Los Angeles Herald 7 May 1903 — California Digital Newspaper Collection:
https://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/cdnc?a=d&d=LAH19030507.2.24 . For more on the British strategic, political,
and commercial interests in the region, see Arnold T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1928), preface; See also, Benoy Kumar Sarkar. “The Reshaping of the Middle East”. The Journal of Race
Development. 9, no. 4 (1919): 334
39
The status of the Arab Sheikhdoms was described by the British as being “in special treaty relations with
the British government”. This was a unique category fitting neither a colony nor a protectorate. For more
discussion on this form of administration, see Aileen Keating, Mirage: Power, Politics, and the Hidden
History of Arabian Oil (New York: Prometheus Books, 2005), 21-22

39

influence of respective governments was loose, Britain could manage to establish an
informal empire. Here, the flag-follows-trade formula was adopted. 40 Concessions and
commercial treaties opened up the region to the international trade and helped consolidate
the British influence in the “Neutral Zone.” 41
In 1901, Qajar king Mozaffar-al-Din Shah (1896-1907) granted a concession to
British capitalist William Knox D'Arcy to “search for and obtain, exploit, develop, render
suitable for trade, carry away and sell natural gas, petroleum, asphalt and ozokerite…for a
term of sixty years.”42 The concession covered most parts of Iran with the exception of the
five Northern provinces which fell into the Russia’s “Zone of Influence.” D'Arcy was also
granted the exclusive right to lay pipeline from oil wells to the Persian Gulf, establish
distribution depots, construct and maintain factories, and undertake all other works and
services necessary for the operation of the concession. D’Arcy was also required to
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establish a company and pay the Iranian Government ₤20,000 in cash and ₤20,000 in
stocks, in addition to an annual royalty equal to sixteen percent of the net profits of all
companies founded.43
To the Iranian Government, the practice of granting concessions was an economic
tool to overcome the chronic deficit and supplement tax revenues.44 Concessionary projects
also created an opportunity to extend the government’s influence in the outlying
provinces.45 Besides strengthening the British imperial domination, concessionary projects
were designed to establish and maintain control over natural environment and local
populations. Imperial powers and state-builders alike conceived of systematic production
and accumulation of knowledge about natural environment and local communities as a
precursor to the control of the political environment.46
The selection of Abadan Island as the ultimate site for construction of an oil refinery
in southwest Iran exemplifies the collaboration of science and imperial knowledge to
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dominate and remake nature and nomadic pastoral societies in Khuzestan. The following
chapter suggests that the oil enterprise utilized the corpus of knowledge on southwest Iran
compiled by diplomatic and military agents of the British Empire to identify and evaluate
alternative sites for the refining center. The imperial intelligence also shaped the ways in
which the oilmen manufactured, imagined, viewed, and used the natural environment and
people. The geographical and ethnographic information in conjunction with the scientific
and technical expertise pertaining to refining and production of oil helped establish a new
outpost on the global oil frontier. The imperial knowledge of Khuzestan Province was the
product of numerous reconnaissance and exploration missions conducted by British
diplomatic agents and military officers in south Iran and in the Persian Gulf. This body of
data took on various forms, such as maps, ethnographies, encyclopedic gazetteers, annual
and military reports, etc. The oil enterprise, as a wing of British imperialism, reciprocated
the favor within a couple of years. During WWI, for instance, the oil Company provided
the India Office with the maps and the “extensive knowledge” about the region that the
Company had accumulated during its activity in Khuzestan.47
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2.2 In Search of Land for Refinery: Potential Locations on the Iranian Littoral
On June 7th, 1908, only two weeks after the discovery of oil at Masjid-i-Sulaiman,48 George
Reynolds, the main geologist and the general manager of the Oil Concessions Syndicate,49
informed Captain Lorimer, the British Consul at Ahwaz, of the Syndicate’s plan for
acquisition of a piece of land in Southwest Iran to serve as a potential terminus for a
pipeline which was to be laid from the oil wells to the head of the Persian Gulf.50 This
correspondence was part of the routine communication between an official of the Oil
Syndicate and a British consular officer in Khuzestan. Since the beginning of operations in
1903 in the West of Iran, the oil enterprise always enjoyed the good offices of the British
consuls in the region in particular when there was a need to cut a deal or make agreements
with local chieftains. This particular correspondence, however, suggests that while the
search for oil was underway in southern foothills of the Zagros Mountains, the question of
the location of a seaboard loading or refining installation was under consideration by the
syndicate management in Glasgow. Such speculations gained momentum soon after oil
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was struck in marketable quantities in May 1908 and the need for its transport to the high
seas became a business imperative.
At first, a scheme was proposed to build reservoirs in Iran, somewhere near the
head of the Persian Gulf, and put up a refinery either in India or in Britain. The port cities
of Bombay (present-day Mumbai) and Karachi on the western coast of the Indian
subcontinent were regarded as potential locations for a refinery. Bombay and Karachi were
more favorable than Southwest Iran because they were located within the British dominion.
To some British agents, Iran was viewed as a foreign sovereignty with potential hostility
to British interests.51 Also, within British political and commercial circles, Iran was
portrayed as a disturbed country with no efficient administration.52 Karachi was deemed
desirable due to availability of cheaper labor and sound industrial infrastructure. The
advantage of Karachi over Bombay was its proximity to the profitable markets of Northern
India. These early schemes proved uneconomical for several reasons. The Government of
India had levied a duty tax on import of crude oil to India to protect the Burmah Oil
Company—then the only British oil firm— against other global suppliers of petroleum, in
particular Standard Oil Company, in the Indian market. Moreover, transportation of crude
oil from the head of the Persian Gulf to the Indian subcontinent was costly. Finally, the Oil
Syndicate as an infant industry had not yet built enough credit to secure the government
bonds required for building a refinery in India.53
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For practical reasons, the syndicate management began to search for potential sites
within the Iranian territory. Archival records suggest that at least three areas at the northern
head of the Persian Gulf were selected as potential “export bases” for Persian oil. These
areas are illustrated in Figure 2.2. As I will discuss in what follows, in the process of
identification of the three locations, the oil enterprise drew on the imperial intelligence
about Southwest Iran, consciously aligned its interests with the British Government, and
contributed to the fulfillment of the British imperial objectives in the region.54

Figure 2.1 Approximate demarcation of Khuzestan Province in the early twentieth
century.
Source: Skeleton Map of Persia, May 1913 [9r] (2/4), British Library: India Office Records and Private
Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/379, f 9, in Qatar Digital Library
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Figure 2.2 Three potential locations on the Persian Gulf proposed for the refinery.
A) Bandar Dilam, B) Khor Musa, C) Khorramshahr District.
Source: “GENERAL OUTLINE MAP OF THE PERSIAN GULF”, 1903. British Library: India Office
Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/20/64, f 55, in Qatar Digital Library

2.2.1 Bandar Dilam
One of the potential areas pinpointed for building a refinery was Bandar Dilam, a small
port of the wheat-growing district of Behbahan (Circle A in Figure 2.2). It was some eighty
five miles northwest of the port town of Bushire and around a similar distance east of the
mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab.55 Located in the administrative province of the Gulf Ports,
Bandar Dilam offered the shortest caravan route from the Persian Gulf to Isfahan and other
destinations in the Iranian plateau.56 It used to be a thriving trading port in the eighteenth
century which had gradually lost its historical prominence in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. One of the main merits of Bandar Dilam was its navigability. It was
55
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the first point on the constantly changing sand banks of the Persian littoral to the east of
the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab River to be navigable by large vessels.57 However, its
anchorage was located three miles off shore.58 This would have posed practical challenges
to landing of heavy machinery and pipeline material as well as loading of petroleum
products. Moreover, Bandar Dilam was connected to the Indo-European telegraph
network.59 Large tracts of state-owned land were available for acquisition. Per Article 3 of
the D’Arcy Oil Concession, the concessionaire was entitled to uncultivated state land free
of charge to use for production of oil. A hypothetical trajectory of pipeline between the oil
wells and Bandar Dilam would traverse the oil belt

60

in South Iran covered by the Oil

Concession. The pipeline would also pass through the area known for its natural oil springs
which could make it easy for future exploratory operations. However, Bandar Dilam was
surrounded by swampy tracts of land which were regarded as a technical impediment to
pipe-laying work. Moreover, due to the lack of enough intelligence, the security and
maintenance of the oil infrastructure in certain southern precincts were not guaranteed.61
To make a sound assessment of the potentialities of the area, the Oil Syndicate
solicited assistance from the British Government. With a view to collecting first-hand
information and surveying the region in terms of the requirements of the Syndicate,
Lieutenant Arnold T. Wilson, the British military officer commanding the Ahwaz Oil
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Guards,62 was dispatched to the neighborhood.63 The data collected by Lieutenant Wilson
during his field visit helped the Oil Syndicate arrive at a better understanding of the
environmental and social characteristics of Bandar Dilam. Lieutenant Wilson was later
commissioned to expand his survey throughout the southern districts of Khuzestan and
develop intimate relations with local tribal leaders. He also prepared maps, reports, and
confidential memoranda about the region’s geography, tribal societies, economy, and
politics. Not only did such geographic, military, and political undertakings serve the
interests of the British government to control nature and nomadic tribal communities, they
benefited the oil company, as well. The only existing map of the region in 1909 was one
of the products of the British Officer’s exploratory endeavors.64

2.2.2 Khor (Hor) Musa
A second location proposed for oil tankage and refinery was Khor (Hor) Musa,65 a deep
channel in the mudflats at the head of the Persian Gulf some sixty miles to the west of
Bandar Dilam (Circle B in Figure 2.2).66 Located in the southern section of Khuzestan
Province, the inlet was comprised of two main branches. As Figure 2.2 illustrates, the
eastern channel would extend for seventeen miles then divide into two smaller khors, each
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leading to one village. The western branch, which was navigable by local boats, would
extend inland for some fifty miles to a point close to the course of the Karun River.67 Khor
Musa had a navigable stream of twenty-five miles which provided ample room for large
vessels on its banks. The only impediment to movement of oceangoing vessels and oil
tankers was a shoal, one and a half miles in length, which carried only three fathoms (18
feet) of low water. Similar to Bandar Dilam, the land surrounding Khor Musa was quite
marshy. This shortcoming coupled with the scarcity of fresh water supplies, an important
requirement for the refining of oil, presented technical and engineering challenges.68
Despite its functional merits — i.e. shipping advantages and good pipeline connections to
the oil fields— inland transport from the Khor to the oil wells seemed complicated and
costly.69
The selection of Khor Musa as a potential location for the prospective refinery is
also indicative of the Oil Syndicate’s attempt to link the oil infrastructure and the new oil
frontier with the British imperial interests in the region. Khor Musa rose to prominence in
the early twentieth century when it turned into a key element of the British defense scheme
against Russia's expansionist policy towards the warm waters of the Persian Gulf— which,
as mentioned earlier, the British Empire was trying to keep exclusively as the “British
Lake.”70 In 1904 when the Karun Irrigation Scheme was under consideration in Tehran,
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which threatened the hegemony of the British Empire in the region, Lord Curzon, then the
Viceroy of India, suggested that Khor Musa should be opened up for navigation to the
plains of Khuzestan as a compensation for any British commercial loss in the Karun area.71
The Khor took on new significance in 1906 when it was considered a potential terminus
for different railroad projects envisioned by the competing imperial interests. For instance,
the Khor was regarded as an alternative station at the head of the Persian Gulf for a German
imperial artery, the Baghdad Railway.72 In response to this scheme, the Persian Railway
Syndicate,73 a British firm, in 1911 developed a plan to build a railroad between
Khorramshahr and Khor Musa, as part of a larger trans-Iranian railway project.74
None of these imperial projects had materialized in 1908 when the Oil Syndicate
began to examine the potentialities of the channel. However, there is no doubt that the
management was fully aware of the strategic, commercial, and military significance of the
Khor for the British imperial policy in the region. In 1912, the British Government formally
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secured the right of first refusal to lease all the foreshore lands in the vicinity of the Khor
and its distributaries.75 In the early 1920s, when it became evident that the oil company
should independently incur the exorbitant expenditure for dredging the Shatt to facilitate
ocean tanker transport, once again Khor Musa was regarded as a potential site not only for
the construction of an ocean port for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company but also as a naval
base for the British Admiralty in the Persian Gulf.76 In 1938 roughly forty miles upstream
the eastern branch of Khor Musa the port town of Bandar Shapur was laid out which served
as the southernmost terminus for the Trans-Iranian Railway— the world’s largest
infrastructural project in the interwar decades.

Figure 2.3 Map of Khorramshahr (Muhammareh, a.k.a Mohammerah) and its
surroundings. As the map shows, no uncultivated land was available on the
Khorramshahr foreshore that could meet the requirements for the refinery, 1912.
Source: British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/60 (vii), in Qatar Digital
Library
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2.2.3 Khorramshahr (Mohammerah) District
A third alternative was the Khorramshahr district in Southern Khuzestan (circle C in Figure
2.2). Khorramshahr (then called Mohammerah or Muhammareh), located at the junction of
the Shatt-al-Arab and the Karun River (See Figure 2.3), was a desirable location for a
refinery since it possessed all the characteristics that the oilmen were seeking. It was a
well-connected port town in Southwest Iran and second only to Basra in trade in the Shattal-Arab region.77 By various accounts, Khorramshahr along with Bushire and Basra were
the principal ports on the Persian Gulf through which trade would enter Iran.78
Khorramshahr was navigable by large vessels and was connected to the Indo-European
telegraph line. Post and telegraph services were also available. Abundant supplies of fresh
water could be obtained from the adjoining rivers. Khorramshahr grew in size and
importance in light of the opening up of the Karun to international trade in 1888. Gradually,
merchants from Khuzestan’s major cities – Shushtar and Dizful– and European businesses
opened offices in Khorramshahr.79 The population of the town also increased from 3000 in
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1882 to around 10,000 in 1908.80 A few miles above the town was the headquarters of the
local Arab chieftain (Sheikh Khaz'al Khan, also known as Sheikh of Khorramshahr), who
was the de facto ruler of Southern Khuzestan and on good terms with the British Empire.81
Iranian Government agencies, such as the Customs and Karguzari (Foreign Office
Agency), also operated in Khorramshahr.
Like Khor Musa, Khorramshahr had occupied a strategic position in the British
imperial policy towards Southwest Iran. In the late nineteenth century Khorramshahr was
viewed as a port town with potential to turn into the emporium of trade between Armenia,
Arabia, Iran, and India.82 In the early twentieth century, the district of Khorramshahr was
characterized as a de facto British protectorate and a dependency of England like
Hyderabad, Egypt and Tibet.83 Before the Great War, the Government of India was
considering making use of Khorramshahr as a potential “naval station” for the British
Empire in the Persian Gulf.84 A British consulate was operating in the town, one of the two
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British diplomatic offices in Khuzestan. On the eve of discovery of oil, Khorramshahr was
home to the largest community of Europeans in the Persian Gulf, with several European
firms, such as the Lynch Brothers and the Imperial Bank of Persia, having offices in town.
Despite all the merits, no uncultivated land was available on the Khorramshahr foreshore.
As Figure 2.3 shows, a continuous strip of date gardens and villages had occupied the banks
of the Shatt and the Karun River between the Turco-Iranian border and the town.

2.3 Abadan Island
The failure to identify appropriate land with enough river frontage in Khorramshahr made
the Oil Syndicate look for other potential sites in the district. Eyes turned to a mudflat
island across the Karun River from Khorramshahr. The alluvial Island of 'Abbadan,85
locally known as Jazirat-al-Khidhar (Khidhr Island),86 had all the prime advantages of a
refining center. It was located some 138 miles to the southwest of the oil fields area and
lay in a south-easterly direction on the border of Qajar Iran and Turkish Arabia— Presentday Iraq— which in 1908 was part of the Ottoman Empire.87 As the schematic map in
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Figure 2.4 illustrates, Abadan was surrounded by the region's major transportation routes:
the Karun River on the north, the Shatt-al-Arab on the west, and the Bahmanshir (also
known as Bahmishir) River on its east. The Persian Gulf marked the Island’s southern
edge.88 Therefore, it was possible to transport petroleum products from Abadan to the
inland markets in Iran and the Asiatic Turkey via the adjoining rivers, and to the regional
and global markets via the Persian Gulf.89
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Figure 2.4 Schematic map of Abadan Island, 1897.
Source: THE SHAT-AL-'ARAB [123r] (1/2), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers,
IOR/L/PS/10/266, f 123, in Qatar Digital Library

2.3.1 Abadan’s Environment and Society on the Eve of Oil Development
Abadan was located in the delta of the lowland portion of the basin of the ancient Asiatic
rivers— the Euphrates, Tigris, and Karun— where the great Mesopotamian plain met the
Persian Gulf.90 Geo-historical accounts suggest that the island was originally a spit
separating the waters of the Karun and the Bahmanshir from those of the Tigris. The
continuous deposit of silt by the rivers on the shallow floor of the upper portion of the
Persian Gulf gradually extended this spit south-eastwards. Simultaneously, the land on the
west bank of the Tigris was thrust forward in the same direction causing the Euphrates to
join the Tigris and form the Shatt-al-Arab. After the first settlements began to emerge on
the island around the eighth century a channel known as Haffar (digger) was dredged at its
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north-western corner, connecting the Shatt-al-Arab with the Karun — as a result of this
process the spit turned into an island.91
The northern part of the island was one of the nearest points to the oil fields where
deep water made it possible for ocean-going tankers to cruise the Shatt-al-Arab.92 The only
impediment to navigation was the infamous bar at the mouth of the Shatt in the Persian
Gulf that blocked the passage of steamers drawing over eighteen feet. Such ships upon
arrival had to lighter part of their cargo outside the bar and reload after passing the bar.
However, there existed two prevailing gales in the locality causing variation not only in
the temperature, but also in the Shatt's water level. “Shamal,” a north-westerly wind, would
blow the water out, while the southerly wind would drive it into the Shatt. The latter wind
would even enable steamers up to twenty-two feet to pass the bar and navigate the Shatt.93
Although the island contained large tracts of uncultivated land with broad frontage
to the adjoining rivers, it was not a desolate “Desert Island,” as a historian of the AngloPersian Oil Company characterized it.94 Such a distorted account of Abadan’s natural
environment, which perfectly fit into the discourse of “civilizing mission” propagated by
the Company and the agents of the British Empire, represents a conscious attempt on the
part of the Company to reconstruct the natural environment of Abadan prior to oil
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development. Archival documents suggest that at the turn of the twentieth century the date
industry was booming on the Island with more areas coming under cultivation each year.95

Figure 2.5 Settlement layout and patterns of date plantations in the northern section of
Abadan Island, 1909. Dashed lines represent the boundaries of the existing date gardens.
Source: British National Archives FO 925/41221

On the eve of discovery of oil, Abadan Island, as shows in the maps prepared by
British diplomatic agents in the region, was fringed with stretches of date palm plantations.
At least 55 agricultural settlements and villages were recorded to have existed on the
island.96 Abadan was part of the date-producing region, known as palm belt, which
stretched along both banks of the Shatt-al-Arab and its main distributaries. Date was the
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main article of export and food staple in the region. Date cultivation was also a major
agricultural activity in the Persian Gulf region.97 The edge of the island on all sides was
intersected by numerous creeks which were used as the principal means of irrigation as
well as a mechanism of tidal control. While the center of the island was mostly
uncultivated, the margins adjoining the rivers were covered with palm dates. Depending
on the quality of soil and depth of water currents, the extent of cultivation and the density
of gardens varied across the island.98 As Figure 2.5 shows, continuous stretches of
plantations with varying depths marked the Bahmanshir bank of the Island. On the Shattal-Arab bank, however, date groves were in patches — though date planting was in
progress.99
Based on the existing historical documents, we can estimate that in 1908-1909
Abadan Island had a floating population between 12,000 and 24,000.100 The fluctuation of
population could be attributed to several factors, such as the movement of nomadic
communities and the seasonal nature of date agriculture, among others.101 The majority of
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inhabitants of Abadan, like other districts of Southern Khuzestan, were from the region’s
major Arab tribes, the Muhaisin and the ka'ab.102 In addition, small communities of
Persians, Bahrainis, Africans, Baluchis, mixed Arabs and Idans (immigrants from the
Ottoman side of the Shatt) resided on the island.103
Abadan Island was a borough of the district of Khorramshahr, which was the seat
of the semi-autonomous tribal administration of Southern Khuzestan. In general, tribal
communities on the peripheries of major provincial cities and towns enjoyed a considerable
degree of autonomy from the Qajar Government.104 Abadan Island was administered under
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a feudal system. It was divided into four executive units, of which the most populous
village functioned as the headquarters for a local sheikh, or headman, acting as a
representative of the Sheikh of Khorramshahr. Headmen of the villages were mostly
Saiyids (descendants of Prophet Mohammed).105
2.3.2 Alternative Sites
In spring 1908, Andrew Campbell, General Manager of the Burmah Oil Refinery near
Rangoon, was dispatched to Khorramshahr to survey Abadan Island and choose an
appropriate location for a refinery. Not only did Campbell thoroughly examined the island,
he also drew extensively on the local information about the environmental characteristics
of Abadan. Campbell also supplemented his analysis with the British intelligence material.
For instance, he used the Admiralty map to evaluate the navigability of the rivers
surrounding the island. Combining this information with the technical-functional
requirements of a petroleum refining plant, Campbell identified two sites on the western
shore of Abadan, which, he believed, were “excellent” locations for construction of a
refinery (Sites A and B in Figure 2.6). Campbell also suggested that the land required for
refinery should be larger than 500 acres with a river frontage of at least 1500 yards.106
Despite offering water with less impurities and cooler temperature— the factors that played
a major role in the refining process of the day107— the Bahmanshir River, in Campbell’s
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view, was “too shallow and narrow for navigation.”108 The undulating river was navigable
by vessels of seven-foot draught for only thirty miles upstream from the Persian Gulf and
then for the rest of its course was “clogged” by sandbanks which prohibited the movement
of any craft larger than local “sea-going” boats.109
Campbell's first pick, shown as Site A in Figure 2.6, was in the southern part of the
island, right below the anchorage point, shown as “Chellabi Point” on the Admiralty Chart.
Site A, as Campbell described it, was some twenty miles “inside the bar” at the mouth of
the Shatt and fifteen miles above the Fao telegraph station. Campbell's second alternative,
Site B in Figure 2.6, was located in the northern section of Abadan, twenty-nine miles
above the Fao telegraph station and approximately eleven miles below Khorramshahr. Both
sites were in “barren,” uncultivated areas where no major villages or date groves existed.
Therefore, the question of compensation for the loss of date trees was eliminated. The
proposed sites were also accessible by “safe draught,” eighteen-foot steamers. Owing to its
proximity to the Persian Gulf and the Fao telegraph station, which meant good connectivity
to London and India through the Indo-European Telegraph Line as well as easier maritime
communication with India, Campbell favored Site A over Site B.110
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Figure 2.6 Three alternative sites proposed for the refinery.
Source: 'THE SHAT-AL-'ARAB' [123r] (1/2), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers,
IOR/L/PS/10/266, f 123, in Qatar Digital Library)

The selection of the most advantageous site triggered a series of correspondence
among Syndicate officials and British diplomatic and military agents. George Reynolds,
the Syndicate General Manager, and Lieutenant Arnold Wilson, the British military officer,
both with intimate knowledge of the locality, had good reasons to disagree with Campbell.
They both dismissed the southern site on various grounds. Reynolds and Wilson
maintained that the refinery should not be positioned far from Khorramshahr. Proximity to
the commercial and political center of Southern Khuzestan, in their view, meant better
security and easier access to services, amenities, and “daily requisites” for future
employees.111 Furthermore, the northern site, being eleven miles by river and seven miles
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by land from Khorramshahr, provided a better communication with the newly established
headquarters of Strick, Scott & Co., the Managing Agents of the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company.112 Reynolds believed that proximity to the Fao telegraph station, one of the
merits of the southern site as cited by Campbell, would be of no use to the future refinery.113
This opinion was perhaps due to the requirements of the Ottoman Telegraph Regulations
that prohibited transmission of coded messages at the Fao telegraph station.114
A set of empirical information collected by Lieutenant Arnold Wilson and other
military officers rendered Site A unfit for a refinery. For instance, the sharp bend of the
course of the Shatt-al-Arab near the southern site, coupled with strong water currents
during flood seasons, was believed to endanger the safe berthing of ships.115 The southern
site was also prone to frequent flooding. It was located below the area locally known as
Tingah (strait) where the width of the island reduced to less than two miles. This part of
Abadan was so low-lying that it was often up to one foot under water during high-tide
months.116 Furthermore, owing to such factors as low elevation, proximity to the Persian
Gulf, and frequent floods, the soil below the Tingah area, where the southern alternative
site was located, was saline. The high amounts of salt in the soil was considered a negative

112

Laurence Lockhart, “Memo,” 12th June 1927, , Abadan Refinery, Historical Notes. BP Archives, ArcRef
71439. Strick, Scott & Co. served as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s Managing Agency in Iran until
January 1st, 1923, when T.L Jacks and Arnold Wilson replaced them. H. E. Nichols to Arnold T. Wilson.,
November 30th, 1922. Anglo-Persian Oil Company Limited: Confidential letter Book, No.1, BP Archive
ArcRef 54496, P.456
113
George Reynolds to The Concessions Syndicate Ltd, 25th January 1909, BP Archives, ArcRef 177165,
“Letterbook: GB Reynolds in Persia to The Concessions Syndicate Ltd in Glasgow”, p.53
114
George Reynolds to the Concessions Syndicate Ltd, 8th April 1909, BP Archives, ArcRef 177165,
“Letterbook: GB Reynolds in Persia to The Concessions Syndicate Ltd in Glasgow”, p.241
115
Laurence Lockhart, Memo, 12th June 1927, BP Archives, ArcRef 71439, “Abadan Refinery, Historical
Notes”
116
High tides reached 10 feet in spring between May and October.

64

factor for construction and foundation work.117 In contrast, the northern site was more
elevated and less likely than the southern site to be flooded. Moreover, Abadan was less
than two miles wide at the northern site which made it possible to access the Bahmanshir
River as the potential source of water supply.
The two alternative sites offered contrasting scenarios for the trajectory of a
pipeline. If a refinery were to be erected on Site A, a hypothetical pipeline, laid in a direct
line from the oil wells, needed to traverse impassable marshes and floodplains of Southern
Khuzestan. While the pipeline had to pass five natural obstacles to approach Site A, there
was only one major barrier, the Bahmanshir River, to reach Site B.118 Moreover, placing
the refinery in close proximity to the Karun River, the major transportation route in
Southwest Iran in 1908 and, undoubtedly, the most economical path to carry pipeline
material from the head of the Persian Gulf to the oil fields, meant economizing on
construction and patrol of the pipeline. In other words, the farther the location of the
refinery from the Karun River, the higher the costs of transport of material and laying the
pipeline. The same economic logic guided the path of the pipeline when it was actually
built in 1911. As Figure 2.7 illustrates, the trajectory of the pipeline in the areas where the
natural terrains permitted was close to the course of the Karun River. After traversing two
ranges of hills119 and entering the flat lands of Southern Khuzestan, the pipeline ran parallel
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to the Karun River and remained close to the course of river before crossing the
Bahmanshir.120

Figure 2.7 The southernmost segment of the oil pipeline. Represented by the dashed line
in the map, the pipeline remained very close to the course of the Karun River in the areas
where natural terrains permitted.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 67573D

A third alternative was proposed by the British Consul-General at Khorramshahr.
This location, Site C in Figure 2.6, was located off Abadan Island in the area known as
Manikh near the junction of the Karun and Bahmanshir rivers. Site C was only one mile
away from Khorramshahr and offered several advantages. For instance, it was located on
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the track of steamers running on the Karun River, owned and operated by the British firm
Lynch Brothers. It was cooler than Abadan and its proximity to Khorramshahr was
obviously advantageous to the Company. Building a refinery at Manikh would have saved
costs on more than eight miles of pipeline and a great deal of transport and carting. It could
also have eliminated the tortuous task of laying a pipe across the Bahmanshir River.121
Manikh, however, was omitted from the list of alternatives after a survey by a British
military officer proved it unfit for a refinery. Sounding measurements off the site revealed
that this very location was not fully navigable for ocean tankers and steamers. Furthermore,
very strong eddies were spotted near the site in the Karun River which, the officer believed,
would interfere with handling and berthing of ships.122
Taken all factors together, site B offered competitive advantages over other
alternatives. Its ground was relatively flat, yet the risk of inundation in its proximity was
miniscule. It was endowed with deep water and located near Khorramshahr port town.
Furthermore, it was a natural location for a refinery considering the most efficient and costeffective trajectory of the pipeline.123 As a historian of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company
once noted, locating a thoroughly suitable area in the “flat swampy district” was a very
difficult task. Although site B was not an ideal place it was the best possible
“compromise.”124
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2.4 Land Acquisition Project
2.4.1 Delineation of the Site
Acquisition of land for refinery faced three major challenges: delineation of the site,
determination of the amount of land required, and identification of the “tenure of
purchase.”125 Following a pattern established two centuries earlier by the East India
Company, the oil enterprise decided to obtain land in Southwest Iran for the purpose of
extraction, transport, refining, storage, and export of oil.126 The Syndicate Works Manager
in February 1909 roughly delineated the boundary of the required land. Preparing a rough
sketch, shown in Figure 2.8, Reynolds selected one square mile piece of land between the
Braim and Bawarda villages. Avoiding nearby “cultivation and dwellings,” the site, as the
Woks Manager described it, stretched from the Shatt-al-Arab on the west to the
Bahmanshir River on its east.127
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Figure 2.8 Approximate tracing of the required land for the refinery drawn by the
Syndicate Works Manager.
Source: British Library, India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/143/1

Braim was the eleventh largest village on the western shore of the Island
downstream from the confluence of the Karun River and the Shatt-al-Arab. Villages on the
western shore of the island were on average two miles apart. Braim consisted of 50 mud
houses. The inhabitants of the village were from the Thawamir sub-division of the Ka'ab
Tribe. Bawarda (Bawairdeh) was located two miles below Braim. It was comprised of 20
mud huts and was home to Arab tribesmen from Al Bu Ma'arrif sub-division of the
Muhaisin Tribe. To avoid suspicions of the local authorities — which the Oil Syndicate
hoped would help them in the course of land negotiations — Reynolds never visited
Abadan in person. As a result, his conception of the position of the site and its surroundings
was far from reality. By superimposing a hypothetical, one-square-mile rectangle on the
map of Abadan Island, taken from the 1909 plane table surveys prepared by Lieutenant
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Arnold Wilson, we can visualize the position of the proposed site vis-à-vis the adjacent
agricultural communities. Figure 2.9 shows that the selected site could not easily stretch
from the Shatt to the Bahmanshir River, since the bank of the Bahmanshir was covered
with villages and date gardens. Moreover, the land between Braim and Bawarda was filled
with three agricultural settlements and date groves, which all were missing in Reynolds’
account of the site. As Figure 2.9 illustrates, the only location with no date groves that
offered one-mile river frontage was the area named Duwah lying between the two
agricultural settlements identified as Mullah Ghanam and Arusiyeh. Mullah Ghanam was
an agricultural estate owned by a local landlord. However, no historical records could be
found on Duwah. It could be inferred from the map that Duwah was a small hamlet
consisting of a few huts. Arusiyeh was also an agricultural settlement two miles south of
Braim.128 Based on the reconstructed map, it can be estimated that the site selected for the
refinery was half a mile below Braim, 150 yards below Mulla Ghanam, and half a mile
above Arusiyeh.129
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Figure 2.9 Reconstructed map of the proposed site for the refinery and the trajectory of
the oil pipeline. As the map shows, the one-square-mile site was placed on a hamlet
known as Duwah which is completely missing from the official account of the land
acquisition.
Source: “Sheet No. 1, Map of Shatt-Al-Arab and Bahmanshir”, 1909, FO 925/41221

2.4.2 Assessment of Land Value
The obstacles facing the Oil Syndicate regarding land acquisition in Abadan were twofold.
First, the ground was under the control of the Sheikh of Khorramshahr. Under the 1903
royal decree (farman), the ownership of Abadan Island along with large swaths of land in
the Khorramshahr and Karun districts were granted to the Sheikh on behalf of Arab
tribesmen, making him the de facto owner of the whole of Southern Khuzestan. The royal
mandate, nevertheless, prohibited the sale or transfer the ownership of land to foreign
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subjects.130 Moreover, local landlords were prohibited from selling or leasing their land
without the Sheikh’s sanction.131
The second impediment to land acquisition on Abadan Island was to make
assessment of the market value of properties, especially in the northern section of the
island.132 Once again, the oilmen relied on British imperial intelligence to solve the
problem. Confidential enquiries were made from the British Consul at Basra to get an
estimate of the market value of land on the Ottoman side of the Shatt-al-Arab. It turned out
that, on the western bank of the Shatt, price of land varied between ₤60 and ₤120 per jareeb
(acre),133 depending on the proximity to Basra and the cultivability of land — whether the
land was fully reclaimed, partially reclaimed, or complete waste land (good for cereal
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cultivation but not for date palm).134 However, the political situation on the Iranian side of
the Shatt was quite different. Historically, property law in Qajar Iran deprived foreigners
of owning land.135 As mentioned earlier, the 1903 royal decree also prohibited the Sheikh
and local landlords from selling land to foreign subjects. While land purchase was out of
the question, leasing remained the only option available to the Oil Syndicate.136 It was
reported that a piece of ground at the southern part of the island was leased for agricultural
purposes at ₤2.2 per jareeb (acre).137 As mentioned earlier, the quality of soil and water in
the northern section of the Island was much better than the southern part. In 1909, capitalist
agricultural activity along the northern shore of Abadan was on the rise. Multiple pieces of
lands were rapidly “sold” to local Arabs and brought under cultivation. As a result, the
northern section of the island had gained a “prospective value.”138
Disregarding the real market value of land, the syndicate management rendered the
proposed site “waste ground,” arguing that “it should be obtained for about one pound per
acre at the very outside.” 139 As shown in the previous chapter, the area selected for refinery
was not a waste land as the syndicate management described it. Rather, a hamlet known as
Duwah stood there which was surrounded by agricultural settlements. Even the general
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manager disagreed with the syndicate management, maintaining that thanks to irrigation
schemes and centrifugal pumps the land now has a “value it never had before.”140 Further,
the price demanded for land for non-agricultural purposes was higher than the speculated
figures for agricultural uses.141
2.4.3 The Politics of Land Acquisition
The Oil Syndicate employed various tricks and tactics to obtain the required land at the
lowest possible rate and under the most favorable terms. From the outset, while the exact
location and particulars of the site were yet to be decided, to avoid early speculation by the
Sheikh, the whereabouts of the prospective refinery were kept confidential. The Syndicate
general manager once suggested that upon the commencement of land negotiations no
representative associated with the Syndicate should show up near Abadan or set foot on
the island, and simultaneously a “diversion” be created in a different direction.142 Even for
a while, British consular officers in the region were not briefed on the definite route of the
pipeline and the exact location of the refinery. Another strategy adopted by the Oil
Syndicate was to conceal any association between the land identified for acquisition and
the oil enterprise, and to introduce an intermediary to lease the land.143 The Imperial Bank
of Persia was first proposed to take on the role of an agent.144 Upon the Bank’s inability to
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play that role another British firm, Grey, Paul & Co., was considered for the job. Some
Syndicate officials even entertained the idea of introducing the Political Resident and
British Consul-General at Bushire as the client, since, it was believed that the British agent
was able “to get the land much cheaper than any private individual.”145
Despite such cautionary tactics, the Syndicate's interests and activities in the region,
as the British Consul at Ahwaz noted, had become “public knowledge.” As a result, the oil
enterprise’s proposal to orchestrate a “benami transaction” through an intermediary was
met with objection from British political representatives in the region. For instance, British
Consul at Ahwaz dismissed the idea of concealing the real identity of purchasers, since in
his view, “the sheikh would not sell unless he knew for what purpose the land was wanted,
and had assurance that the Persian Government would raise no objection.”146 Concurring
with the Consul's argument, Political Resident believed that the Syndicate should
commence negotiations with the sheikh head-on, suggesting that the sheikh would, for the
sake of “self-preservation,” even embrace any British vested interest in his territory.
Opposing the nominal purchase scheme, British Minister at Tehran also believed that rather
than using a third firm as a “stalking-horse,” the Syndicate should deal directly with the
Sheikh.147
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2.4.4 Imperial Interests and Land Negotiations
On April 14th, 1909, immediately after the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was floated and
took over the Concessions Syndicate Ltd.,148 a wire was dispatched to Reynolds, allowing
him to contact the Sheikh and secure the best terms on which to obtain land for refinery.
The Works Manager was also permitted to discuss with the Arab chieftain the questions
surrounding the land and security for the pipeline which passed for 100 miles within his
territory. On April 20th after a brief interview with the Sheikh and his deputy, Reynolds
drew up a draft agreement.149 The Sheikh asked for ₤2000 for the lease of one square mile
of land (equivalent to 640 acres), that was roughly equal to ₤3 per acre, on Abadan Island
and the right to the laying of pipeline anywhere in his territory.150 While Reynolds and
British diplomatic envoys in Southern Khuzestan believed that the Sheikh’s proposed rate
was not “unreasonable,” the Directors of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company were not willing
to pay more than ₤500 annually— which was less than ₤1 per acre. In the Directors' view
the company was entitled under Article 3 of the D'Arcy Concession to obtain free of cost
any uncultivated state-owned land. Furthermore, they regarded any rental advanced to the
Sheikh as a “subsidy” to safeguard his goodwill and cooperation.151
In these circumstances, the Foreign Office took the opportunity not only to break
the deadlock in the land negotiations, but also to achieve an imperial goal in Southwest
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Iran. British officials were aware of Sheikh’s urgent need for capital for implementation of
a small-scale irrigation scheme on the Karun River. They used this confidential information
as a leverage to cut a deal that would favor both the oil company and the British Empire.
Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary, and Sir G. Barclay, British Minister at Tehran,
believed that better terms might be reached with the Sheikh if new incentives such as a
loan or extended “assurances”152 be offered to him.153 Through advancing an “irrigation
loan” to the Sheikh in the name of the British Government—which in reality was to be
furnished by the A.P.O.C— the British Government was able to secure “reasonable” terms
for the land, and simultaneously, obtain from the Sheikh the monopoly of irrigation works
on the Karun River.154 This would ensure that only a British enterprise or a multinational
company endorsed by the British Government would be allowed to undertake any irrigation
schemes on the Karun River. This concession put an end to a potential threat to the British
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imperial interests in the region posed by commercial and political presence of foreign
rivals.155
Quite displeased with the initial rate proposed by the Sheikh, the Directors of the
A.P.O.C succumbed to the Foreign Office’s proposition.156 The Company also solicited the
diplomatic assistance of Major Cox, Political Resident and Consul-General at Bushire, who
undoubtedly was Britain's most powerful diplomatic representative in the Persian Gulf
region.157 At the Foreign Office's order, Political Resident accompanied by the ConsulGeneral at Khorramshahr and J. B. Lloyd, the representative of the Company's new
Managing Agents in Iran,158 commenced negotiations with the Sheikh and his deputy.159
The Sheikh’s local adviser was also “consulted” to influence the talks. During the
negotiations, the Political Resident constantly reminded the Sheikh of the favors and
assurances that the chieftain had received from the British Government and pressed him to
show his appreciation by generous treatment of the “first British undertaking” in his
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territory.160 After four rounds of discussions, the Sheikh agreed to lease to the Company
an area “free of date trees” of roughly one square mile — equivalent to 650 jareebs (acres)
or 2000 yards by 1577 yards161 — between the two villages of Braim and Bawarda with a
frontage of 2000 yards on the Shatt for the period of the Oil Concession. The Company
also rented a strip of land, 30 yards in width, connecting the initial site to the Bahmanshir
River. In return, the Sheikh received a payment package worth ₤16,500 (equivalent to
approximately ₤2,000,000 in 2020)162 comprised of ₤10,000 as a loan, bearing an interest
rate at 6 percent and repayable in ten years, and ₤6,500 for the ten-year lease of the
property. Other points of dispute were eventually resolved, and the agreement was
concluded on July 16, 1909.163
2.4.5 Constitutional Government and the Abadan Agreement
The agreement was signed only three days after the pro-constitutional forces marched on
Tehran, deposed Mohammad Ali Shah, and reinstated the Constitutional Government. At
the Sheikh's request, the Company and British officials agreed to keep the details of the
Abadan Agreement confidential and postpone the commencement of operations until
political crisis in Tehran would end.164 The reason for the secrecy lay in the Sheikh’s fear
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of the potential consequences of the agreement. It was possible that the Abadan Agreement
would trigger the hostility of the influential ulama (religious leaders), constitutionalist
leaders, and public opinion towards him.165 As a precautionary measure, the Sheikh even
requested that the money be paid to him in gold rather than a bank draft.166 Signs of popular
resentment were felt in the region. Public opinion at this time was informed by a modern
nationalist discourse which rejected the legitimacy of the oil concession and challenged the
British imperial presence in the region.167 To prevent probable popular protests, the Oil
Guards were kept on call at Ahwaz.168
The Sheikh's apprehension proved realistic. In October 1909, in the wake of the
commencement of operations at Abadan, rumors spread in Tehran about a mutual
arrangement between the Sheikh and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Subsequently, the
Iranian Government pressed the Sheikh to release the content of the agreement. The British
Consul-General at Khorramshahr believed that sooner or later the agreement must be
communicated with the Iranian Government and that the Company and the Sheikh should
act in harmony regarding the level of detail that should be disclosed to Tehran.169 The
Sheikh first procrastinated his response to the Central Government and asked the British
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officials to remain silent on this matter.170 When the story of the agreement appeared in the
Indian Press, the British Minister in Tehran called on the Sheikh to share the agreement
with the Iranian Government.171 The Abadan Agreement raised objections at Tehran for
several reasons. The Constitutional Government believed that any agreement between the
oil company and local tribal leaders would infringe upon Iranian sovereignty. In the
Government’s view, Abadan Island was entirely state-owned land and the Sheikh had no
special rights to it.172 Tehran considered the agreement “null and void,” because it was not
officially countersigned by local Iranian authorities.173 The Iranian Government also
cautioned the A.P.O.C that every accord between the Company and private individuals
should be submitted to Tehran for ratification, otherwise no assistance could be rendered
in times of disputes.174
The Sheikh, however, believed that similar agreements were made between the oil
enterprise and the Bakhtiari Khans in the past. Furthermore, on accounts of the 1903 royal
decree and hereditary rights, the Sheikh considered himself the legitimate proprietor of the
island and as such entitled under clause 3 of the Oil Concession to lease a piece of his own
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property.175 Minister of Interior, himself a Bakhtiari constitutionalist, suggested that a
Government-appointed commission be dispatched to Khorramshahr to make inquiries into
the transactions between the Sheikh and the Company and calculate the amount the former
was liable to pay to the Government. This proposal was shelved after the Minister received
a “serious warning” from the British Government protégé in Tehran who stipulated that
the Abadan Agreement like the other deals made between the Oil Syndicate and the
Bakhtiari Chiefs would enjoy the backing of the British Government.176 Although the
Constitutional Government failed to further challenge the Abadan Agreement, it never
recognized the accords between the Company and local tribal leaders that threatened
Iranian sovereignty.177 Moreover, Iranian officials began to watch the Khuzestan affairs
more intimately and kept an eye on the activities of the Company and the Sheikh.
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CHAPTER 3
FROM PETRO-CAMP TO PETRO-SCAPE: SPATIAL ENGINEERING,
COLONIAL IDEALS, AND LABOR CONTROL, 1908-1924
This chapter retells the early history of Abadan. It provides an analysis of the evolution of
Iran’s symbol of early oil urbanism from its inception in 1909, when it was designed and
built as an oil camp, through 1924, when it turned into a sprawling industrial settlement
with a population of more than 30,000. This is the time when the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company, for the reasons that I will discuss in the next chapter, implemented the first
package of comprehensive reforms and incorporated some elements of model company
towns into Abadan’s physical-spatial structure to ameliorate the difficulties and
inequalities that rapid industrialization had created. Uncertainties about the chemical and
commercial potentialities of Iranian crude oil overshadowed the initial layout of the
refinery. Its spatial organization, as I will discuss in this chapter, was as much the
embodiment of social and technical necessities of oil production as it was the outcome of
colonial precedents and the conceptions of laissez-faire capitalism, old-style paternalism,
and labor control. In tandem with the increased petroleum outputs, Abadan grew in size
and population. Both extensions and alternations were made to the oil camp on a piecemeal
basis as expediency demanded.178 Gradually, several indigenous settlements emerged
around the Refinery which accommodated not only local workmen but also migrant
laborers and other fortune-seekers who had moved to the island in the hope of finding
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employment with the growing oil industry. In the course of fifteen years, Abadan evolved
from a primitive oil camp into an “industrial landscape” or what I term petro-scape.179
The lack of unitary character in Abadan created a pattern of urbanism that had a lot
in common with colonial cities. A closer scrutiny also reveals that Abadan’s spatial
structure consisted of three separate parts which echoed the Company’s social visions and
labor policies. As I will show in what follows, the Company utilized various spatial tools
and methods to engineer the space, to increase its control over the workforce, to forge the
desired social order, to recreate the unequal power structure similar to colonial models,
and, last but not least, to ovoid labor militancy. This is manifested in the provision of
company-sponsored welfare services — such as housing, social amenities, healthcare, and
public utilities — as well as the policing and protection of the oil infrastructure.
Nevertheless, workmen and local inhabitants were not passive recipients of the Company’s
domination. In the last section of this chapter, I will show how they defied the company’s
spatial coercion through creating spaces of resistance on different geographic scales. Also,
loose control over some neighborhoods, where non-European personnel and local
inhabitants of the town resided, gave rise to the emergence of the first indigenous industrial
settlement in Iran’s modern history.
Although the town’s development was primarily driven by oil, Abadan was a
multidimensional phenomenon. As Nelida Fuccaro put it, due to the rapid pace of
urbanization triggered by oil development, early oil cities were “more multifaceted and
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less permanent than others.”180 This chapter will analyze Abadan’s built form from a
critical perspective. Drawing on Margaret Crawford’s approach to the analysis of company
towns in The Workingman's Paradise,181 I will show how the built environment of Abadan
was the product of an interplay of such determinants as industrial design, colonial practices,
technical requirements of the oil industry, capitalist logic, vernacular construction
techniques, regional and climatic conditions, and social order. In other words, I will situate
the physical-spatial form of the oil town within broader contexts where factors such as
industrial restructuring, immigration, ethnic divisions, imperialism, labor control, and
paternalism are as significant as architectural design, pragmatism, and functionalism.182

3.1 Temple of Oil in the Garden of Eden
“There can hardly be a doubt that Abadan Island, formed by the [Bahmanshir] estuary and
the Shatt-el-Arab, will be the place selected. It is worth a passing thought that, according
to a tradition and the firm belief of the Mohammedan dwellers in Mesopotamia and
[Khuzestan], this piece of ground, watered by the Tigris, Euphrates, and the Karun, and
destined within five years to become a prosaic settlement, paved and tin-roofed, the home
of men seeking the welfare of the world and their own profits by one of the most disfiguring
and evil-smelling processes known to modern science – is no other than the veritable
Garden of Eden itself!”183
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3.1.1 The Oil Enclave
Andrew Campbell, Burmah Oil Company works manager at the Rangoon refineries, who
was previously engaged in the selection of the site for the Abadan refinery, devised the
first scheme for distillation of Iranian crude oil. In May 1909, based on Campbell’s
analysis, two petroleum products, Water White, a type of burning oil for lamps, and a lesser
grade kerosene, known as Victoria, were considered for production at Abadan. This plan
was altered in February 1910 when Charles Greenway, the APOC Managing Director,
suggested that for commercial reasons the Company should produce fuel oil and benzene
(motor spirit).184 Campbell's field visit to Abadan, coupled with the distillation program he
proposed for Iranian oil, inspired the first rudimentary layout of the Abadan refinery—
which was designed to handle 2,000,000 gallons of crude oil per month. The tentative
plans, initially prepared in Rangoon, were sent to London where they were modified by
John Gillespie, the consultant engineer to the Burmah Oil Company.185

184

Ronald W. Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company: Volume 1, The Developing Years,
1901-1932. (Cambridge University Press: 1982), p.148; Also see, C. Greenway to J. Hamilton, 17th February
1910, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd. Private Letter Book, Volume 1. BP Archives, ArcRef 54484. p.142
185
The Naft, 7 (July 1931), p.14

86

Figure 3.1 Abadan Refinery, general layout and land use, August 1910. The solid and
dashed lines represent the finished and incomplete sections, respectively.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36509

An early plan of the arrangement of works at Abadan dated August 1910 (Figure
3.1) indicates that the Abadan refinery was designed as an industrial camp. Such
settlements have received various names in different contexts, but in English-speaking
countries they are categorized under the umbrella term “company town.”186 Given the
breadth and diversity of these industrial settlements, scholars have failed to provide a
precise definition of company town. The definition that Encyclopedia of Social Sciences
formulated more than eighty years ago still serves the purpose: “a community inhabited
186
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chiefly by the employees of a single company…which also owns a substantial part of the
real estate and houses.”187 In these communities the company may function not only as the
employer but also as the landlord and even the provider of public utilities.
Historically, the company town symbolized the rise and gradual hegemony of
industrial capitalism. It also served as an outpost introducing industrial modernity into
previously unexploited territories.188 Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
industrialists, entrepreneurs and corporations used different versions of industrial
settlements as a device not only to exploit natural resources in remote areas, but also to
effectively manage and control labor force, enhance production and profit, and implement
social ideals.189 In academia, scholars and researchers have formed different
conceptualizations of the company town. Some view it as the means of advancing the
corporate power’s civilizing missions, while others conceive it as the space of transnational
interaction or the site of labor-capital encounter.190 Specific characteristics of these
settlements varied according to a myriad of factors, including, among other things, the
dominant economic activity, the location of the industry, the existence of private or state
capital, and the degree of autonomy of company town from local or state governments.191

187

Horace P. Davis, “Company Town,” in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 4, New York: The
Macmillan Co. 1930, p.119.
188
Margaret Crawford, Building The Workingman's Paradise: The Design of American Company Towns
(Verso, 1995), p.6
189
Oliver J. Dinius and Angela Vergara, “Company Towns in the Americas: An Introduction,” in Company
Towns in the Americas: Landscape, Power, and Working-Class Communities, ed. Oliver J. Dinius and Angela
Vergara (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2011), p.2
190
Margaret Crawford, Building The Workingman's Paradise: The Design of American Company Towns
(Verso, 1995), p.6
191
Marcelo J. Borges and Susan B. Torres, “Company Towns: Concepts, Historiography, and Approaches,”
in Company Towns: Labors, Space, and Power Relations across Time and Continents. Edited by Marcelo J.
Borges and Susan B. Torres (Palgrave Macmillan, September 2012), p.2

88

For the sake of this study, it is important to figure out how we could position the
Abadan refinery within the broad spectrum of company towns. I argue that the Abadan oil
camp resembles the resource towns and extractive industries known as “enclaves” that
proliferated in colonial and neocolonial settings in the late nineteenth and the first half of
the twentieth century. Financed, equipped, and managed by foreign interests, enclave
economies were export-driven, de facto autonomous entities located in remote, thinly
populated areas, where the influence of the local or central government was feeble, and
whose production was not fully integrated into the host country’s national economy.192
The Abadan refinery, as it was initially designed, possesses the characteristics of
the first generation or so-called “classic” company towns, which were the direct product of
the second phase of global capitalism characterized by extensive regime of accumulation
of wealth.193 In the United States, company towns in this period ranged between two
typologies: industrial landscape, also known as economic landscape, and model towns.194
While the former was primarily predicated upon economic logic that aimed at maximizing
industrial production and profitability, the latter type was driven by social ideologies and
utopian

visions

of

creating

orderly

and

harmonious

communities

where

designers/reformers in collaboration with industrialists sought a compromise between
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capital and labor, and between optimal conditions of production and betterment of workers’
living and working environment.195
As Margaret Crawford notes, the spatial-physical structure of industrial landscape
was the product of “vernacular expression” of industrial needs, where the technical and
social requirements of a particular method of industrial production determined
application— and modification— of earlier examples. On the contrary, in model company
towns, professional design and some degree of planning were the main determinants of
built form.196 While the Abadan oil camp had an initial plan, it was not a planned company
town. However, as I will discuss in this chapter, in the postwar years, several attempts were
made to remake the oil camp and invest its physical-spatial structure with some elements
of model towns.
3.1.2 Anatomy of the Oil Camp: Engineering the Refinery and Cracking Petroleum
Like other classic company towns, the Abadan oil camp consisted of two distinctive parts:
1) place of production, and 2) housing for working populations. As Figure 3.1 shows, the
initial settlement lacked social services, such as healthcare, educational or entertainment
facilities, that many classic company towns of the time would provide to their employees.
Although some of these amenities were gradually provided to certain elements of the
workforce, the reason why welfare services were not incorporated into the Abadan
refinery’s initial spatial program could be attributed to the mentality of the designers and
the predisposition of the Company Directors. Both Campbell and Gillespie belonged to the
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generation of shop culture engineer-entrepreneurs of the second half of the nineteenth
century, who were concerned primarily with the “engineering of materials” rather than the
“engineering of men.” This generation, by and large, interested itself in traditional
engineering operations, such as design of machines and layout of shop floors or
construction of workshops.197
The designers of the Abadan refinery provided immediate technical solutions to the
pressing question of how to crack Iranian oil into major marketable products in an
economical way. As a chemist, Andrew Campbell designed the structure of burning oil
refinery— including distillation boilers, stills, and benches— based on his experiments
with the Iranian oil samples in the Rangoon laboratory. Gillespie complemented his
colleague’s work by adding the requisite infrastructure and designing the layout of sheds,
workshops, and piping network. However, the Abadan oil camp, as a whole, did not have
a long-term development plan. As a result, in the postwar years, the refinery became highly
congested, partly because there was no sufficient space between the machines nor enough
room for internal expansion of different sections.198 This necessitated the reorganization of
the refinery’s production core in 1924. For their part, the Company Directors, imbued with
the ideas of colonial paternalism and economic pragmatism, were not keen on providing
social services with no tangible “economic value” to the Company. Indeed, minimizing
capital expenditure remained the cornerstone of the Company’s fiscal policy until 1924.199
Grounded in the technical knowledge and refining procedures of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century, the engineering of the Abadan refinery was predicated upon
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the industrial logic of oil production. Besides environmental, social, and political
circumstances, previous experiments in the Rangoon refineries influenced the design of the
oil camp.200 As Figure 3.1 illustrates, internal fencing divided the oil camp into five
separate zones, each dedicated to one stage of the process of oil production. A network of
narrow-gauge railway, four feet and six inches wide, ran around the compound, connected
different zones, and facilitated material handling.201
As in other company towns, the production core, (zone A, Figure 3.1), dominated
the compound. Organizing the company town around the industrial production unit
symbolizes the rationalized logic of mechanized production and epitomizes the supremacy
of expediency over ideology. Zone A encompassed all the workshops, plants, facilities,
and infrastructure that played central roles in processing crude oil and administering the
company town. As Figure 3.1 shows, the sections that were in commission by August 1910
included: office building (A-1), stores (A-2), foundry (A-3), workshop (A-4), distillation
boilers, stills and benches (A-5), treatment plants, tin-making shed (A-6), and the pipe
work. To facilitate radio communication with vessels and oil tankers a watch tower was
erected next to the office building. Overtime, Campbell and other chemists became more
familiar with the idiosyncratic characteristics of Iranian crude oil and enhanced the
techniques to produce a larger volume of refined products with higher quality standards. In
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tandem with these developments, new plants and industrial elements were added to the
company town's production core.
The refinery also included other sections that supported the production process.
Zones B and C, for instance, accommodated tank farms designed for storing crude oil and
refined products, respectively. Crude oil was highly volatile and more inflammable than
distilled petroleum. As a result, reservoirs of crude oil were placed at the back of the
refinery within a safe distance from zone A. Due to the accumulation of high volume of
crude oil, zone B was dubbed Danger Zone. The refinery's riverfront, zone E, also
contained some infrastructural and administrative components, such as water pump and
wharf (E-5), the works manager's residence and temporary office (E-4 & E-1), and the main
foreshore gateway. The central part of zone E served not only as the terminus for the export
of Iranian oil and refined products to the regional and global markets, but also acted as the
point of entry for the machines and materials used for building the refinery. The number
and diversity of wharves on the refinery’s foreshore gradually increased and this section
eventually turned into the Abadan Port.
Besides devising the physical layout and designing the distillation process, the
designers of the Abadan oil camp engaged in traditional engineering operations, such as
construction work. Upon his visit to southwest Iran in 1908, Campbell learned about the
vulnerability of Abadan to flooding and suggested that protective measures be considered
when building the refinery. For instance, he recommended raising all foundations above
high-tide level.202 The early map of the refinery (Figure 3.1) shows that roads were also
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elevated above the high-water mark. Given the scarcity of building materials on the island
and its vicinity, Campbell also advised that bricks be used as the major construction
material.203 Based on Campbell’s recommendations, a rectangular tract of land in the
southern section of the site, where he had spotted abundance of good-quality clay (Zone
D, Figure 3.1), was designated for “Brickwork Material and Reclamation of Ground.”
The form and configuration of individual buildings in the refinery facilitated labor
control. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, with a view to maximizing
visibility and control of workers’ movement, factory buildings were designed on the basis
of open-space layout that included “as few columns as possible” and avoided unobservable
corners and unproductive passageways. Therefore, the ideal factory excluded buildings
with the form of an L, T, or E, and preferably consisted of rectangular single-story
structures.204 Similarly, at the Abadan oil camp, as Figure 3.2 illustrates, major structures
in the production zone — namely, tin-shed, main office, store, workshop, and foundry —
took rectangular forms. Furthermore, the distance between buildings made possible the
“panopticonic gazes” across the oil camp. 205
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Figure 3.2 A panoramic view of Section A taken from the Watch Tower looking East,
circa 1910.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36509

3.2 Tripartite Oil Town: Paternalism, Spatial Technologies, and Economic
Pragmatism
Like other employers that set up enclave company towns in remote areas, the AngloPersian Oil Company encountered the necessity of provision of accommodation and other
amenities to oil workers to ensure efficient undertaking of operations. Historically,
companies pursued different objectives by provision of social and welfare services. The
so-called paternalistic efforts aimed to enhance the performance of workers, cultivate
employees’ royalty, resolve the inherent contradictions between capital and labor, develop
a “personal bond” between workmen and employers, weaken the degree of solidarity
among the workforce, and forge a positive public image for the companies.206 Margaret
Crawford defines paternalism as “all varieties of enforced benevolence that interfere with
a person’s liberty of action for that person’s good.” As Crawford notes, welfare services
were usually accompanied by the “discourse of benevolence.” Companies publicized
paternalistic programs under the guise of altruistic measures and used these services as
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evidence of their commitment to well-being of their employees. Paternalistic efforts,
however, provided employers with a strong tool for labor control by creating a system of
“structured dependency” surrounding the workers’ daily lives.207 For their part, workers
were not passive actors in the system of paternalism. In fact, as I will discuss later, with
their agency and activism, workmen made employers rethink and revise paternalistic
policies.208
In company towns erected in colonial and neocolonial settings the benefits of
company paternalism corresponded to the privilege of “whiteness.”209 Similarly, welfare
services at Abadan were allocated according to the preconceived hierarchical structure of
the labor force which was defined based on employees’ occupational status and racial
properties. Although in the early 1920s the Company formally introduced a “grading
system”210, which was seemingly designed based on qualifications and experience of
workmen, in reality a three-tier system governed the categorization of the staff. This system
served as the main mechanism of regulating salaries and wages as well as allocation of
company paternalism.
The first category, known as the first class, consisted mainly of European staff of
different grades. In the early years of operations, the first tier mainly consisted of Scotsmen
who were former employees of the Burmah Oil Company.211 Over the course of the
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following decades, the population of this group increased and gradually diversified but
remained predominantly European and overwhelmingly Scottish. Nonetheless, from the
late 1920s for the sake of publicity several hand-picked Iranians, who had received
university degrees from British universities, were admitted into this tier. Clerical staff
along with foremen and skilled artisans made up the second-class personnel. The majority
of this category were Indian nationals. It also included a handful of skilled workmen from
Iraq, Burma, and China. At the outset of operations, Iranians constituted a small percentage
of the second tier. In the light of the so-called “Iranianization” of the labor force in the
1920s and 1930s, the second tier turned into a category comprised of salaried office
workers and technical men of Indian and Iranian nationals. The lowest tier—obviously the
largest among others—initially consisted of semi-skilled, unskilled and contract workmen
and manual laborers. This category was mainly comprised of local Iranian and Arab
tribesmen and peasants from southwest Iran. In the 1930s, the third class included Indian
and Iranian semi-skilled and unskilled laborers.212 Not only did the foregoing tiered social
structure determine the whole life of the community, it also created a tripartite urban space
similar to a typical colonial city in British India.213
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Company paternalism at the Abadan oil camp mainly catered for the first-class
personnel or the British cadre. The Company’s policy towards this group of employees was
a mixture of welfare state and the British Raj.214 While Indian workmen received selective
housing and welfare services, local laborers were completely excluded from the discreet
paternal benevolence of the Company. In this chapter I will show that the spatial structure
of Abadan was the joint product of the Company’s paternalistic policy, colonial reference
models, and engineering of space. This is illustrated in living arrangements as well as other
company-sponsored social, entertainment, healthcare, and public services.

3.2.1 Residential Spaces
Housing was the most significant element in the framework of company paternalism. Not
only was housing arrangement used as a means of labor control, it also served as a spatial
tool for shaping social relations and forging a hierarchical technical order. Labor
geographer Andrew Herod maintains that the joint goal of designers and industrialists in a
typical company town is to control the social and political life of workmen by
hegemonizing and manipulating the physicality of the built environment. In other words,
Herod notes, the design of company town aims at “social engineering” through deliberate
“spatial engineering.”215 At the Abadan oil camp, spatial engineering manifested itself in
both production and non-work spheres on different geographical scales. While labor
control lay at the heart of spatial planning strategies, the Company aimed to accomplish
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numerous goals by employing various “spatial technologies,” such as separation,
enclosure, boundary-making, and spatial coercion.
One of the manifestations of spatial engineering at the Abadan refinery was the
separation of employee housing. As Figure 3.1 vividly illustrates, residences for British
and “native” personnel were situated on opposite sides of the oil camp. Housing for British
staff (C-1, Figure 3.1) was located upstream from the refinery on the western corner of
zone C. Accommodation for “native” workmen was provided downstream from the
refinery in the lower section of zone D. This housing arrangement laid the foundations for
socio-spatial segregation of the workforce—one of the features that made Abadan similar
to colonial settlements.216 The company’s official discourse justified the separation of
residential quarters merely on the “disciplinary” grounds. 217 In reality, however, spatial
segregation of housing had its roots in the colonial practices and served several functions.
In the colonial city, separation of the European quarter from the indigenous town
was partly informed by the prevailing scientific and medical theories of the second half of
the nineteenth century which assumed a causal relationship between physical distance and
bacterial infection. It was also based on the “British/native” divide, which was the
mainspring of the colonial order, and aimed to create a dominance-dependence relationship
between the colonial community and the indigenous populations.218 Drawing on this
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reference model, separation of housing helped inscribe a semi-colonial power structure
onto the spatial layout of Abadan, which, among other things, served as a tool to exercise
control over labor and implement discriminatory welfare programs without causing
conflict. Minimizing contact between European and “native” employees was also a means
of safeguarding the cultural identity of British employees.219 There is ample evidence that
strict labor and residential separation was enforced in other company towns in neocolonial
and colonial contexts, in which segregation based on the “racialized view of the world”
was a cultural norm.220 Similar trends are also discernable in the oil enclaves and resource
towns of the early twentieth century in Latin America — such as Mexico, Argentina, and
Venezuela, to name just a few— where company towns were organized along occupational
hierarchies determined by race and national origins.221
3.2.1.1 Bungalow Area: Enclave within an Enclave.

Following the Anglo-Indian

practices, the selection of the site for European residences across the oil landscape was
predicated upon the “criteria of health,” construed according to the culture-specific
understanding of the causes of disease.222 In the second half of the nineteenth century, in
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accordance with the prevailing European health and sanitary systems, several guidelines
were devised in British India to regulate the location and layout of residential space for the
European settlers. These rules suggested that such environmental factors as air, soil, water,
and elevation should be taken into account, when evaluating the ideal sites.223 Following
these colonial conventions, prime locations were earmarked for the European staff quarters
and considerable attention was paid to the provision of adequate ventilation, efficient
drainage and sewerage disposal, clean water supplies, and elevated terrains. For instance,
in the oil fields, a prominent spot, known as the Guards' Hill, with a commanding view of
the entire valley, the coolest location in the hot weather and well-protected from the sulfuric
smells of the oil wells, was designated for the accommodation of British staff.224
A similar approach was adopted in Abadan. As part of the process of examination
of the potential sites for the refinery, the bank of the Bahmanshir River was first regarded
as a “salubrious place” for housing the British employees. The eastern foreshore of Abadan
offered a cooler temperature and higher quality water supplies compared to the western
shore.225 However, it was considered “mosquito-ridden” and even notorious as the site of
frequent outbreaks of malaria. In the end, it was suggested that staff residences should be
distanced from the stagnant pools and creeks of the eastern shore and be located in the
center of the island or near the bank of the Shatt-al-Arab river.226 As mentioned earlier,
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staff housing eventually was placed at the western corner of the oil camp. Given the
direction of prevailing winds, this neighborhood was shielded from the strong odors and
gases emanating from the refinery.227
Colonial models also governed the architecture of the European quarter. This
neighborhood, which came to be known as the Bungalow Area, was designed as a gated
residential estate and was fully separated by metal fences from the other parts of the
refinery. Representing an enclave within the oil enclave, the Bungalow Area contained a
set of culture-specific values expressed in manifestations of modernity—such as spacious,
solidly built bungalows, surfaced roads, manicured lawns, and electric light, heating, and
ceiling fans.228 The neighborhood resembled the Anglo-Indian sector in the colonial city
or what Anthony King terms the “colonial urban settlement.” 229 The latter itself was based
on the earlier colonial settlements and the residential models of the upper-middle class and
the “landed gentry” in the metropolitan society.230 The Bungalow Area also had a lot in
common with the contemporaneous “white zones” that multinational oil companies had
built in oil enclaves in Central America and the Caribbean.231
Resembling a residential block within the European quarter in the colonial city in
India, such as the civil station or hill station, the initial layout of the Bungalow Area, as
Figure 3.1 shows, consisted of a straight avenue, known as the High Street, which ran
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perpendicular to the Shatt-al-Arab river, and was lined with rows of rectangular plots
reserved for detached residences. The reference model for the High Street was the Mall,
the main thoroughfare in the Anglo-Indian settlement. As a place of social interaction and
personal display, the colonial Mall itself was a reinterpretation of the principal avenues in
the metropole that connected the major political, social, and religious institutions.232
As Ching-Liang Low notes, “a topos of linearity and geometry” underlay the
Anglo-Indian settlement. The geometric lines in the colonial city “are not only literal
descriptions of the physical settlement patterns of the European community, but are also
vivid testimonies to the culture’s persistent interest in demarcation, naming and
segregation.” For Ching-Liang Low, such preoccupation with “walls, detachment and
spaces-in-between” originated from the settlers’ deep-seated anxiety about the destruction
of racial boundaries by daily activities of “native” population. 233 Indeed, the Company’s
obsession with demarcation manifested itself at the outset of operations when the first
enclosure was put up around the refinery. In March 1910 soon after the Sheikh of
Khorramshahr and the representative of the Company jointly confirmed the exact
demarcation of land on the ground, the boundary of the one-square-mile site was marked
with brick pillars.234 Unclimbable metal fencing, ten feet high, enclosed the site, separating
it from the adjacent date gardens and agricultural settlements.235 Similar to the colonial
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examples in India, the fences were used to keep the local population off the site.236 In other
words, “lines of demarcation were also lines of defense.” 237 At Abadan, for the purpose of
social control a physical enclosure was utilized to separate the refinery’s space from the
public realm. Enclosure was thus used as part of a spatial technology of control.238 Spatial
enclosures and partitioning are also capable of enforcing bodily discipline.239 Andrew
Herod maintains that the practice of crossing the physical boundary that circumscribes
workplace creates a sense of self-discipline and instills a set of work-related values,
attitudes, and behavior in workers.240 Therefore, building fences within the refinery and
separating different zones were also used as mechanisms for labor control and discipline.
In order to maximize hegemony over space, Company officials even planned to
make the foreshore exclusive to the refinery and block the public access to the site’s
riverfront by extending the northern and southern fences up to six yards beyond the low
water line into the river.241 Beside the underlying colonial disposition and social control,
the idea of cutting the public access to the riverfront was driven by economic logic. If
implemented, some 2000 yards of fencing material on the refinery’s frontage could have
been saved. The legal advice from the British military officer prevented a potential
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encroachment upon the public realm which could have not only curtailed the daily passage
of local crafts but also upset ecological balance on the island. Lieutenant Wilson reminded
the managing agents that Article No.1 of the Abadan Agreement prohibited the Company
from blocking public right-of-way along the riverfront.242 The Company’s obsession with
fencing aroused suspicion in Tehran. The Iranian Government accused the Company of
building a fort and secretly importing guns and ammunition to Abadan. To verify these
claims the agent of the Iranian Foreign Office in Khorramshahr, known as Karguzar,
visited the refinery site.243

Tents and Tins: Early Accommodation at the Oil Camp
At the outset of operations, the Company experimented with a variety of housing types and
construction techniques to accommodate the first group of British personnel who were
brought to Abadan for their managerial and specialized technical skills. European
employees were engaged on three-year contracts.244 Moving from Burma and India to Iran,
British oilmen draw inspiration from familiar settlement models in colonial settings. As in
the oil fields, tents were pitched to shelter the first group of employees at Abadan. In
November 1909, three plinths for a tent and store huts were constructed in the area
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designated for European housing (C-2 in Figure 3.1).245 Although evidence is scanty
regarding the composition and internal layout of these canvas structures, it seems that they
were built on the service tent model, which was prevalent in India in the early twentieth
century, and consisted of “a large and lofty room surrounded by double walls of canvas
enclosing space between them with partitions at two or more corners for bath or store
rooms.”246
To the west of the tents a typical colonial-style building was erected. It was a
makeshift structure lined with timber and clad in corrugated iron (C-3 in Figure 3.1; also
see Figure 3.3).247 The “tin bungalow” or “tin hut,” as the building came to be known, was
rectangular in plan and featured a relatively high masonry plinth, a pillared verandah, and
a thatched, high-pitched roof truncated at its apex — all characteristic elements of a typical
Anglo-Indian bungalow of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In colonial India, this
type of structure was usually built for impermanent accommodation of British
sojourners.248
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Figure 3.3 A view of the first settlement at the Abadan refinery, circa 1911. From left to
right, the tin bungalow, tents, and No.2 Bungalow under construction.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36509

Figure 3.4 A photo of the first settlement in the Oil Fields, circa 1908. The caption reads:
“Building on right with verandah was messroom and two bedrooms, building nearest
camera was offices and that farthest from camera (near hills) was servants’ quarters.”
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 64874

The Bungalow: A Colonial Housing Prototype
The term bungalow deserves some further discussion here. It was the nomenclature used
to describe the first series of dwellings erected for the accommodation of British employees
in Iran. In the 1930s and 1940s, it was used to describe almost all types of company
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housing. As part of the cultural legacy of oil, the term remained in public usage and became
part of the social and architectural vocabulary in Khuzestan Province even after the
nationalization of the oil industry in 1951. In his masterful study of the bungalow across
time and space, Anthony King shows that this type of dwelling is a multidimensional
phenomenon— it is the physical as much as the cultural, the social, the political, and the
economic. The meaning of the term evolved since the seventeenth century, when it was
first used to describe the peasant’s hut in Bengal. In the colonial context, however, the term
described a type of housing “suitable for the European occupation.” Anthony King notes
that, “the bungalow, and the architecture in which it is expressed, becomes a symbol of the
new imperial power.”249
By building the first bungalow at Abadan, British oilmen not only introduced a
novel housing prototype, but also transplanted the concomitant colonial attitudes and social
relations as well as a host of norms, behavior and domestic lifestyle which were hitherto
nonexistent in southwest Iran. The tin bungalow thus served as the culturally controlled
environment and the territorial unit for the first colony of British expatriates in Abadan. It
was also the harbinger of the socio-spatial hierarchy and the lack of unitary character in
Abadan’s physical-spatial form.250 Indeed, along with the bungalow such colonial
distinctions as “sahib” and “memsahib” arrived at Abadan and began to draw hard and fast
racial lines within the workforce.251
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Although there is no evidence on the internal layout of the first bungalow at
Abadan, it can be assumed that it followed the original colonial model which consisted of
a main central chamber surrounded by three or four rooms. Similar to Anglo-Indian
bungalows, the tin hut was permanently staffed by several Indian servants.252 A visual
comparison of the early settlements in the refinery and the Fields (Figures 3.3 and 3.4)
reveals that the tin bungalow fulfilled at least two functions. As Figure 3.4 illustrates, the
early structures in the oil fields, which were organized around a central open space,
consisted of the tents, servants’ quarters, dining hall/residence, and administrative offices.
Assuming that the same model was applied at Abadan, it can be inferred that the tin
bungalow was used, simultaneously, as a messing hall and a residence. Occupied by
European senior staff, the tin bungalow overshadowed the adjacent tents and huts that were
put up to house junior employees, including the British assistant engineers. In other words,
Figure 3.3 could be viewed as a microcosm of the European quarter in the years to come.
It represents the conscious engineering of residential space to forge industrial relations
within the first-class personnel at the Abadan oil camp. It shows how colonial housing
typologies were used both to accommodate different classes of labor and shape, maintain,
and reinforce, the favored social hierarchy.
“Kutcha” and “Pucka” Bungalows
The technical-colonial order was further imprinted onto the spatial layout of the oil camp
when the first two-storied pucka bungalow was erected on the refinery’s foreshore (E-1 in
Figure 3.1). In colonial India, Pucka— as opposed to cutcha (or Kutcha) — bungalow was
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a masonry structure designed for long-term or permanent use and represented the phase of
consolidation of power in the process of colonial domination. While cutcha bungalow was
of temporary nature, usually built of sun-dried bricks and plastered with mud or mortar,
Pucka bungalow was made of burnt bricks.253
Indeed, the first pucka bungalow at Abadan complemented the settlement pattern
borrowed from the colonial housing model which had already begun by the construction
of the tin hut which was a type of kutcha bungalow. The pucka bungalow, unlike the tin
hut, drew from the local construction techniques and materials, and, similar to colonial
buildings, was the product of cultural interaction.254 Similar to the buildings in
Khorramshahr or Basra, it was made of sun-dried bricks with facing of burnt bricks. The
roof was made of mat and chandel255, and was “constructed of [wooden] poles of small
diameter placed close together and overlaid with mats made from date palm leaves and
covered with earth.”256 The building's upper floor housed two senior staff members,
including the refinery manager, and the ground floor served as the general office and the
dispensary.257
As Margaret Crawford argues, change is an inherent feature of company town.258
Building, alteration, demolition, and rebuilding were among the activities that were
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prevalent in all industrial settlements. The Abadan oil camp was no exception. Perhaps due
to structural or functional failure, the pucka bungalow had to be replaced with No.1
Bungalow, also known as “Ye Castle.” As the first permanent building in Abadan, No.1
Bungalow was completely constructed of local materials and embraced some architectural
features of vernacular buildings in southwest Iran. In this sense, the castle signified the
rationalization of construction and the evolution of meaning and form in bungalow design
practices in the Abadan refinery. As Figure 3.5 illustrates, unlike Abadan’s first kutcha
bungalow, No.1 Bungalow was not built on a raised podium. The plinth, on which the
building was constructed, was designed to ensure protection against high tides and spring
floods.

Figure 3.5 No.1 Bungalow, also knowns as the Castle, circa 1911. It functioned as the
Works Manager’s residence and temporary Office.
Sources: BP Archives, (Left) ArcRef 36137, (Right) ArcRef 176326w

No.1 Bungalow served as the Works Manager’s temporary residence-office and
was the only non-rectangular building in the oil camp. It was cruciform in plan, featuring
a flat roof, thick walls, ceiling-to-roof windows, and window shutters—a set of design
provisions aimed to protect internal space against extreme climate, facilitate crossventilation, and control the penetration of excessive sunlight into the building. No.1
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bungalow was a two-storied structure, and unlike the tin hut, the verandah would not run
around the building. In the Persian Gulf region, the second storey was a critical component
of residential buildings, particularly in hot, moist summers when the ground floor, unless
situated on a very high plinth, was practically uninhabitable.259 The building's location,
character and form, in particular its fortress-like appearance, gave a symbolic dimension
to the refinery. In other words, the Castle served as an architectural representation of the
oil enterprise. Perhaps to appease the nationalist feelings, as Figure 3.5 shows, the Iranian
flag began to appear on top of the building.
Technical Desiderata and Organization of Space
Not only was the physical-spatial form of the Bungalow Area influenced by the colonial
settlement typologies, it was also affected by the technical necessities of oil production.
Technical requirements, for instance, caused alterations in the layout of the neighborhood
as well as the pattern of land use in the northwestern section of the refinery. In 1912, the
neighborhood’s linear shape, originally organized along the High Street paralleling the
refinery’s western enclosure, took a turn in the opposite direction and then extended along
the foreshore towards the site of No.1 Bungalow. This shift came about for two reasons.
First, as Figure 3.6 illustrates, the eight-inch pipe running from the crude oil tank farms
(Section C) to No.1 jetty blocked the eastward extension of the Bungalow Area along the
initial straight axis. This pipeline was laid to increase the production of crude oil and
compensate for the delay in completion of the refinery— which was initially scheduled to
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get completed by January 1912.260 Second, the idea of the expansion of the Bungalow Area
towards the “Finished Oil Tanks” was considered a risky arrangement. Therefore, a
technical barrier, which resulted from economic exigencies of the time combined with
safety considerations led to the formation of an L-shaped neighborhood. As a result of these
developments, the subdivisions at the western corner of the foreshore (E-2 & E-3 in Figure
3.1), which were reserved for future extensions, took up residential and entertainment
functions.

Figure 3.6 Plan of the Abadan Refinery, 1912.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36509

260

“The second annual meeting report,” August 1911, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd. Private Letter
Book, Volume 1. BP Archives, ArcRef 54484. p.386. Also: 'Administration Report of the Persian Gulf
Political Residency for the Years 1911-1914' [42r] (88/488), British Library: India Office Records and
Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/711, in Qatar Digital Library. p.70.

113

The Bungalow Area’s spatial structure was also engineered to reinforce the
hierarchical social order that was initially forged as a result of the first settlement pattern.
On the eve of WWI ten bungalows in total were constructed for the accommodation of
forty-eight European personnel. The Refinery works manager and other senior staff resided
in two-storied bungalows erected on ample plots on the foreshore. For instance, as Figure
3.7 shows, in 1912, No.3 Bungalow was erected on the parcel adjoining No.1 Bungalow
(E-2 in Figure 3.1). No.5 Bungalow was built on a section of the parcel initially designated
for the Works Manager’s residence (E-4 in Figure 3.1). Mid-level British employees were
accommodated in the medium-sized bungalows behind the front row. No.4 Bungalow, for
example, was built on the subdivision opposite No.2 Bungalow (C-4 in Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.7 A view of the Bungalow Area near the foreshore looking east, 1912. No.3
Bungalow to the left and No.1 Bungalow (the Castle) in the center, both constructed in
the “Country” Style and used for the accommodation of senior staff.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 28253

Junior employees were housed in smaller bungalows located at the northwestern
corner of the Bungalow Area which were designed for a group of two, four, or six men. As
Figure 3.8 illustrates, four small bungalows for junior bachelor employees were erected on
the new subdivisions opposite No.2 Bungalow. In the light of the new land acquisition in
December 1914, the Bungalow Area began to expand northward. During the War years,
two junior bachelor bungalows (Nos. 11 and 12) were also built on the strip of land at the
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northern enclosure of the refinery. In the postwar years, due to the shortage of housing,
European employees of varied grades had to share accommodation. In 1920, for instance,
there was no room to accommodate the three new marine superintending engineers. Junior
employees had to share rooms with other peers and even sitting rooms in all small type
bachelors’ bungalows were converted into bedrooms. Moreover, some men had to go to
other bungalows to dine.261 As a result, in these years distinctions by the type of
accommodation became less pronounced. This situation necessitated further land
acquisition and led to the expansion of the housing program. In May 1922, 21 jareebs
(acres) of land were acquired for a period of 60 years for a single payment of £500. As
Figure 3.9 depicts, the new land was located adjacent to the Bungalow Area, immediately
north of the ground acquired in December 1914.262

Figure 3.8 A view of Small Type Bachelors’ Bungalows (No.7-12) seen from Bungalow
No.6, circa 1920.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36530
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Figure 3.9 Site plan of the northern section of the Bungalow Area and the new land
selected for Acquisition, June 1919.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 100497

The Bungalow-Compound Complex
A typical colonial bungalow was usually positioned within a two-to three-acre enclosed
ground known as the “compound.” Constituting the building block of the European quarter
in the Indian colonial city, the bungalow-compound complex consisted of several
components, such as the garden, verandah, servants’ quarters, and drive— a private road
to the house. The bungalow-compound complex, as Anthony King notes, crystalizes the
cultural universe and the system of social behavior unique to the Anglo-Indian
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community.263 The first series of detached bungalows at Abadan followed this colonial
model. Each bungalow was staffed by several servants and a cook. In colonial bungalows,
servants’ quarters were located at the rear of the premises, “lying leeward at some distance
from the bungalow.”264 Following the colonial precedents, as Figures 3.10 illustrates, the
servants’ quarters in the senior-and mid-level staff bungalows were detached, single-storey
structures erected on the periphery of each plot. 265 Separation of servants’ quarters from
the main residence was also standard practice in the Victorian upper-middle-class homes,
and facilitated the surveillance of servants.266

Figure 3.10 A view of the rear side of No.3 Bungalow Compound, circa 1921. As the
photo shows, the Servants’ Block was a single-story rectilinear structure located at the
rear end of the premises.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36530
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Landscaping in residential estates was also viewed as a means of preserving the
cultural identity of the British occupants. For instance, each bungalow was surrounded by
a garden that functioned as a cultural link between the members of the expatriate
community and the metropolitan society. As Gail Ching Liang Low notes, English gardens
in colonial settings were a “sustained attempt to inscribe a leisured pastoral ideal of
Englishness in a foreign land” and served as both a visual barricade against the undesirable
outsiders and an element nullifying the adulterating effect of what was considered
“foreign.”267 At Abadan, landscaping of bungalow compounds drew attention in the
1920s.268 For each bungalow a water pump was installed. In 1923, it was decided that the
Company should take charge of the maintenance of all frontage gardens, because it was
deemed “desirable for the sake of appearance that frontage gardens should be kept nice,”
while employees had to cover the maintenance costs of the back yard and the side yards.269
Despite these efforts, in the beginning the quality of landscaping and gardens did not look
impressive to some outsiders.270 However, following the appointment of the superintendent
of gardens, and with the establishment of a nursey, where saplings and seeds of shrubs and
hedges imported from Ceylon (present-day Seri Lanka) and India were cultivated, the
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quality of lawns and gardens considerably improved.271 In the late 1920s, a British visitor
characterized the Bungalow Area as an “English garden suburb.”272
Domestic Space and Furniture
Similarly, domestic space was organized to provide British oilmen with the culturally
contained way of life. Since the first group of British staff had come from Burma and India,
cultural preferences that governed the internal layout of domestic space were similar to
those of the Anglo-Indian community or what Anthony King has characterized as the
“colonial third culture.”273 In this sense, the bungalow served as a “cultural enclave,”
offering the occupants with “solitude and familiar surroundings.”274 For instance, domestic
space in colonial bungalows was divided, according to the upper-and middle-class norms
in the metropolitan society, into separate, specialized rooms for siting, relaxation, greeting
guests, eating, bathing, and sleeping. Each specialized space was designed to fulfill certain
functions and accommodated specialized, culture-specific equipment, such as cutlery,
tableware, dining furniture and side boards.275

271

John Woolfenden Williamson, In a Persian Oil Field: A Study in Scientific and Industrial Development.
(London: Ernest Benn Limited, Second Edition (Revised and Enlarged), 1930), p.147
272
John Woolfenden Williamson, In a Persian Oil Field: A Study in Scientific and Industrial Development.
(London: Ernest Benn Limited, Second Edition (Revised and Enlarged), 1930), p.146
273
Anthony King stipulates that the “colonial third culture” is the product of culture-contact situations in
the colonized country between the cultures of the metropolitan society and the indigenous society.
Anthony D. King, Colonial Urban Development: Culture, Social Power and Environment. (London:
Routledge, 1976), p.65
274
Anthony D. King, The Bungalow: The Production of a Global Culture. (Oxford University Press, 1995),
p.44
275
Anthony D. King, Colonial Urban Development: Culture, Social Power and Environment. (London:
Routledge, 1976), p.57

119

Figure 3.11 The Entrance Hall of the General Manager’s Bungalow, circa 1926. The
arrangement of furniture in this specialized space created a culture-specific environment
resembling the domestic space either in a high-ranking official bungalow in the colonial
setting or the upper-and middle-class residence in the metropole.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36152

Until the late 1920s, all bungalows at Abadan were designed by engineers and
draftsmen with Indian experience at the Managing Agents headquarters in Khorramshahr.
In the early years, due to the lack of standardized plans, some personnel were able to alter
the buildings’ internal layout according to their own taste. In other words, the design of
bungalows presented an opportunity to some British staff to display their occupational
status and prestige within the oil enterprise. In one instance, two staff members changed
their bungalow’s original layout to surpass the size of their colleague’s residence. This
caused the actual capital outlay for the building to increase threefold and raised severe
criticism from the Company Directors. The Directors even contemplated charging the
respective employees with a rent calculated at ten percent of the total construction cost plus
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the ground rent.276 In another case, the siting and dining rooms in a bungalow were so
disproportionately large that the occupant had to use partitions to make the spaces
“habitable.” This situation made the Managing Director consider standardizing the
domestic space “on the most economical basis.”277
Furnishing and decoration of European residences also recreated the domestic
space of colonial bungalows in India or Burma. Some senior staff coming from the
metropole expected to get the equivalent of a flat in London West End. 278 As a general
policy, the London management wished to keep the expenses down particularly in
furnishing junior bachelors’ bungalows; however, the Company reluctantly followed the
paternalistic practices of the Burmah Oil Company rather than the precedents set by British
firms in India.279 In the beginning, furniture requirements were provided on a case-by-case
basis. Sale indents were prepared by the Refinery works manager and then were sent
through the Managing Agents to London for approval. Most of the articles were shipped
from Karachi and London to Abadan. There were also some furniture items that were
provided by local manufacturers. The quality of furniture imported from India was
relatively poor and the articles provided from Britain turned out to be costly. Moreover,
the Company had to pay fifteen-percent Iranian Customs Duty for imported furniture. All
these factors made the company management consider manufacturing all the required
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furniture in Iran. In 1920, plans were prepared to set up a woodworking plant at Abadan
and make furniture for bungalows locally.280
Another strategy to economize on furniture expenses was to adopt a standard scale
for different types of bungalows. Each bedroom was furnished with one washstand and a
towel roll, but occupants were responsible for provision of their own face and bath towels.
The bedroom also featured a single iron bedstead with M. Poles with mattress and two soft
and hard pillows. One almirah (wardrobe), one chest of drawers with mirror, one toilet set,
one sleever (sleeper) and one simple chair, and one chota hazari table were also provided.
Before the Bungalow Area connected to the electric power network, each bedroom was lit
by one kerosene-burning lamp. The bathroom usually included either a pucca bath with
towel rail and water closet or a tin bath with one “thunder box” as well as one oil/electric
lamp. Following the local practice in summer, employees would sleep on the roof in beds
protected by mosquito curtains. Upon arrival, every employee was assigned one mosquito
curtain, four pillowcases, four bed sheets, and two blankets. Employees were also charged
for replacements.281
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Figure 3.12 The Drawing Room in the General Manager’s Bungalow, circa 1926. As the
residence of the highest-ranking Company official at Abadan, the Works Manager’s
Bungalow was furnished with luxury items. For instance, Persian rugs rather than Indian
durries adorned the drawing room.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36152

The drawing room, which was a shared space, varied in size. In a typical bungalow,
it usually featured a couch, two armchairs, four small chairs, one card table, and one Indianstyle carpet known as durrie (dhurrie). Senior and junior bungalows were eligible to get an
allowance up to £100 and £20, respectively, for extra amenities.282 In senior officials’
bungalows, more items were used to furnish the interior and the furniture in general was
of higher quality. For instance, in the residence of the General Manager, as shown in Figure
3.12, Persian rugs and upholstered armchairs decorated the drawing room. The number of
oil/electric lamps corresponded to the size of the room.
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The dimensions of the dining room were also proportionate to the number of
occupants in each bungalow. This space included a Cambridge sideboard, a dinner wagon,
one table with the required number of chairs, and a durrie. As with the drawing room,
depending on the size of the room, sufficient lamps were provided to appropriately light
up the space. Table linen and crockery also corresponded to the number of occupants.
Kitchenware, however, was the same for different bungalows. Bungalows were supplied
with crude oil and kerosene for water heating, light (before the electricity network was
installed), and cooking, respectively. Each European employee had to recruit a servant at
its own expense. In junior staff bungalows, a group of two, four, or six employees used to
dine together.283 In the beginning, the Company provided four houseboys and one cook to
each bungalow. In 1924, only one cook and one farrash was provided to each mess.284
Furniture, in general, fell into two categories: one group, including beds, tables,
chairs, cutlery, and kitchen utensils for single employees, were repaired or replaced, if
necessary, free of charge by the Company. The second group included the items that were
replaced at employees’ expense, such as crockery, mosquito nets, bed linen, and the like.
Married employees were billed the cost of furnishing the extra bedroom and sitting room
and had to provide their own crockery, cutlery and table linen.285
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Prior to the formation of the Staff Department in February 1923, accommodation
of British personnel was handled by different departments. For instance, allocation of
employees to different bungalows was decided by the Refinery works manager. In July
1923, a Bungalow Warden was appointed who, under the supervision of the Chief
Storekeeper, was in charge of the furniture store and was tasked with the smooth settling
of the new personnel, ensuring the proper allocation of bungalow furniture, linen, and
personal outfit based on the “sanctioned scale,” and returning all the personal items to the
store upon the employee departure.286
Economic Pragmatism: From County-Style to Barrack-Type Bungalows
In order to build economical and enduring housing, the management experimented with
different styles of construction. No.1 Bungalow, which was built based on the vernacular
construction methods, accommodated only two seniors, while junior European staff
continued to occupy the tin hut and canvas tents. In order to expedite the housing program,
the management decided to build new bungalows on the lines of the so-called “European
style” of construction. Between 1910 and 1911, five bungalows of European style were
commenced. These buildings were made of steel frames with concrete slabs and were filled
in with burnt bricks produced locally. Roofs were covered with cement plaster and
insulated with puddled clay.287 One of the examples of this style was No.2 Bungalow
(Figure 3.13; C-4 in Figure 3.1) which was a double-storied building designed for
accommodation of eight men.288
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Figure 3.13 No.2 Bungalow under construction, 1911. It was constructed in the so-called
“European Style.”
(Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36137)

Since steel frames needed to be imported from Karachi or London, the total cost of
this type of bungalow was relatively high. When Hamilton and Greenway, the Managing
Directors of the APOC, visited Abadan in February 1911, it was decided to switch to the
“country style” of construction in the next phase of staff housing. The Directors believed
that the vernacular system would be “cheaper” and more “suitable” than the European
style, and in the long run would largely “effect the economy.”289 The Works Manager’s
bungalow and a semi-detached bungalow were built in the country style. These were
double-storied structures made totally of kiln-burnt bricks. In general, the initial cost of the
residences built in the local style was lower than those made with steel-framed structures.
Nonetheless, due to the use of low-quality construction materials and weak foundations,
the former deteriorated very quickly. Moreover, because of high maintenance costs, the
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management often chose to demolish and rebuild rather than refurbish the country-style
buildings.290

Figure 3.14 Front views of the Works Manager’s Bungalow (No.5 Bungalow), circa
1920. Built in the “country style” on the Refinery foreshore, the Works Manager’s
Bungalow also served as the architectural representation of the oil industry in the postwar era. In fact, the two-storied structure surrounded by a complete verandah turned into
a prototype used extensively in the first-tier buildings constructed by the Company in the
1920s. Verandah, white gown, and helmet represented colonial-type environmental
control strategies at the intermediate and micro levels, respectively.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36164

Country-style bungalows were followed by small-type bachelors’ bungalows. As
Figure 3.8 shows, these were single-story structures built with kiln-burnt bricks, featuring
wide verandahs and chandelled roofs. Similar to their predecessors, these structures, built
between 1913 and 1923, deteriorated quickly in the period of ten years.291 Moreover, smalltype bachelors’ bungalows faced a major technical problem. Because of the lack of top
ventilation, pockets of warm air would accumulate under the ceiling which were blown
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onto the occupants by the ceiling fans.292 This technical issue was addressed in the next
generation of bungalows by employing the Anglo-Indian design practices. For instance, in
the new bungalows clerestory ventilators were provided which were equipped with
swinging glazed-and-wooden frames and protected by sunshade structures known as
chajja.293 All these features were among the colonial design regulations of “tropical
architecture,” or architecture for Europeans in the tropics, also knowns as Military Board
style, provided by the Government of India in the second half of the nineteenth century.294
With the rapid increase in the number of European employees in the early 1920s,
the Company embarked upon a housing program to accommodate the new junior bachelor
staff. Once again, a colonial housing type, known as the chummery, served as a reference
model. The chummery in British India was a type of accommodation providing rooms and
a common kitchen to low-ranking bachelors or unaccompanied Europeans.295 At Abadan,
this housing model evolved into a hybrid barrack-type bungalow which combined colonial
precedents with vernacular construction techniques. Upon visiting the oil fields in the early
1920s, H. E. Nichols, the Managing Director, decided to draw inspiration from upcountry
buildings which, in his view, were more economical and efficient than bungalows
previously erected at Abadan. Built by the masons recruited from the cities of Shushtar and
Isfahan, company-sponsored residences in the oil fields had embraced some elements of
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the indigenous construction techniques. For instance, they featured arched ceilings made
of local materials including stone and gypsum. Furthermore, the application of exposed
gypsum plaster had made interiors look “brighter” and “cooler” than Abadan bungalows
in which cement plaster and oil paint was used. Following the Managing Director’s visit,
the Head Draftsman at Khorramshahr was tasked with preparation of design blueprints for
a handful of new barrack-type bungalows at Abadan based on the housing models built at
Masjid-i-Sulaiman.296 These bungalows which came to be known as Slide Valves provided
one room per man and one bathroom for every three men and included a common kitchen
(See Figure 3.15). The slide-valve type caused a great deal of discontent amongst occupants
who always vilified this housing model due to its alleged congestion, shortage of bathing
facilities, and lack of privacy.297
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Figure 3.15 Site plan of the Bungalow Area, 1924.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 68331

The barrack-type bungalow was driven by economic pragmatism. Before the
implementation of this housing scheme, the cost of a typical bungalow in Abadan was, on
average, fifty percent higher than the residential buildings erected in other oil centers, such
as Ahwaz and Masjid-i-Sulaiman. The management always believed that by improving the
design quality and eliminating extravagant fixtures large sums of money would be saved
and construction expenses would drop to a level close to other operation areas. For
instance, the so-called “lavish” and “unnecessary” woodwork featuring older bungalows
was removed from the new slide-valve type.298
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Despite all the measures, construction expenses remained relatively high in
Abadan. Several factors may explain this anomaly. First of all, given the island’s extreme
climatic conditions, thick walls and deep arcaded verandahs were required to counter the
heat. Foundations also had to be stronger than buildings erected upcountry due to the
salinity of soil and high levels of underground water. Moreover, bungalows at Abadan were
made of kiln-burnt bricks with lime and sand mortar. A large share of construction
materials had to be imported from outside. For instance, bricks in large proportions were
supplied from Basra while some quantities were produced locally. Other building materials
were provided through intermediaries or local suppliers on a five-percent commission
basis.299 For instance, stone, sand, and gatch (gypsum) were brought in from Bushire
through the intermediary of British Vice Consul in Bushire.300 Since building materials
were not deemed ordinary articles of commerce, the prices varied throughout the year
depending on various factors, such as seasonality, availability of boats, and political
circumstances in districts.301 In the postwar years, the monopoly for provision of building
materials was granted to local authorities which further increased the rates.302 From the
constructional standpoint, due to the salinity of soil and high level of underground water in
Abadan, which was within a depth of eighteen inches to six feet, heavy foundation was
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required which consisted of a mixture of cement, broken bricks, and sand.303 Considering
the geological properties of the island, engineers of the Associated Portland Cement
Manufacturers Ltd. suggested that “slow-setting” cement should be used at Abadan which
was more expensive than the conventional “very-quick-setting” type of cement.304
Increased exchange rate of Iranian currency in relation to Indian rupee and the inflated
rates of construction labor in the postwar years could also account for the increased cost of
bungalows. For instance, in 1919, the total cost of Bungalow No. 14 turned out to be sixty
percent higher than the initial estimate.305
Individual buildings were contracted to local Arab headmen (maistry) or head
masons from Khorramshahr or Basra. For instance, the construction of three plinths for a
tent and store-huts which were among the first structures erected at the refinery was granted
to a head mason (ustad) and four laborers who were recruited through a local merchant
(Haji Nasir).306 The Managing Agents and the contractor would enter into an agreement,
the terms of which were arranged in favor of the Company. For instance, the contract
enabled the Company to oversee the progress and, if necessary, unilaterally interfere with
or even take over construction work. 307 It was also common practice to recruit contractors
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through the intermediary of a guarantor who was usually a local notable or merchant and
who would take the full responsibility for the satisfactory execution of the contract and
completion of work by a fixed date. For instance, for the construction of the office building
an Arab guarantor was hired through British firm Frank C. Strick & Co. which was the
agent of the APOC in Basra. The commissions that the middlemen received also swelled
the total construction costs.308
While economic pragmatism remained the major tenet of staff housing, in the 1920s
environmental factors began to play an important role in the design of bungalows. As
Figure 3.16 illustrates, the new section of the Bungalow Area took a new orientation to
take advantage of the prevailing winds, including northerly and north-westerly winds in
summer, and adapt to the climatic conditions of Abadan. Hence, the new bungalows were
designed with wider southern facades and smaller windows on the eastern and western
sides. The new bungalows also featured large clerestory windows, and older bungalows
were retrofitted and equipped with non-glazed clerestory openings. The walls at the ground
level were protected from the sun by verandahs designed to project shades on a horizontal
distance of 8 feet in May, June, and July between the hours of 10:00 AM and 2:00 PM. To
decrease heat conduction through the upper portions of the walls not protected by
verandahs, cavity walls with six-inch still air were used. 309
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Figure 3.16 An Aerial View of the Bungalow Area, circa 1926. To better accommodate
Abadan’s climatic conditions, the new section of the Bungalow Area took a north-south
orientation. Nevertheless, similar to the Anglo-Indian residential estates, bungalows were
arranged en echelon. Moreover, ceremonial axialities, monumental symmetries, and wide
setbacks were the characteristic features of the Bungalow Area.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36529

3.2.1.2 Native Village: The Intermediary Zone.

As mentioned earlier, the southern

corner of zone D near the riverfront (D-2 in Figure 3.1) was initially earmarked for the
accommodation of non-European employees. In this section of the oil camp a hybrid
settlement known as the Company’s Village emerged which constituted a second element
of Abadan’s triple urban space. Imbued with the colonial third culture, Company officials
called this settlement the Native Village or the Native Lines. Until the early 1920s, the
inhabitants of the Native Village were largely comprised of migrant workmen from India
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who similar to the “intervening” groups310 in the colonial city filled the intermediary ranks
of the company town’s social hierarchy. While the refinery acted as a metal barricade
separating the Bungalow Area from the Native Village, the village itself functioned as a
buffer zone between the British expatriate community and the neighboring indigenous
settlement that sprang up on the southeastern side of the refinery.311 The Native Village
also served as the oil camp’s resource center. Not only did the neighborhood accommodate
the second-class personnel, it was the site of production of large quantities of bricks, the
major material used in the construction of the refinery. In the early years of operations, the
soil extracted from the neighborhood was used for reclamation of the refinery site. The
company also used part of this area as dumping ground and open store, where such
construction material as bricks, firewood, building timber, poles, mats, and bhoosa (broken
straw) were kept.312

Coolie (Cooly) Lines and Native Houses
Before company officials began to build accommodation for “native” workmen, this group
of employees lived in tents and other makeshift structures, similar to those shown in Figure
3.17, which were made of modest materials, such as mud, reed, corrugated iron, and
thatch.313 Eventually, arrays of mud huts, known as coolie lines, were built to house the
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first group of skilled and semi-skilled workmen who until 1922 were primarily composed
of Indians. Coolie lines consisted of two words that both belonged to the language of the
colonial third culture. The term coolie, prevalent both in the metropole and the colonies,
was associated with exploitation and cheap labor and was a key element of the colonial
economic system.314 The word lines originated in the military terminology. Signifying a
linear layout, the term denoted “the physical demarcations of ground indicating the relative
location of the units of tented accommodation in a temporary camp.”315 The term was also
used to describe the area in the cantonment, the permanent military station in British India,
where indigenous troops known as the “sepoy” and their families resided and constructed
shelters made of “his own straw or bamboo and matting hut.”316 The Coolie line was also
a type of barrack housing prevalent in nineteenth-century all-male labor camps in Europe
and North America which were built in isolated regions near extractive sites.317 Barracklike “shacks” were also used to accommodate unskilled workers in many American
company towns in the early twentieth century.318
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Figure 3.17 Abadan Refinery, a view of the western section of Zone D looking north,
1911. The photo provides a glimpse of makeshift or kutcha structures provided to the first
group of skilled and semi-skilled laborers brought to Abadan from East Asia.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36137

Like the bungalow, the coolie line also belonged to the toolkit of colonial agroindustrial architecture. The term was used to describe any planned or regulated
accommodation provided for a service community. Providing the minimum level of shelter
for workmen in plantation estates and manufacturing villages across colonial India, coolie
lines followed a more or less prearranged layout: they were composed of one- to twostoried structures partitioned into back-to-back rooms opening onto a narrow verandah,
five to six feet wide, which would run along either side of the building to protect rooms
against excessive sun light and facilitate ventilation. The size of rooms ranged between ten
and one hundred square feet. In plantation farms, usually two or more workmen of the same
cast would occupy each room, and it was common practice to let laborers work out the
arrangements among themselves.319 Kitchen was provided at the end of the verandah, but
usually cooking was done inside each room.320 In the colonial context, this industrial
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housing prototype was provided for the lowest grade of unskilled laborers, or coolies. 321
In Abadan, however, coolie lines were designed to house the second-class personnel,
including artisans, foremen, and clerks who were recruited from India, Burma, and China.
It seems that no specific plans or guidelines for the construction of coolie lines were
provided by the London office. As a result, the Managing Agents who oversaw all the
operations in Iran ordered the construction of ten coolie lines in the oil fields on the basis
of the generic formula. Each “line” was composed of ten rooms, 100 square feet each—
“big enough to hold a family,” in the words of a manager. The decisions regarding the
selection of site, arrangement of the dwellings, and other construction specifications were
relegated to the Fields works manager. Due to the scarcity of bricks in the oil fields area,
coolie lines were to be built of stone and gatch, as gypsum was called in Farsi.322
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Figure 3.18 Abadan Refinery, Chittagonian Lines, circa 1920. As the photo vividly
illustrates, each pair of coolie lines was comprised of two “lines” facing one another with
a utility hut in the middle which contained the communal cooking and washing facilities.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36179

Evidence is scanty regarding the ways in which the first coolie lines were built at
the Abadan Refinery. We may assume, however, that similar guidelines as those provided
to the Fields must have been given to the Refinery works manager. It can be inferred that
the first coolie lines were built of mud and sun-dried bricks because they were later referred
to as “mud lines.” The map of the Refinery from 1910 sheds light on the initial layout of
these structures (Figure 3.1; D2). The plan had envisioned three rows of housing organized
in pairs running parallel to the Shatt. The open spaces provided among the lines aimed to
facilitate ventilation and ensure social control. As Figure 3.18 shows, each pair was
comprised of two “lines” facing one another with a utility hut in the middle which
contained the communal cooking and washing facilities. Figure 3.18 also indicates that in
order to “effect economy,” similar to the Fields, each coolie line was composed of double
rows of ten rooms built back-to-back to save a wall in each two rooms. By August 1910,
as Figure 3.1 shows, two units (No.1 & No.2) had been erected in Area D-2 on the
Refinery’s foreshore.
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Figure 3.19 Map of the Abadan Refinery, October 1911.
Source: FO 925/17051

The first residents of the coolie lines came from the Rangoon refineries. These men
were Chittagonian Sunni Muslims with some experience in the Burmese oil industry who
were sent to Abadan on a free-contract system through the intermediary of the Burmah Oil
Company.323 The so-called Rangooni workmen formed the first cluster of skilled and semiskilled workforce in Abadan, whose number steadily grew as additional migrant laborers
were recruited from India and elsewhere.324 Since the beginning of operations, the
employment of Indians in the Iranian oil industry met with strong protest from the Iranian
Government. Per Article 12 of the D’Arcy Oil Concession, the Company was required to
supply its workforce from Iranian subjects, except for “technical staff, such as the
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Managers, Engineers, Borers, and Foremen.” The Iranian Government repetitively accused
the Company of breaching the Concession and disapproved of recruiting large numbers of
Indians and “Turkish subjects” – namely Arab and Armenian workmen employed from the
present-day Iraq– in non-technical positions. Rejecting these charges, the Company always
claimed that, “Indians are skilled mechanics or laborers of a class unobtainable in
Persia.”325 Moreover, the Indian Emigration Act of 1883 restricted labor migration to
specified regions, including Iran. The Company launched several rounds of negotiations
with the British Raj to waive the restrictions on the employment of Indians in Iran.326
Indians were engaged through the offices of the British trading firm Shaw, Wallace
and Co., which until 1926 acted as the agent of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in India.
The Company’s general policy was to shape an ethnically diverse pool of workforce
composed of “antipathetic” sects, such as Hindoos, Sikhs, and Muslims, to prevent
organization of labor and potential strikes.327 As a result, Shaw, Wallace and Co. and its
subsidiaries opened offices in several provincial cities and industrial centers throughout the
Indian sub-continent. For instance, for construction of tank farms, rivetters were employed
in Karachi and Bombay.328 To run the tinning department (tin-making plant) half a dozen
solderers were recruited from other Indian installations.329 Clerks were recruited from the

325

F. Macindoe to Sadigh-es-Saltaneh, January 20th, 1915, Correspondence with Persian Legation and
Imperial Commission relating to Payments of Royalties and Legation Expenses, BP Archives, ArcRef 69952
326
For a full account of negotiations between the Company and the Government of India regarding the
employment of Indians in the Iranian oil industry and the subsequent changes in the Indian Emigration
Act, see Touraj Atabaki, “Far from Home, But at Home: Indian Migrant Workers in the Iranian Oil
Industry”, Studies in History 31, no.1 (2015): pp. 93-98
327
H. E. Nichols, April 25th, 1921, Notes on a Visit to Persia, Mesopotamia and Egypt. BP Archives, ArcRef
28604/002
328
W. E. C. Greenwood to C. Greenway, 9th May 1914, “Busreh Fuel Oil Tank Depot” in Persia: General
Correspondence (Mainly Between London and Mohammerah), BP Archives, ArcRef 70284
329
C. A. Walpole to R. Pitkethly, 7th October 1912, BP Archives, ArcRef 104121, “All DO[Demi-Official
Letters from except London and Glasgow”, p.306

141

Punjab area; servants for domestic services were supplied from Bombay; and, for process
work Chittagonians were employed. However, for carpentry tasks and woodwork Chinese
workmen were engaged.330 As it was standard practice at the Burmah Oil Company, and
given the requirements of the Government of India, the indentured labor was brought to
Abadan on a three-year contract. Transportation costs to Abadan (as well as return tickets
to India) and accommodation were covered by the Company, while laborers had to take
charge of their foodstuffs.331 Political developments combined with labor activism made
the company revise its labor recruitment policies. For instance, following the repatriation
of large numbers of Indians in the early 1920s, skilled and semi-skilled workmen were
recruited from Iranian, Armenian, Iraqi, and Bahraini nationals.
By 1912, 643 Indians and 36 Chinese were in the employ of the Company in
Abadan,332 and, as Figure 3.19 illustrates, in total eleven coolie lines had been constructed
in the Native Village. Assuming that each coolie line was comprised of 20 rooms, then the
rate of occupancy in the first series of coolie lines was, on average, three persons per room.
Similar to the Bungalow Area, a piece of oil infrastructure influenced the layout of the
neighborhood. As Figures 3.20 and 3.21 show, the extension of the light rail track for the
brick-making project in Zone D blocked the eastward extension of the coolie lines. Rather
than growing in parallel rows, as the initial plan had envisioned, the new wing of the lines
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was built perpendicular to Shatt. In the new section, the service units—containing
cookhouse, water stands, and latrines—were placed at the back of each pair of coolie lines.

Figure 3.20 Site plan of the Abadan Refinery, June 1913.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36509

The Native Village gradually grew eastward as the new rows of housing were built
to accommodate the increasing population of workmen imported from abroad. Between
1912 and 1914, the number of Indian migrant laborers augmented from 643 to 900, of
whom almost 400 were artisans (280 were fitters and 128 were rivetters) and the rest
engaged in clerical positions.333 The new housing lines, called “native houses,” were
planned on the eastern side of the brick kiln railway (D-3 in Figure 3.1). Maps of the
Abadan refinery from 1913 and 1915 (Figures 3.20 and 3.21) show that native houses were
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envisioned as lines of barrack-type housing, organized in pairs. Native houses were
morphologically similar to coolie lines but were longer and had larger rooms. In the select
lines public water stands were provided.334

Figure 3.21 Site plan of Abadan Refinery, February 1915.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36509

Spatial Engineering in the Native Village
Space in the Native Village was engineered at various scales to control labor and
institutionalize the desired hierarchical order within the “native” workforce. At the level of
residential units, coolie lines and native houses both were designed to create a regimented
environment to shape the workers’ behavior and instill in their mind the sense of discipline
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and the rhythm of industrial work. In other words, coolie lines were used as an instrument
not only to acclimate laborers to industrial life but also to turn them into an army of labor,
eliminating the laborer’s individual self in favor of a collective undertaking. Also, native
houses and coolie lines were designed as rectangular structures to ease the visibility and
control of the workers’ movement. On the larger scale, the village’s layout which was
comprised of a network of intersecting streets and alleyways, was used to organize and
divide workmen’s housing and facilitate constant surveillance of the village and its
occupants. No blind spots, enclosed open spaces, or dead ends were envisioned in the entire
village. Furthermore, as Figure 3.22 shows, open spaces separated neighborhoods, such as
the Inland Water Transport (I.W.T) camp and the New Coolie Lines, from the rest of the
Village. Separation of quarters helped the Company provide varied paternalistic programs
to different labor groups and minimized the risk of labor protest.
Designed to accommodate 2000 skilled and semi-skilled workmen on a supposedly
clean geographical slate, the Native Village aimed to establish a hierarchical social order.
To this end, the neighborhood was divided along ethnic and occupational lines. In the postwar years, for instance, it consisted of such sections as Old Process Lines, Mud Lines,
Foremen’s Quarters, Chinese Lines, Sikh Lines, New Process Lines, Punjabi Lines,
Rangooni (Rangoony) Lines, Clerks’ Quarters, Chittagonian Lines, Armenian Lines,
among others.335 The hierarchical organization of the village determined the quality of
housing. Coolie lines and native houses in Abadan, as in other industrial towns in India,
were of pucca and kutcha types and, by and large, were made of low-quality and sometimes
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recycled materials.336 In the Fields, for example, the doors and windows that were not
deemed appropriate for bungalows were used in native houses.337 The construction of the
newly built clerks’ quarters in the oil fields was so poor that cook houses and latrines were
demolished after a heavy storm of rain.338 As a general rule, the quality of each “line”
corresponded to the occupational status of the occupants. Pucca buildings with better
amenities were provided to higher-grade workmen, such as clerks, foremen, assistant
engineers, maistries, and tindals. Moreover, fewer workmen were assigned to each room.
For instance, every unit in the clerks’ quarters consisted of a bedroom, which also served
as the living room, with a bathroom for each clerk and a dining room for every two clerks.
Latrines and cook houses were separated from the residential quarters by an alley.339
Clerical staff was entitled to free furnished quarters on three-year contracts. However, due
to the shortage of accommodation, rooms were shared among a group of men. Moreover,
most quarters were unfurnished, and employees had to bring their own furniture. Clerical
staff was also granted allowances to recruit cooks and servants.340
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Figure 3.22 Site Plan of the Native Village, December 1919.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 71403

Allocation of housing and amenities was not merely based on the occupational
status of each “native” group. The Company favored certain elements of the workforce and
provided them with better facilities. For instance, the most “habitable” quarters in the
Native Village were provided to Chittagonians, who had a lengthy presence in Abadan and
were considered one of the most loyal labor groups to the Company.341 This group was
also provided with a separate quarter below the brick kiln railway. Other company towns
also created similar occupational, ethnic, and racial cleavages through manipulation of
space both as a means of control and as a strategy to prevent organization of labor.342
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Living Conditions in the Native Village
“Most of the buildings are of a very temporary nature, and have in many cases been
constructed of mud which has been excavated from the neighborhood…in addition to this,
the buildings are huddled together much too closely…The only quarters which at present
may be said to be really habitable are the Chittagonian Lines and even these require
extensive repairs to the roofs, and are in any case hopelessly overcrowded at present.”343
The juxtaposition of the gloomy picture of the Native Village rendered by the Company
Manager and the map of Abadan from 1919 (Figure 3.22) shows that the Native Village
was not constructed according to the preconceived plans. Native houses were erected in
different sizes and shapes. The dimension and the number of rooms varied from one “line”
to another. For instance, the Rangooni Lines consisted of 90 rooms, while Punjabi Lines
included 50 rooms.344 Two major historic events may account for the chaotic development
and high degree of overcrowding in the Native Village: the British Government takeover
of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the outbreak of the Great War in Mesopotamia.
Up until 1914, the operations of the Company in Iran were largely affected by the
uncertainties that encircled the incipient oil enterprise that was struggling in a competitive
market dominated by colossal oil corporations. The threat of absorption by the Royal
Dutch-Shell combined with the overwhelming financial hardships that the Company
encountered after the refinery came into operation in 1912 compelled the Directors to look
to the British Government for help. As discussed in the previous chapter, the A.P.O.C.
enjoyed the government’s political support at various stages of its activity in Iran. For
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British officials, however, the Anglo-Persian was merely a private firm whose undertakings
were beyond the control of the British Government.345 Moreover, the concept of state aid
to private industries was not yet an acceptable doctrine among British statesment and
policymakers who, by and large, had faith in the merits of laissez faire capitalism.
In these circumstances, an imperial vision changed the political atmosphere in favor
of the Company. As early as 1904 the British Admiralty was considering the possibility of
converting its fleets from coal-burning to oil-fired propulsion. The growth of marine engine
technology and the rise of German naval power gave the project an increased urgency. A
search began to spot resources with reliable supplies of fuel oil across the British territories
and beyond. After it became evident that the Iranian oil fields were capable of serving the
requirements of the Royal Navy on the long-term basis, the British Parliament in a radical
break with tradition passed an act in June 1914, authorizing the British Government to
purchase fifty-one percent shares of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and appoint two ex
officio directors with veto powers over all acts of the Company and its subsidiaries.346 The
British Government takeover gave the Company enough financial means to expand its
operations in Iran and abroad. Almost 30 percent of the two-million-pound government
investment in the Company was designated for the refinery extensions and
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improvements.347 Moreover, the Company signed a thirty-year contract with the Admiralty
to provide the Royal Navy with a steady supply of fuel oil at a reduced fixed rate. All these
developments not only caused the Iranian oil industry to boom, but also turned oil into a
strategic commodity for the British Empire.348
The outbreak of the Great War in the region on November 5th, 1914, turned the
Abadan Refinery into a “war center.” The oil infrastructure was used by the Government
of India to support the Expeditionary Force against the Ottomans on the Mesopotamian
front. The refinery also served as part of the British Empire’s communication infrastructure
in the region. At the request of the India Office, a wireless station was erected at Abadan
and a joint post and telegraph office was opened in 1916 on the Company’s premises.349 In
return, the oil infrastructure in the entire province was protected by British forces. During
the War years, the Refinery management was tasked with two projects: undertaking the
Government War Programs350 and increasing the capacity of the Refinery to fulfill the
Admiralty contract. To accomplish these assignments large supplies of skilled and
unskilled labor were required.351
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The Company leveraged its “special relations” with the British Government to
persuade the Government of India to relax the restrictions on the emigration of Indian
artisans and foremen to Iran. By May 1915, hundreds of Indian foremen and their families
were brought to Abadan and accommodated in the middle section of the Native Village.
New lines were also under construction to the north of the foremen’s quarters to house a
group of Indian clerical staff.352 However, provision of accommodation to the second-class
personnel was not on the Company’s list of priorities, and housing production did not keep
up with the increased populations of the workforce. Moreover, peculiar conditions created
by the War also influenced the progress of construction work at Abadan. In these years,
particularly after the fall of Basra on November 21st, 1914, not only did Abadan face labor
shortage, it also experienced a rapid diminution in the supply of construction materials.
Government projects in Basra offered more attractive employment opportunities than the
Abadan Refinery, drawing large numbers of local and migrant workmen to the other side
of the Shatt. Moreover, Abadan was required to supply construction materials, such as sand
and rubble, for the Civil Commission works in Mesopotamia.353
Housing shortage was dire in these years to the degree that, for instance, in 1916
there was no room available in the Clerks’ Quarters to accommodate the Police
Inspector.354 Also, the lack of proper accommodation caused the head of the Arab Guard,
Sheikh Moose, to move to Khorramshahr.355 To provide rapid housing, the Company
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adopted a vernacular housing prototype known as sarifa (also zareefa or sareefa), a
prevalent form of shelter among “marsh Arabs,” which was constructed of mud and reed.356
For instance, several sarifas were erected to accommodate the Indian Force from 4th Rajput
Detachment that was dispatched to Abadan to take charge of security at the Refinery. In
another case, sarifas were put up to accommodate the construction staff who had come to
Abadan in December 1914 to build a wireless tower.357 Housing shortage made the Inland
Water Transport (I.W.T), a British Government agency, erect a compound for the
accommodation of the I.W.T personnel, including the Persian Labour Corps. The so-called
I.W.T Camp consisted of 27 mud huts and was located at the southeastern corner of the
Native Village.358
Housing shortage also caused most “lines” to become overcrowded. In 1916, the
British Consul for Khuzestan was shocked at the quarters’ state of overcrowding after
learning that the Company would accommodate 60 people in a 60-by-12 foot shed.359 The
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Medical Advisor made similar observations: “…There are large rooms built, as far as I can
make out, to accommodate no fixed number of men, with at one time twenty and at another
time forty men in occupation.”360 In 1921, as a result of a labor strike and the continued
pressure from the Government of India, the Company launched a housing program for the
second-class personnel and sanctioned the construction of eight blocks for married
workmen, two houses for head maistries, eight houses for tail tindals, three new lines, and
one block for married maistries.361
Despite all these efforts, the housing situation did not improve in the Native Village.
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company Annual Report in 1924 rendered the living conditions of
artisans “deplorable.” The Report claimed that at the Armenian Line which was among the
best structures in the Native Village, fourteen families “herded together” in a 750-squarefoot shed. Even several artisans and their families were living “under canvas” in the bazaar
area. The shortage of housing made the Refinery works manager reject the applications of
some Indian artisans to get permission to bring their families to Abadan.362 Clerical staff
also lived under similar circumstances. In the words of an Indian clerk, “…large numbers
of people were huddled together in small rooms incompletely furnished, by way of
furniture and lights, nothing to say anything of cook houses and latrines.” 363

360

Dr. Jamieson, August 23rd, 1922, “Sanitary Conditions at Abadan and Schemes for Improvement,”
Reports to the Board by Sir john Cadman 1923 to 1924, BP Archives, ArcRef 70209
361
Blocks for married workmen and the lines took precedence over other housing projects and the total
cost was estimated at £20,000. H. E. Nichols, April 25th, 1921, Notes on a Visit to Persia, Mesopotamia and
Egypt. BP Archives, ArcRef 28604/002
362
“Department of Labour,” Anglo-Persian Oil Company Limited: Annual Report: 1st April 1924 to 31st
March 1925, BP Archives, ArcRef 54359, p.61
363
A. T. Mudliar to the Fields Manager, January 10th, 1922. “Indians in Persia,” Advertisement in Bombay
Chronicle, A. P. Oil Company: Number and Treatment of Indian Employees. British Library
IOR/L/P.S/11/213

153

The Company had adopted a standard scale of furniture exclusively for the higher
ranks of the second-class employees. In the clerks’ quarters, every bedroom/living room
featured one bedstead, one chest of drawers, one deck chair, one bentwood chair, one
teapoy, and one jug. The bathroom included one wash-stand with towel and one basin. By
this standard, every clerk was to be provided with one mattress, two pillows, two
pillowcases, four bed sheets, two blankets, one lahaf, one mosquito net, two bath towels,
and four face towels. The dining room also featured one dinner wagon, one bentwood chair,
one meat safe, one dining table and one ice chest. In practice, however, the full list of
furniture was not provided to all clerks. Company officials acknowledged that such articles
as ice chests, dinner wagons, and chests of drawers were not provided in sufficient
quantities.

364

As an Indian clerk noted, “People got to go without even bedsteads

necessitating to sleep on the floor. [I]f there are chairs, tables are not available and if
available not issued, reserving to the British.” As a result, most furniture articles had to be
acquired either from the company stores or from the bazaar on the workmen’s own
initiative.365 For instance, charpoy, the traditional Indian woven bed, was a very popular
article among Indians and was selling at the Abadan bazaar.
Insanitary environmental conditions in the Native Village were conducive to the
spread of diseases among the workmen. Not only were coolie lines and native houses
congested, they were dark and damp. Drinking and bathing taps and latrine seats were
disproportionately provided. Similar patterns were recorded in most agro-industrial
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company towns throughout colonial India.366 In the words of the Medical Advisor at
Abadan: “…with a single case of smallpox in one of these rooms, 39 people are off work
for a fortnight.” Moreover, the rooms had no openings to the outside other than a door. As
such, ventilation was poor or nonexistent. 367 Given the climatic characteristics of Abadan,
particularly in summer when the temperature would reach as high as 120 degrees
Fahrenheit, living in these quarters must have been extremely tough. The “lines” were also
crowded together, another factor that was believed to be contributing to the spread of
disease and epidemics. Only Armenian lines were built with “sufficient” space between the
buildings.368 Furthermore, only two nullahs on either side of the village collected water
run-offs and effluents and an effective drainage system was nonexistent. Unlike the
Bungalow Area, where structures and roads were built on raised platforms, no measure was
taken to protect the village against flooding. Moreover, as a result of the high level of
subsoil water, the nature of soil, and the numerous pitfalls and excavations made for the
brick-making project in the neighborhood, stagnant pools were created after rains which
became the breeding ground for Anopheles mosquitoes and the spread of malaria.
The Company’s Bazaar
To address housing shortage and generate revenue out of land, the Company rented ground
to locals. While the Company had built and owned three marketplaces in the oil fields, it
adopted the policy of minimizing capital expenditure at Abadan which involved engaging
local investors and merchants in the construction of houses and shops. By 1924, more than
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500 huts and shops were erected by private parties in different sections of the Native
Village. As a result of these developments, an indigenous built form grew up along the
brick kiln railway. In this area, the village’s main street and marketplace emerged— which
came to be known as the Company’s bazaar— and served as the main road to the Refinery’s
Southern Gate and Time Office. The Company’s bazaar consisted of an agglomeration of
more than 100 shops and hundreds of residential compounds densely packed together.
These structures were made of a wide range of building materials, such as burnt bricks,
mud and sun-dried blocks, timber, and mat. The rapid growth of the bazaar could partially
be attributed to the need to supply foodstuffs and goods to oil workmen and other residents
of the Company’s Village. Indeed, the provision stores run by the Company could not meet
the expectations and proved to be a money-losing venture. The scarcity of certain staples
made some residents raise livestock, such as cows, sheep and goats, on their compounds.369
The bazaar gradually became an established economic and social institution in the
Native Village. Three types of tenants resided in the bazaar quarters: individuals leasing
houses and shops owned by the Company; landlords owning shops and houses built on the
Company’s land; and, tenants living in houses and shops owned by private landlords.370
While the majority of residents in the village were Company employees, large numbers of
businessowners and contract laborers as well as peddlers resided in the bazaar quarters,
too. Based on the estimate provided by Company officials, the total population of the
Native Village in 1923 was around 2700, of whom 2000 lived in coolie lines and native
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houses and the rest resided in the huts and houses built by locals in the bazaar.371 In fact,
the density of population in the Native Village was estimated, quite optimistically, at 150
persons per acre. Even this figure was 50% higher than the maximum threshold set for a
typical colonial industrial settlement.372 Given the total number of privately-owned houses
in the Native Village, the informal population of the village must have been at least twice
the estimated official figure.373 This situation led the Chief Medical Advisor to suggest that
the overflowing population should be removed from the village and resettled somewhere
else.374

3.2.1.3 Indigenous Settlements.

Until the 1930s, no provision was made to

accommodate third-class employees and unskilled laborers. The Company also assumed
no responsibility to house people who indirectly served the oil works, such as contractors,
contracting labor, and shopkeepers. The following remarks by a Company official
encapsulate the rationale behind this policy:”…bringing Europeans or Indians into a
country, we had to provide accommodation for them, but it was not clear that we should
provide accommodation for Persians in their own country.”375 The housing situation was
different in the Fields. Thanks to labor activism and political agility of local tribal leaders
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(Bakhtiari Khans), the Company was forced to provide both indentured and local laborers
and even the contract-based workforce with free accommodation. Only shopkeepers who
worked on the Company’s premises had to pay rent. The Company’s housing policy at the
Abadan refinery was extremely radical even by the colonial standards of the time. Most
industrial centers located in remote areas or far from major urban centers in British India
would provide different classes of workforce with rental or rent-free accommodation.
Company officials usually justified the inequitable treatment of local labor on the pretext
of large populations of indentured laborers or the “peculiar” conditions in Abadan.376
From the onset of operations, Iranian artisans and unskilled laborers had to fend for
themselves in the agricultural settlements around the oil camp. Simultaneously, oil
development drew hundreds of villagers and nomadic populations of southwest Iran to
Abadan Island in the hope of finding wage-earning jobs at the Refinery. As a result, several
indigenous settlements mushroomed around the oil camp. It should be noted that migration
of settled and semi-settled rural populations to towns and villages has been a historical
phenomenon in southwest Iran.377 Some of the first encampments that emerged
immediately adjoining the oil works were suspiciously burnt down by fire.378 The most
notable agricultural settlement that witnessed considerable growth in the early years was
the village of Arusiyeh, also known as Saiyid Muhammad, to the south of the refinery
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whose population by 1911 had reached 1200.379 One of the reasons for the rapid growth of
Arusiyeh compared to other agricultural settlements was its proximity to the Native
Village. As I will show in what follows, Arusiyeh evolved into Abadan’s third and largest
residential quarter which was home to the third-class employees and other subaltern
groups.

Abadan Village
In 1909, Arusiyeh consisted of 12 mud and date stick huts. The first inhabitants of the
village were Arab date cultivators from the Baghlaniyeh sub-division of the Muhaisin
tribe.380 As Figure 2.9 in the previous chapter shows, Arusiyeh and its surrounding date
groves had initially grown along a tidal-irrigation canal, named after the village. It was
three feet deep and three feet wide and cut across the island from the Shatt-al-Arab to the
Bahminshir River.381 This agricultural settlement shaped the nucleus of what soon came to
be known as the Abadan Village or the Sheikh’s Village. Unlike the Native Village, this
settlement was outside the Company’s jurisdiction and was administered by the Sheikh’s
representative who also acted as the village’s headman. As a result, the Company had no
control over the village’s spatial structure and built form.
There is little information about the village’s early layout. It can be assumed that
the Abadan Village followed the prevalent vernacular order that underlay all pre-industrial
indigenous settlements in southern Khuzestan. It was comprised of an organic collection
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of residential quarters or wards, known as mahalleh, which was occupied by a specific
ethnic or tribal group. As the village grew bigger each mahalleh was divided into smaller
wards, each characterized by a particular language, or religious affiliation or the
geographical origin of its inhabitants.382 However, unlike the Native Village, Abadan
Village did not have a socio-spatial hierarchy. It can be inferred from the archival
documents that most buildings were erected on the vernacular systems of reed huts and
huts-in-compound. The average plot size was 40 X 40 feet. Due to the shortage of housing
in the postwar years, there was a tendency towards subdivision of larger plots with several
households living side-by-side in the same compound. Reed huts were mostly erected near
the Arusiyeh canal and constituted a distinctive neighborhood known as the Sarifa Area. It
was also common practice that people would erect mud houses out of the earth excavated
from their own enclosure.383
Viewing the Abadan village through the colonial bifocal lens, Company officials
perceived the village as a congested “native” settlement characterized by a system of
values, ideas, and social behavior that were not congruent with the norms and notions of
aesthetic and order underlying both the colonial and metropolitan middle-and upper-middle
class cultures. For instance, from the perspective of the Company’s architect, the Abadan
Village had grown in a typical “haphazard manner of an Eastern Village.” 384 Colonial town
planners once described the village as an exemplar of the human settlement where people
were left to themselves: “The huts are built irregularly. Though there are lanes among the
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huts that run comparatively straight, they are too far apart, and very serious insanitary
congestion has occurred between them, some huts being completely surrounded by others
except for a tortuous gulley which forms the only means for approach.”385
The first oil workers who settled in the Abadan Village were from the poor rural
areas of southern Khuzestan and Turkish Arabia (Present-day Iraq). As mentioned earlier,
the D'Arcy Oil Concession required that the concessionaire procure its non-technical
workforce from Iranians. On the other hand, under Article 12 of the Abadan Agreement,
the Company agreed to recruit locals only with the Sheikh’s warrant. In the beginning,
Arab labor was engaged through either the Sheikh himself or through his associates.
Nevertheless, the pool of workforce would vacillate throughout the year.386 The total
number of Arab laborers never exceeded 1000. Imbued with colonial and orientalist
stereotypes, Company officials and British military officers associated particular ethnic
groups with certain types of work.387 For instance, local Arabs were believed to be “too
well off to be under the necessity of working with a spade at 2 krans a day” and were
deemed unsuitable for “regular and strenuous work.” Similarly, Bakhtiaris from the central
part of the province were considered more reliable than local Arabs and flexible in using
European tools.388 Moreover, as in the case of Indian labor, the Company did not intend to
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deal with an ethnically homogenous Iranian workforce. The scarcity and seasonality of the
local Arab labor provided the Company with a solid excuse to extend its recruitment net
beyond the Khorramshahr district.389
The population of the unskilled labor force soon began to diversify. In November
1909, after “giving [Khorramshahr] labor every chance,” thirty coolies were recruited from
Bushire for work at Abadan.390 Bushire, the principle seaport of southern Iran, was the
region’s major market for coolies. Manual laborers usually worked in gangs under their
own chief, known as Tindal or head maistry.391 Furthermore, ballamchis, as the sailors of
local passenger and cargo boats (known as ballam or bellum) were named, were taken from
Basra and day watchmen and errand-runners, known as farrash (alternatively, ferrash),
were employed from the Kurdish population of northwest Iran.392 Furthermore, large
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numbers of men were employed through contractors.393 Labor was also drawn from the
impoverished artisans from the distressed handicrafts industries and the poor populations
of the urban centers of Khuzestan and Central Iran, including Shushtar, Dizful, and Ram
Hormuz.394 In March 1911, 573 Iranians, of whom the great majority were local Arabs,
were in the employ of the Company at Abadan.
As the number of oil workers increased, so did the size and population of the
Abadan Village. On the eve of the Great War, the number of Iranian and Arab manual
workmen was 3055, the great majority of whom (2977) were employed as coolies.395 It
was estimated that, like other industrial towns in India, the population of Abadan was
roughly three times the number of workmen.396 Considering this formula, the population
of the Abadan Village would have been around 9000 in 1914. Besides poor peasants and
nomads, large numbers of emigrants displaced by political upheavals, wars, famines, and
epidemics flocked to Abadan. For instance, in the wake of the Great War, many
tribespeople, including 50 relatives of the village’s headman (Saiyid Muhammad), crossed
the Turco-Iranian border and settled in the Abadan Village.397 In 1921, due to the rampant
scarcity of food in the central parts of Khuzestan, Abadan saw a massive influx of “destitute
people.”398 It should be noted, however, that urbanization, sedentarization, and migration
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of population towards the southern centers of population had already begun in Khuzestan
prior to the development of the oil industry on Abadan Island.399
During the war and postwar years, the Abadan Village expanded in different
directions. By 1920, it consisted of 564 mat huts. Other than coolies and manual laborers,
more than 1400 Iranian skilled and semi-skilled workmen, who constituted thirty percent
of the total population of indentured labor, also resided in the Abadan Village.400 The
village rapidly grew bigger in the following years. By 1924, it had extended 2300 feet along
the river and roughly 2000 feet inland and accommodated more than 90% of Abadan’s
population which was estimated at 30,000.401 In this year, the village was home to more
than 7000 oil employees, who could not get Company housing in the Native Village, and
6000 contract-based laborers and their dependents. Given the size of the two contiguous
settlements (the Native Village and Abadan Village), which together occupied some 200
acres, the average population density was estimated at 150 persons per acre.402 Rapid
population growth combined with the lack of provision of sufficient public services by the
Company or by the Sheikh administration caused a myriad of problems in the village.
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The Abadan Bazaar
The Abadan Village was separated from the Native Village by an earthen canal and a wire
metal fence. What connected the two neighboring settlements was the natural line of
approach to and from the Refinery that overlapped the main street in the Native Village.
As Figure 3.23 illustrates, along this pathway, that led oil workers to the refinery’s
Southern Gate, indigenous shops were established and the Abadan Village’s major social
and economic institution and public space, namely the bazaar, emerged. While there
existed a few brick structures in the bazaar, the majority of shops were made of mud,
timber, and reed. The bazaar’s largest building was situated next to the Arusiyeh canal and
included a café. The bazaar also featured butchery and poultry markets and a
slaughterhouse.403

Figure 3.23 Abadan’s Bazaar and Main Street Looking South, circa 1920. The bazaar
was lined with masonry and local cabin shops.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36179
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For the Western observer, the place of residence and the place of production were
undifferentiated in “native” settlements. That is why the whole village came to be known
as the Sheikh’s Bazaar. The bazaar even overshadowed the residential quarters in the
cartographic representation of Abadan prepared by the British Admiralty. As Figure 3.24
shows, both the Native Village and the Abadan Village were represented by their respective
bazaars shown as a corridor lined with blocks of shops which extended in parallel to the
river from the Refinery’s southern Gate (Point A shown on the map) towards the
Company’s new tank farm near the Bawarda Village.

Figure 3.24 Map of the Abadan Refinery, circa 1924. The orange dashed line represents
Abadan’s bazaar and main street.
Source: British Library
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Before the development of a full-fledged marketplace, however, oil workers used
to go to the bazaars of Khorramshahr and Basra to fulfill part of daily and “special”
needs.404 One of the first historical accounts of the Abadan Bazaar has been recorded on
the eve of the Great War, when Turkish troops who had set up encampments on the western
side of the Shatt-al-Arab directly opposite the Refinery would cross the river in “bellums”
to purchase foodstuffs at the Abadan shops.405 Gradually, Iranian, Arab and Indian
shopkeepers and merchants opened businesses at Abadan. Indian rupee and Iranian kran
were the major currencies circulating in both bazaars. The British employees of the oil
company also patronized the shops. 406
As mentioned earlier, the Company had no direct authority over the Abadan
Village, where Iranian employees in great numbers resided. Company officials made
several attempts to take over the Abadan Village and Bazaar during the War years;
however, negotiations with the Sheikh of Khorramshahr never came to a fruition. Indeed,
the Sheikh was generating large revenues through rents and taxation out of the Abadan
Village and Bazaar. While the rent of shops and houses was on the rise in the postwar years,
Company officials showed interest in the acquisition of some 38 jareebs (acres) of land
along the main street but, once again, their request was declined.407 Company officials
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stressed the nuisances that the village could present to the refinery, including the imminent
threats of disease or fire outbreaks, as the main reasons for the Company’s interest in taking
over the Abadan Village.408 However, the major objectives were to contain the growth of
the village, extend control over the bazaar, and prevent a potential labor unrest. The
management also believed that by dominating the shops, the Company could better regulate
the price of foodstuffs, manage currency exchange rates, and control the increased cost of
living at Abadan.

Living Conditions
General living conditions at Abadan were extremely harsh for local workmen. As
mentioned earlier, the Company did not provide any form of housing for Iranian artisans
and unskilled laborers, let alone any kind of welfare services. The struggle for
accommodation remained Abadan’s chronic social issue throughout the presence of the
British oil company in Iran. Even in 1924, when housing was provided to senior Iranian
clerks and artisans, only one-sixth of local workmen were assigned company-sponsored
houses.409 As a result, most people had to erect vernacular mud huts, sarifas, and tents to
accommodate their families. Some chose to rent ramshackle hovels from private landlords
in either the Abadan Village or the Native Village. At the Abadan Village, the Sheikh’s
representative sanctioned building permits and determined the location of new
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constructions. The areas allocated to reed huts were reportedly in the most insalubrious
part of the village. Even some huts were erected in the middle of cemeteries.410
The general level of wages for unskilled laborers was always at a bare minimum
and disproportionate to the ever-increasing cost of living and the chronic inflation at
Abadan.411 For instance, between 1910 and 1925, the standard daily pay rate for an adult
coolie increased from 2 krans to 3-4 krans.412 In general, the scale of pay for Iranian skilled
workmen was much lower than the scale used for Indians engaged in similar occupation,
on the grounds that the latter in general were more skillful than the former. Moreover, labor
turnover was high, and job insecurity overshadowed daily lives of wage-earners. The
Refinery’s demand for coolies varied widely and unpredictably on a daily basis. As a result,
no notice of discharge was issued in advance. Workmen were informed that their
employment has been suspended or terminated when showing up in the morning to drop
tickets at the Time Office. Suspension was also utilized by the Company as a means of
control and labor discipline.413
The cost of living for unskilled workforce recruited from outside the region tended
to be greater than living expenses of locals. This explains why the management in the early
years preferred to supply unskilled workforce from Khuzestan. For instance, in 1911 the
living expenses of each Kurdish watchman was 10 tomans (100 krans) per month, almost
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twice the rate paid to a local Arab guard. The Company was ready to tolerate this “abnormal
rate” for a handful of farrashes; however, it was not willing to overpay hundreds of daily
wage-earners.414 By the same token, the Company was very discreet in its local recruitment
practices. For instance, in 1911, when the need arose to recruit 400 coolies for a pipe-laying
project at the refinery, the London management decided to dispatch only half this number
to avoid a sudden inflation of coolie rates.415
In the postwar years, the exorbitant taxes levied by the Sheikh of Khorramshahr
contributed to a rapid increase in the cost of living in Abadan. Until January 1925, the
village was administered by the Sheikh’s representative. As discussed in the previous
chapter, the Arab chieftain considered himself the sole proprietor of the island and
collected a wide range of rents and taxes. As a general rule, the Sheikh took half the
produce of all date trees.416 However, the crop taxation rates collected from Iranian and
foreign cultivators were 90% and 10%, respectively. The inequitable treatment of Iranian
peasants even motivated some locals to take on British nationality to pay less tax.417 In
addition to ground rent, the Sheikh levied municipal (Baladiyeh) and property
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(Mustaghelat) taxes in the Abadan Village, and collected arbitrary fees for different
activities, including permit issuance for new buildings or maintenance of existing huts and
shops.418 The Sheikh also devised a contracting system for all major staples, commodities
and services in Abadan, Khorramshahr and Ahwaz.419 Under this system, which was
unprecedented in the rest of the country, the monopoly of the supplies of major
foodstuffs— such as bread, meat, and dairy products— as well as transportation,
hospitality, and entertainment services were contracted out on a yearly basis to the highest
“bidders.”420 In 1924, the Sheikh’s gross income from all taxes at Abadan was estimated
at £38,000.421 In exchange for such heavy taxes, no particular services, other than collection
of night soil, were provided to the inhabitants of Abadan. Monopolies were not limited to
food stuffs and services. Arab agents with close ties to the Sheikh and his associates were
awarded the monopoly of the supply of building materials at Abadan.422
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Residents of Abadan lodged complaints to the Iranian Government and to the
Parliament (Majlis) regarding the Sheikh’s taxation on major food staples and other
services.423 Believing that increased taxes would have adverse effects on the Company’s
wage bill and would raise living expenses at Abadan, Company officials also rendered the
Sheikh’s taxation “obnoxious” and “outdated.”424 In July 1924, the Iranian Government
asked the Sheikh to withdraw all “illegal taxation” in Abadan, Khorramshahr, and Ahwaz,
and threatened that the Government would otherwise intervene.425 To put more pressure
on the Sheikh, the Iranian Government threatened to send an agent to Abadan.426 As a result
of the increased tensions with the Iranian Government, the Sheikh withdrew the tax on
bread.427
Casual Labor, Industrial Discipline, and Tribal-Agrarian Life
“…We had come straight out of the wilds into a circle dependent entirely upon the horrible
resources of modern ingenuity. The contrast was so great as to produce an almost physical
shock. Those days in the mountains had stretched themselves out into a complete lifetime,-twelve days? twelve years, rather;--the mind had adapted itself to those conditions; now
it had to be slewed round in the space of half an hour…From constant contact with life
reduced to its simplest elements, we walked straight into a hell of civilisation.” 428
423
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If the encounter with “modern” life in the oil company town, following a short-term trek
across the Bakhtiari country, had created such a strong “physical shock” to the English poet
and novelist, then the contradiction between the cyclical pattern of agricultural and
nomadic life and the linear rhythm of industrial work must have had a profound
psychological impact on the local labor. No doubt, the unfamiliar industrial discipline was
not compatible with the free spirit of pastoral life. Iranian and Arab peasants and tribesmen
found it hard, if not impossible, to adapt to modern factory conditions and moved back and
forth from industrial work to agricultural and nomadic modes of life. Clothing of workmen
in these years was also indicative of their “transitional status.”429 Bakhtiari nomads,
accustomed to spending summer in cool highlands upcountry, could hardly work in hot
and humid weather of lowlands of southern Khuzestan, where temperature would reach
120 degrees Fahrenheit. Timekeeping was also a new practice for new local workmen.
Iranian laborers were required to drop tickets at the Time Office every morning.
In the oil fields, Company officials attributed the fluidity of labor to the tribesmen’s
“roving spirit”430 and “call of the wild.”431 Similarly, Arab laborers’ periodic desertions
from the Refinery work and their gravitation to the agricultural way of life was pejoratively
viewed as an indication of their “invincible distaste” for a steady and serious industrial
work.432 Like other company towns, prior to the establishment of the industrialized social
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order and working-class culture, the rhythm of agricultural year made its presence felt at
Abadan.433 In the 1920s, as part of the policy of “Persianization” of the workforce, the
Company employed different strategies to alter the nomadic spirit of the local labor force.
For instance, in the Fields the culture of consumption was publicized through “model
markets” to encourage Bakhtiari nomads to give up the pastoral life for a “modern” and
sedentary way of living.434

3.2.2 Selective Paternalism and Public Services
From the early years of operations through 1924, by and large, economic rationality and
colonial practices governed the Company’s paternalistic policies and programs. As with
housing arrangements, segregation was central to these paternalistic endeavors. For
instance, Indian clerks were barred from using the library built for the Europeans and were
encouraged to set up their own library. Likewise, local Arabs and Iranians were not allowed
to use the Indian library.435 Sanitation facilities at the Refinery were segregated along
ethno-occupational lines. For instance, European lavatories were provided for Shift
Engineers, while “native-type” dry latrines were built for “colored” employees.436 In
general, first-class employees were the major beneficiary of Company paternalism. For
instance, the Company set up a provision store and a dairy farm in the Bungalow Area to
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serve the European personnel.437 Skilled and semi-skilled workmen were selectively and
partially benefited from welfare services. For instance, the Company provision store in the
Native Village catered only for Indians and provided some basic staples, such as rice, flour,
sugar, dahl, and ghee.438 In what follows I will discuss how the British metropolitan and
colonial third cultures, industrial requirements, and the dynamics of relationship between
the Company and different groups of employees drove the planning and design of the
company-sponsored social and healthcare services and public utilities in Abadan.
3.2.2.1 Social and Entertainment Spaces. Major social amenities were geared towards
British employees and were erected behind the fences in the Bungalow Area. As mentioned
earlier, such services were not envisioned in the initial plan of the oil camp and were
considered subordinate to the major undertakings, namely completion of the production
zone and provision of housing. After the Refinery became fully operative in July 1912, the
first group of social facilities were built in the oil camp. A cement-plastered tennis court
and a guest house were put up in the British quarter (E-3 in Figure 3.1; Figure 3.25) and
“when heat would permit tennis was played during the summer evenings.”439 In providing
these services the Company draw inspiration from the socially and functionally specialized
amenities that characterized the gentlemanly lifestyle of the British middle and uppermiddle-class in the metropolitan society. These services encompassed a wide range of
social, sports, and entertainment activities representing the institutionalized forms of nonwork or “leisure” associated with particular times— “the summer evenings” in the case of
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British employees in Abadan.440 A network of social and entertainment amenities governed
by similar recreational expectations were also provided to the Anglo-Indian community.
For instance, the hill station was designed as a place of resort for the colonial community.
Drawing on this model, the Company designated Khorramshahr as “the local health resort
for Abadan community.” 441

Figure 3.25 Site plan of the Bungalow Area showing the location of the Guest House and
Tennis Courts, circa 1915.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36509

In the postwar years, as Figure 3.25 illustrates, a second tennis court was added to
the resort center in the Bungalow Area. Consistent with the country-style of construction
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adopted in the European quarter, the new tennis court was made of an indigenous type of
plasterwork which was a mixture of mud and tibbin (chopped straw). Moreover, the guest
house was replaced with an English Club known as Gymkhana. Similar to the housing
arrangements, the Company inspired from the previously established colonial models to
build this social institution. In the colonial city the club served as the main center for social
interaction and information exchange as well as the place of resort and entertainment for
British community. In particular, the Gymkhana Club was an elite social organization
prototype built for the exclusive use, and according to the cultural preferences, of the upper
echelons of the Anglo-Indian community.442 The Imperial Gymkhana in New Delhi, for
instance, consisted of a broad spectrum of entertainment spaces, including, “a swimming
pool, extensive gardens, bars, billiard rooms, library, reading room, dining and dancing
facilities.”443 Like other expressions adopted by the colonial third culture, gymkhana was
a hybrid term and a product of fusion of words originating from both the indigenous and
metropolitan cultures. The term gym was derived from the word gymnasium which was in
common use in the metropolitan society, and the term khana was an indigenous word with
Persian roots, meaning the place of residence.444
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Figure 3.26 A front view of the Abadan Gymkhana Club, circa 1926. The Club was a
single-storied structure surrounded by an arched verandah. With manicured landscaping
and entertainment facilities, such as tennis courts, the Club aimed to make the industrial
setting unrecognizable and to recreate the entertainment spaces of the colonial third
culture.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36529

Unlike the colonial elite clubs, the Abadan Gymkhana club (See Figure 3.26) was
not used as a means of reinforcing distinctions within the British workforce. To the
contrary, the Company envisioned the British community as a “homogeneous unit” and
prohibited any activities that could have led to atomization of the staff. Sports and other
social and entertainment activities were deemed critical in bridging social gaps among
different classes of the British staff.445 Therefore, Gymkhana was open, with a monthly
subscription fee, to all European employees regardless of grade and seniority on the
condition that they were “generally accepted into polite society.”446 In other words, the
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English Club provided an opportunity to the low-ranking staff to mingle with senior
members of the community, provided the junior staff conformed to the latter group’s
cultural norms and behavioral codes. However, in reality, the hierarchy that existed within
the European personnel found its way into the social space of the Gymkhana Club. A
glimpse of social life in the club in 1923 on a cool summer evening can be visualized
through an account of an ex-employee: “By 6 o’clock, the club was filling up….Perspiring
tennis players were collecting in ranks in front of the bar or in groups on the verandah,
around huge jugs of shandygaff; from the billiards-room the clicking of balls found its way
through the buzzling conversation; white-coated Genoese barmen filled glasses in
preparation for the ritual peg at sundown.”447
The club was also used by the Company as an instrument of control. The
administration of the club was in the hands of the Refinery management on the pretext of
maintaining the quality of services. The Abadan Gymkhana consisted of two committees:
The House Committee and the Sports Committee, both appointed by the Refinery works
manager. The House Committee organized entertainments — such as dances, concerts,
billiards, and parties— and the Sports Committee was responsible for running sports
programs— such as association football, rugby football, cricket, tennis, golf, squash
racquets, and swimming. The company exercised ultimate control over the programs and
activities to the extent that even the books for the library were chosen directly by the
Company Director. Informal lectures and debates were the only activities that members
were allowed to organize independently.448
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Social amenities were also designed to extend control over employees beyond work
hours and to ward off potential disturbances. As the Refinery works manager once noted,
“It is our aim to encourage the men to come about the club, in order to take them out of
their bungalows and incidentally to reduce tendency to moping and grousing.”449
Moreover, social entertainment and sports facilities were also viewed as a deterrent against
activities with potential adverse impacts on the well-being of the staff . In the colonial
context, two risky activities were identified in military stations: excessive consumption of
alcohol and sexual relationship with female members of the indigenous society.450 At
Abadan, drinking habits and visiting the “dentist” in Basra was prevalent among junior
ranks and bachelor employees.451 One of the explanations for the latter was believed to be
the sparsity of female companionship in the oil camp. At the outset of operations, similar
to other oil enclaves, Abadan was a gendered settlement. As a general rule, employees were
barred from bringing their family to Abadan, for the management viewed the presence of
spouses as a source of distraction and detrimental to the process of work. Moreover, the
married accommodation was considered uneconomical.452 British junior staff was even
prohibited from considering the question of marriage in the early years.453 Although the
company relaxed the prohibition in 1913 for senior employees, the policy did not change
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for juniors.454 Therefore, the management believed that making the staff busy at the club
would keep them “out of trouble in the bazaar.” 455
Entertainment Services Revisited
In the early 1920s, the Company’s paternalistic policies underwent changes. The London
management approved the proposal to add new extensions to the Gymkhana Club and
sanctioned the provision of a new tennis court and additional billiard tables.456 This new
approach to paternalism came about for several reasons. First of all, it was the direct result
of the demands of the growing population of junior and mid-level British employees in the
postwar years. The new recruits, who were mostly from the City of Dumbarton in Scotland,
served as shift engineers, chemists, and office men and played a critical role in the efficient
operation of the Refinery. These men, in the words of the Refinery works manager, were
filled with “modern, ultra-democratic spirit” and demanded better social welfare services
from the government and employers alike and did not necessarily conform to the colonial
norms that gave social privileges to senior personnel— who were formerly called men
sahibs.457
The second factor that accounts for the Company’s new paternalism was the
restructuring of the oil industry in the post-war years. Industrial restructuring refers to the
large-scale changes that take place in an industrial sector in reaction to external or internal
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variables— such as introduction of new technologies, reorganization of industrial
production, changes in labor processes— to ensure its competitiveness and economic
growth. The form of industrial restructuring is determined not only by the demands of
capital for the reorganization of production but also by the changes in class relations and
social organization.458 The transformation in the organization of production in the oil
industry followed the industrial restructuring that took place in other global industries
during WWI as part of a transition from the second to the third period of capitalism. This
represented a shift from the period of extensive accumulation of wealth based on
competitive capitalism to the regime of Fordism characterized by mass production and
mass consumption.459 As a result of the military needs of the war and the concomitant
technological developments, the global demand for petroleum spiked and, consequently,
the oil industry boomed in the post-war years. This development led to the growth of the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company inside Iran and abroad. After the War, the Company had its
own distributing and tanker subsidiaries— the British Petroleum Company and the British
Tanker Company— and was moving towards the Chairman’s grand vision: creation of an
integrated oil company.460 The A.P.O.C. enjoyed tremendous growth after the War and
well into the 1920s. Crude oil throughput doubled between 1919 and 1921 by
commissioning five new benches.461 The Abadan Refinery, which was originally designed
to handle two million gallons of oil per month, began to gear up to deal with a monthly rate
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of 100 million gallons.462 Moreover, the expiry of the contract with the Asiatic oil
Company in 1922 opened up a new chapter in the history of the Company. The Company
began to transport and sell its products through its own subsidiaries worldwide. The
Company also expanded its geographical outreach by erecting new oil infrastructure across
the world. For instance, a new refinery was built at LLandarcy near Swansea in June
1922.463
The Company’s rapid growth and subsequent prosperity changed the dynamics of
its relations with different groups of employees. Besides selectively accommodating the
increased demands of labor for better amenities, the management began to rethink the
Company’s earlier paternalistic policies which were driven by pure economic rationality.
Influenced by American and European model company towns, the Refinery works manager
felt the need to devise a new welfare program and formulated a scheme to turn Abadan into
a “model city.”464 The new welfare scheme did not envision a comprehensive plan for the
entire company town; rather, it conjured up the incorporation of several new institutions,
including “a small church, school, concert and dancing hall, masonic lodge, Foremen’s
club, Clerks’ club, Roman Catholic chapel for Goanese clerks, etc.,” into Abadan’s spatial
structure.465 Rather than seeking social harmony, the Refinery works manager’s plan would
reinforce the company town’s social hierarchy by adopting some hand-picked elements of
the model compony town that would cater only for the European employees and high-

462

F. C. Temple and G. Wittett, 1924, “Abadan Town Planning Report,” Report to the Board by Sir John
Cadman on Visit to Persia, October to November 1924, BP Archives, ArcRef 70211, p.1
463
Laurence Paul Elwell-Sutton, Persian oil: a study in power politics. (Lawrence and Wishart, 1955), p.90
464
M. Greenwood to H. E. Nichols, June 7th, 1920, Persia-General Correspondence between London and
Mohammerah. BP Archives, ArcRef 72138
465
R. G. Neilson to M. Greenwood, April 21st, 1920, Persia-General Correspondence between London and
Mohammerah. BP Archives, ArcRef 72138

183

ranking groups of the second-class personnel. The Directors acknowledged the increased
need for new social services in Abadan, yet stressed the necessity of addressing housing
shortage “before churches, schools, etc. are taken in hand.” 466 As a result, due to the need
to finish more urgent works, the model village program never materialized. 467
The Company’s paternalistic policies towards the second-class personnel aimed not
only to increase labor control, but also to widen socio-occupational cleavages amongst
different groups of “native” employees. Obviously, the main objective was to weaken
solidarity within the workforce and avoid potential labor militancy. As mentioned earlier,
only the higher ranks of the second-tier staff benefited from Company paternalism. The
first series of social services were provided to Indian foremen out of necessity. The Great
War caused a massive migration of skilled workforce from Abadan to Basra—because of
higher wages that British Government-sponsored projects on the other side of the Shatt
were paying. The shortage of labor in Abadan in January 1917 had adverse impacts on the
operations of the tin-making plants and consequently disrupted production of tined
kerosene to the extent that the Company began scrambling for the skilled workforce in
Rangoon, Burma.468 With a view to retaining the services of Indian foremen at Abadan, a
tennis court was built in the Foremen’s quarters in the Native Village. Moreover, plans
were laid down to add a small club to this neighborhood to make sure that foremen have
“a lively existence in their spare hours.”469 By the same token, the necessity of provision
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of clubs to the clerical staff was noted by a manager in 1920: “It is becoming increasingly
difficult to keep up a good standard of office clerks. Club buildings, giving facilities for
indoor and outdoor games, would do wonders towards making the men contended, and to
bring other good men into our employ.” However, clerks, like foremen, were not entitled
to all the entertainment amenities that were provided to British employees. For instance,
the billiard room was eliminated from the program of the Clerks’ Club in the Fields.470 In
1920, plans were approved to build a club for Indian clerks at Abadan on the lines of the
Unity Club at the Field.471
Like housing, social facilities planned for the second-class employees were
segregated by occupation and ethnic origins. The clerks’ club known as Abadan Athletic
Club was designed for the Indian clerical staff and Abadan Recreation Club was provided
to the Indian foremen. Both clubs were accommodated in separate huts in the Native
Bazaar. To exercise control over social and entertainment activities, club secretaries were
appointed by the Company.472 As a general rule, clerks were entitled to better amenities
among “native” skilled workmen. They were the only group that could get access to the
medical facilities provided to the first-class personnel and, on certain occasions, were
allowed to mingle with the British staff. As Figure 3.27 shows, the Indian clerks’ club
created a space for crossing the racial boundaries in a highly segregated company town.
Moreover, the Company had engineered the welfare programs to increase control and
efficiency of clerks. For instance, clerks and office assistants were given “free office tiffin.”
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This type of allowance was not designed with the welfare of employees in mind; rather, it
was intended to enhance spirit de corps amongst the staff, avoid wastage of time during
lunch break, and promote “temperance, both in eating and drinking,” as employees were
under the eyes of the “burra sahib” (supervisor). Furthermore, the clerical staff was
required to lunch in the office in order to qualify for the allowance.473

Figure 3.27 An official admission ceremony held for high-ranking Indian staff in the
Indian Clerks’ Club, circa 1925.
Source: Atabaki, 2015

The Company also encouraged sectarian religious practices and granted permission
to select groups of workmen to build religious institutions on their own initiative. For
instance, one half of the Armenian Line was converted into an orthodox church for the use
of the Armenian community.474 Rangooni Muslims were also allowed to erect their own
mosque in the Coolie Lines neighborhood. The only public entertainment facility provided
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to all classes of “native” employees was the Cinema Theater built in 1919 in the Company’s
Bazaar at a cost of £6000. As Figure 3.28 illustrates, this edifice was erected next to the
Refinery’s Main Gate and adjacent to other public buildings, such as the Police Station and
the Sanitation Office.

Figure 3.28 A view of the Company’s Bazaar near the Main Gate, circa 1920. From left
to right: Police Station, Cinema Theatre, and Sanitation Office. These buildings, erected
based on the second-tier colonial architecture, collectively shaped a distinctive industrial
vernacular style in Abadan in the post-war years.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36179

The Company viewed the Cinema as a self-supporting enterprise. Its management
was contracted to a Parsee businessman for a monthly rental of ₹400.475 The Cinema was
used as an instrument to avert the increased labor discontent and the mounting criticism
about the inadequate housing and welfare amenities in the Native Village. It was also
intended to signify oil modernity and show how the new forms of entertainment technology
were used by the Company to extend the scope of employee’s recreational pursuits. The
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new institution, however, did not meet any of these objectives. It was not a successful
venture and the leassee could not fulfill his financial obligations. Moreover, as I will show
later, while the tensions between the Company and workmen escalated, the Cinema was
used as a venue for organization of labor and execution of a major strike.

3.2.2.2 Healthcare Spaces. Disparities in allocation of Company paternalism was most
evident in the provision of healthcare spaces. Similar to housing and social services, the
first-class employees were entitled to better medical services than were other labor groups.
For instance, in May 1916, in the midst of a cholera outbreak, only the Europeans and highranking clerks were inoculated against the epidemic. 476 Following the colonial practices,
“Native” and local employees were not admitted to the medical facilities put up for
Europeans. In the early years of operations, medical arrangements at Abadan and the Fields
were under two separate managerial regimes. The Company’s healthcare system, which
was comprised of dispensaries, hospitals, quarantine hospitals and isolation camps,
underwent a transformation in 1920, when, in the light of all postwar developments, the
Company appointed Dr. Young, the Chief Medical Officer and Political Agent in the
Fields, to the head of the medical work at Abadan.477 As I will discuss in what follows, Dr.
Young and the team of medical staff assumed a pivotal role in the planning and design of
major healthcare buildings at Abadan.
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Staff Dispensaries and Hospital
Prior to the construction of the first staff hospital, medical services were attended to at a
dispensary located on the ground floor of No.1 Bungalow.478 In 1915, a hospital was
erected at the northwestern corner of the Refinery proper behind the Bungalow Area on the
piece of land acquired in 1914 (See Figure 3.29). The hospital catered for the staff, the
workforce category that in the context of healthcare services included both Europeans and
high-ranking Indian clerks. Like the club, the hospital was one of the major institutions of
the urban third culture.479 Colonial examples and prevalent hospital design guidelines
determined the location of the new healthcare institution. For instance, following the
recognized practice in the colonial tropics, it was decided that staff and “native” patients
be treated in separate establishments.480 Moreover, concerns with the environmental causes
of disease, which were predicated upon zymotic theories,481 resulted in positioning the
building at the most salubrious location within the oil enclave. As Figure 3.29 reveals, the
hospital was situated on a dry spot near the center of the island. It was surrounded by
grounds designated for sports activity, with ample day light and air flow at a safe distance
from indigenous settlements as well as moist, date gardens, and stagnant waters. Given the
direction of the prevailing winds, the staff hospital was also protected from the noise, odor,
and polluting effects of the Refinery.

478

Henry Longhurst, Adventure in Oil. (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1959), p.46
Anthony D. King, Colonial Urban Development: Culture, Social Power and Environment. (London:
Routledge, 1976), p.226
480
Dr. M. Young, 18th July 1930, The Re-organization of the Company’s Medical Services in Persia by M Y
Young, BP Archives, ArcRef 68938, p.16
481
Zymotic theory was a medical theory of disease developed in the mid-nineteenth. Zymotic theory held
that disease is caused by a process similar to fermentation and that environmental factors play major
roles in the spread of infectious diseases. Anthony D. King, Colonial Urban Development: Culture, Social
Power and Environment. (London: Routledge, 1976), p.105
479

189

The evidence is scanty on the architecture of the first hospital; nevertheless,
historical documents indicate that its design was a fusion of the pavilion system and the
Fordist concept of mass production. Inspired by the premise of the healing effects of the
natural environment and clean air — or, conversely, by the assumption that disease is
caused and spread by “bad air” — pavilion-ward hospitals proliferated in Europe and then
in North America in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Conceptualized as
instruments of cure, these healthcare institutions were designed on the basis of personal air
space and noninfective pattern of air flow and were surrounded by spacious green
compounds.482 The pavilion-style hospitals featured long, narrow wards that included
dozens of beds and incorporated multiple windows on opposing sides to facilitate crossventilation. While this approach to hospital design was rethought by the adoption of the
germ theory and other developments in the late nineteenth century, pavilion plan remained
an established and accepted model of hospital design well into the 1930s.483
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Figure 3.29 Site plan of the northern section of the Refinery, showing the location of the
staff hospital, known as the Tin Tabernacle, circa 1919.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 100497

The staff hospital at Abadan was a standardized pavilion type made of prefabricated
galvanized iron and timber components which along with its medical equipment was
shipped from Britain and assembled on-site. The Tin Tabernacle, as the hospital was called
by the staff, provided accommodation for 16 European and clerical patients.484 The
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application of metal and wood and other impermeable materials with no cracks or
projections made the prefabricated hospital a good example of aseptic designs of the early
twentieth century. As Figure 3.29 illustrates, the hospital had a symmetrical, cruciform
plan with two separate wings for European and clerical patients. This arrangement became
a prototypical form for the staff hospital over the following two decades. The Tin
Tabernacle was perhaps a type of military hospital and a product of war exigencies which
was sent to Abadan to address the dire needs for medical services. Around the same time,
similar portable hospital units on pavilion-plan were mass-produced by the U.S. Army for
application in WWI.485
As a result of the rapid dissemination of the germ theory, medical officials
expressed interest to incorporate the latest medical technology of the day — such as the
surgical theatre, bacteriological and industrial disease laboratories, and X-Ray plant— into
the layout of the staff hospital. During the war years, the Refinery works manager rejected
the proposals put forth by the medical staff to build a new hospital equipped with modern
medical technology. The works manager believed that until Abadan was completely settled
down there was no need for new hospitals for Europeans. In the interim, he believed, adding
a small “pucca” operation room, electricity, and extra fittings would enhance the
performance of the existing hospital.486
In 1921, under the new medical management, plans were developed for the
improvement of the healthcare system at Abadan. Proposals for a new permanent staff
hospital with specialized spaces and standard medical amenities resurfaced. To the
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Refinery medical officers, the Tin Tabernacle was dysfunctional given the climatic
conditions of Abadan. Not only did it lack appropriate fittings and furnishings, the Tin
Tabernacle was also deemed unsuitable for hospital use with respect to its size, internal
layout, and structure. It was reportedly a “hot house in the summer and ice house in the
winter,” with no sound insulation or a proper drainage system. The accommodation for the
nursing staff was also insufficient.487 The medical staff envisioned a new hospital to
provide accommodation for 16 Europeans and 10 clerks. While meeting the new medical
requirements, space in the staff hospital was engineered to reinforce the existing social
order. In other words, Europeans and Indian clerks were treated in the same building but
accommodated in separate wards and provided with different levels of medical care. The
new hospital would also include 2 beds for women and 2 beds for serious cases in a small
special ward as well as operation theatre, consultation rooms, with separate blocks for
servants and nursing staff. The site of the golf course at the back of the Bungalow Area
was tentatively selected for the new hospital. It was also suggested that as the construction
of the new building was underway, No.5 Bungalow be rehabilitated and converted into a
temporary hospital and nursing quarters.488 As in other company towns, adaptive reuse was
a prevailing policy at Abadan. Upon the construction of the new staff hospital, the Tin
Tabernacle was converted into a Sports Club.489
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Native Dispensaries and Hospital
At the outset of operations, only two small out-patient huts, the Village Dispensary and the
Works Dispensary, were provided to the “native” employees. The dispensaries were
rudimentary structures with no appropriate medical facilities. The Works Dispensary,
characterized as a “castor oil shop” by a Company manager, consisted of a main reception
room for all classes of non-European workmen and a special room for clerks in addition to
an examination room for the medical officer.490 The lack of basic medical tools was to the
extent that once an injured workman brought from the Refinery was anesthetized and
operated on a bare table.491 During the war years, despite frequent outbreaks of epidemics
and the mounting criticism regarding the unsatisfactory medical and sanitary conditions in
the Abadan company town, the Refinery management refused to build a hospital for Indian
and Iranian employees. The daily fines collected from non-European workers for
illegitimate absenteeism or loss of pay were deposited into the so-called Hospital Fund
Account and utilized for a range of bonuses for the first-class employees.492 During the war
years, it was the official view of the Company that provision of a permanent hospital to
local employees was contingent upon the acquisition of Abadan Island by the British
Government as spoils of the Great War. This imperial outlook led Company officials to
believe that it was the responsibility of the Government of India, rather than that of the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, to fund the construction and upkeep of such a healthcare
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institution.493 After the cessation of the War, as Figure 3.30 illustrates, the old huts in the
former labor camp, known as the I.W.T camp, which was built during the War by the Inland
Water Transport agency on the southern side of the Native Village, were used to
accommodate the medical needs of skilled workmen.494

Figure 3.30 Site plan of the non-European quarters, showing the location of the Native
Hospital, circa 1919.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 71403
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As indicated earlier, until the 1920s, sanitary conditions and medical services at
Abadan had not received enough attention. Upon his visit to Iran in 1920, H. E. Nichols,
the Managing Director, was shocked at the state of insanitary conditions at Abadan. He
noted that the Native Village was “dirty” and “huddled up against the refinery fence.” Poor
medical services also drew his attention. Nichols pointed out that, “apart from humanitarian
aspect, we have entered into a contractual obligation in over 5000 agreements, Indian as
well as British, to provide free medical attention.” He also warned that if epidemics broke
out in Abadan, the deficient medical arrangements would provide the Indian newspapers
with substantial evidence to make more allegations against the company regarding illtreatment of the Indian migrant labor.495
In 1921, as part of the medical re-organization plans, the status of healthcare
services in the Company’s Village and the Abadan Village was thoroughly examined. This
assessment indicated that the medical arrangements for non-Europeans were “inefficient”
and “hopelessly inadequate.” In the postwar era, social rationality gradually appeared as a
new criterion along with the factor of economic logic in making a case for revising the
Company’s paternalistic policies. For instance, the Chief Medical Officer called for urgent
action to prevent the increased sick list and the risk of epidemics and noted, “I cannot make
this appeal stronger than by stating that it would be as much an act of humanity as an act
of duty to do so, in the light of existing conditions.”496
The team of medical officers stressed the urgency of building a hospital for different
classes of the second-and third-class workforce. Similar to other medical professionals of
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the time, Dr. Young and his colleagues subscribed to what Jeanne Kisacky terms the postgerm theory. This thesis concerned itself with controlling pathogenic micro-organisms and
helped shift the medical practice from hygienic approach to experimental science.
Gradually, within medical circles, physical contact rather than airborne germs was
perceived as the major means of transmission of infectious diseases.497 However, the
Company’s medical officers until the late 1920s looked to the air to explain some cases of
disease causation. This view was reinforced by colonial mindset that offered convenient
pathological lenses through which medical officers examined the hygienic situation at
Abadan. For instance, the “native” populations were viewed as the crux of sanitary
problems. In the words of the Chief Medical Officer, “it is the Natives that spread disease,
and by providing proper aid for them, we shall help all concerned in the place.” Dr. Young
also stressed the removal of the I.W.T huts and called for the erection of a proper hospital
on “healthy soil” with ample room for future extensions.498 Two sites in the Native Village
were examined as potential locations for the new hospital: a piece of land close to the coolie
lines on the riverfront and a vacant area behind the native houses. As Figure 3.30 shows,
eventually, the latter site was chosen by medical officers on account of its central
location.499
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Figure 3.31 Site plan of the Abadan General Hospital, circa 1928. “air space,” a design
concept widely used in the colonial setting, governed the design of the General Hospital.
Buildings were dispersed across the compound to ensure circulation of air and
penetration of sun light. The plan reveals the stark differences between the design criteria
adopted for the staff and labor wards. While the staff hospital was a sealed, pavilion-type
building, covered breezeways ran across the “native” hospital.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 37027

The planning and design of the so-called “native” hospital echoes the broader
transition in hospital design practices in the era of the post-germ theory. In this period, as
Jeanne Kisacky notes, the pavilion-ward layout was modified to meet the requirements of
the emerging medical science and technology.500 This meant that hospitals created spaces
for the new medical technology and yet provided “a sea of air” within and between the
wards to prevent disease transfer. Moreover, unlike the traditional pavilion hospital,
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external factors including the natural environment ceased to play a major role in the design
of the new generation of hospitals.501 The new healthcare building at Abadan was affected
by the new approach to hospital design. Unlike the old staff hospital, the selected ground
for the new hospital was located within the Native Village immediately to the south of the
Refinery. In the words of the Chief Medical Officer, “…like a railroad, a hospital should
be constructed as near as possible to the population center that it is supposed to serve…and
this applies with even greater force in the East where the transport of the native sick and
their relatives is a serious problem.”502
The new hospital was designed on the post-germ theory pavilion plan principles. It
was accessed by one of the two major roads in the Native Village that connected the
Refinery to the Bawarda Tank Farm. As Figure 3.31 illustrates, the hospital compound was
comprised of individual buildings which were separated by open spaces yet connected by
covered walkways. This layout aimed to maximize circulation of air amongst the buildings
and to reduce direct physical contact and the potential risk of disease transfer. The new
hospital also was intended to centralize all medical services for the non-European
workmen. The medical officers believed that the centralized organization would enhance
the efficiency of healthcare services, a strategy that echoed the Company’s broader policy
in the 1920s. The hospital was to be built with no ornamentations but with adequate
equipment and medical personnel.503 As the Chief Medical Officer suggested, the hospital
was to be constructed with iron pipes and concrete floors, white-washed walls, and roofing
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similar to the bungalow roofs, and was to feature all customary fittings— such as electric
lights, fans, water, and drain pipes.504
The initial spatial program consisted of three major sections: in-patient wards,
outdoor block, and residential quarters for medical and nursing staff. The in-patient section
was divided into separate wards with respect to patients’ ethnic and occupational
characteristics. For instance, the plan earmarked two wards for Chittagonians and other
Indian Muslims, one ward for Hindoos, one ward for Sikhs, one ward for Iranians and
sweepers, one ward for maistries, and one ward for Chinese and Armenian workmen. 505 In
other words, the spatial structure of the wards was engineered to reinforce the existing
stratification within the lower strata of the labor force. The aseptic requirements of hospital
design, which intended to create a germ-free environment, were expressed through
separation of space inside and outside the wards.506 When built in 1922, as Figure 3.31
reveals, the in-patient section, or the Labor Block as it was called, consisted of three parallel
blocks of single-storied wards separated by covered walkways. Each block was divided
into three separate specials wards, providing 60 beds in total.507
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Figure 3.32 A View of the Abadan General Hospital from the Refinery looking south,
circa 1924. The white-washed, two-storied Administrative Block (the first building on the
right) came to symbolize the new healthcare institution and served as the main gateway to
the compound. The photo also shows the Staff Block (the building on the left) and the
Resident Doctors’ Bungalow (the building in the middle).
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 229351
As in other hospitals built in the era of the post-germ theory, asepsis was manifested
in the choice of construction materials and in the application of the state-of-the-art medical
apparatus. For instance, bath and washing facilities covered with enameled lead glaze were
installed throughout the hospital. Asepsis was also expressed through architectural
symbolism. Several buildings were covered with distempered white paint to create a
pristine visual effect.508 One of the buildings with white-washed appearance was the
Administrative Block which served as the main gateway to the hospital. As Figure 3.33
shows, it was a double-storied structure surrounded by an arched verandah. Medical
technology was also deemed key to enhancing worker performance and boosting the
relationship between the Company and the workforce.509 To this end, the Administrative
Block was designed to include not only a dispensary, but also a range of specialized
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medical spaces, such as operation theatre, sterilizing room, laboratory, X-Ray room, and
sanitation office.510 Pathological laboratory was specially provided to study and diagnose
diseases by the use of the latest technology of the day, such as sigmoidoscope and
laryngoscope, among others.511

Figure 3.33 A view of the Administrative Block and the adjoining roundabout that
served as the main entrance to the Abadan General Hospital, circa 1924. The nursing staff
was housed on the second floor and, symbolically, served as the gatekeepers to the
healthcare institution.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36152

The new hospital also provided accommodation for the resident medical officers
and the nursing staff, as well as a group of hospital administrative staff. The hierarchy
within the medical personnel was manifested through the housing type built for each group.
For instance, the nursing staff, including one matron and seven sisters, were accommodated
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on the second floor of the Administrative Block on the lines of the Slide Valve model,
while the resident medical officers were housed in a typical European-style bungalow to
the north of the Administrative Block (See Figure 3.32). A group of administrative staff,
including assistant surgeons, hospital quarter master, and compounders, were housed in
barrack-type quarters, known as the Servants’ Quarters, to the north of the Labor wards.
Other non-European personnel, such as dressers, ward orderlies, clerks, darzies (tailors),
dhobies (cloth washers), carpenters, cooks, and sweepers, lived in quarters outside the
hospital compound.512
Simmering nationalist sentiments coupled with the mounting pressure from the
Iranian Government and the changed labor conditions in the early 1920s made the Refinery
management rethink the medical plans for Abadan. In September 1924, it was decided to
combine the staff hospital and the medical center built for Indian and Iranian workmen.
The pavilion layout made possible the incorporation of a new block for Europeans and
clerks. As Figures 3.31 and 3.32 show, the “Staff Block” was positioned to the north of the
Administrative Block and connected to other buildings via a covered walkway. Aseptic
requirements governed the design of the staff hospital. It was a single-storied structure
surrounded by an arched verandah and consisted of two wings and a central hall, providing,
in total, 40 beds for European and Indian clerical patients. Each wing was assigned to one
group and was divided into a main ward and a smaller ward, also known as “special ward.”
The latter was used to provide medical services to senior staff, high-profile figures, and
female patients. For instance, in September 1924, a Member of British Parliament was
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accommodated in one of the special wards after suffering a renal colic attack.513 The main
hall also included such spaces as the matron’s office, sisters’ duty room, darzie’s room,
and three special wards.514 While the Labor Block was designed as open wards, the Staff
Block was a sealed building. Furthermore, the latter was designed as a convalescent
home— a place for “treatment, and restoration” — and included some features of ward
hospital design of the past. It faced an open ground laid to the north of the hospital
compound. Two tennis courts were also provided for the exclusive use of the European and
clerical patients as well as the hospital medical staff. The third-class personnel, however,
were required to spend the recovery period at their quarters.
The Refinery General Hospital officially opened in September 1924. All the
medical staff moved from No.5 Bungalow to the new building. The new hospital became
Abadan’s medical center, providing services to all the three tiers of the workforce as well
as locals. However, it represented concealed segregation by building separate wards and
enforcing distinctions in the class of patients and in the quality of medical treatment. Microsegregation manifested itself in the quality of construction materials and the structure of
different sections of the General Hospital. After several years, when the deficiencies of the
General Hospital became known to medical officers and the idea of relocating the Hospital
was raised, Company officials considered that the Administrative Block and the Staff
Block could be converted into the Sanitation Department and a public school, respectively;
however, they unanimously believed that the “Native” wards had to be condemned due to
the inferior structure. Regardless of differences in the environment and in the quality of
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services, accommodation of Europeans and locals on one single site was an unprecedented
phenomenon. This radical shift in provision of healthcare services even shocked Londonbased Company officials. During his visit to Abadan in October 1924, a Company Director
was struck upon learning that Europeans and locals were treated in the same compound
adjacent to the refinery. Indeed, the location of the general hospital, which was considered
suitable for the indigenous workmen, was deemed unhealthy for the European patients and
the clerical staff.515 As I will show in the next chapter, in the ensuing decade several plans
were devised to reorganize the general hospital and relocate the staff hospital to a more
salubrious place with better environmental conditions.

Quarantine Hospital and Isolation Camp
A third component of the medical system at Abadan was the quarantine hospital and the
isolation camp. In quarantine facilities run by the Company, it was standard practice to
accommodate Europeans and clerks in roomed buildings and to provide other patients with
tent camps. Moreover, separate spaces were dedicated to infected patients and
“contacts.”516 At Abadan, the isolation camp was initially sited at the northern corner of
the Native Village and consisted of a series of mud huts erected to accommodate the
workmen inflicted with or suspicious of infectious diseases. It served as a counterpart to
the quarantine hospital at Khorramshahr. The latter institution was administered by the
Iranian quarantine authorities and was used to accommodate immigrants and passengers
coming from the districts where there were cases of epidemics or infectious diseases. The
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so-called infectious diseases huts at Abadan were makeshift structures with no flooring or
utilities. During the epidemic outbreaks, patients along with their families, belongings, and
furniture were transferred to the fenced isolation compound for at least ten days. However,
due to religious and cast differences, certain groups of Iranians and Indians did not easily
succumb to the quarantine rules laid down by the Company. In several instances, public
resistance was so severe that the Company sanitary staff had to solicit assistance from the
Sheikh’s guards to implement quarantine measures. Moreover, dozens of guards had to be
posted around the isolation compound to keep people from talking except at a specified
distance.517
In the postwar years, due to the rapid growth of the Native Village in every
direction, the isolation compound gradually became surrounded by huts and sarifas.518
Moreover, its ramshackle conditions made it unfit for effective quarantine services. In the
early 1920s, as part of the healcare re-organization plans, medical officials devised a
scheme to build a new isolation hospital some 4 miles downstream from the Refinery on a
site located at the corner of the land acquired in 1918. As Figure 3.34 shows, the proposed
site was at the southern edge of the Bawarda Tank Farm, the farthest available point within
the Company’s territory at the time.
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Figure 3.34 Map of the Abadan Refinery (left) and the Bawarda Tank Farm (right),
December 1919. The red square indicates the location of the proposed Isolation Hospital.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 71403

Like the General Hospital, the proposed Isolation facility was planned to
“accommodate all classes of patients, as well as nursing staff, dressers, etc.”519 The
Company Directors, however, had a different view on the new quarantine facilities. They
recommended setting up an encampment rather than a new permanent structure. In
London’s view, not only would tents effect economy, they could better meet the fluctuation
in the number of patients compared to brick-and-mortar structures.520 However, the Chief
Medical Officer believed that, given the low-lying nature of Abadan, tents could not be
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considered a feasible option, particularly in winter when they would technically go “under
water.”521 Dr. Young also called for removing the existing infectious diseases huts and
erecting a new hospital “on a system of huts.”522
The initial plan developed for the Isolation Hospital consisted of two separate
blocks for accommodation of two classes of patients: one for Europeans and clerks, and
one for “natives.” The European Block provided for twenty-two beds and consisted of two
large wards, two smaller wards, and two rooms. The Native Block provided for forty-four
beds and included two large and two smaller wards. Moreover, the Chief Medical Officer
suggested that a separate ward in the Native Block should be earmarked for smallpox which
in these years had become endemic to Abadan.523 The scheme to build a permanent
quarantine hospital was suspended when two hospital ships, H.P.5 and H.P.3, were
purchased from the Inland Water Transport agency on a post-war sale market. The paddle
boats were then reconditioned and moored at Bawarda as quarantine facilities.524 The
floating quarantine hospitals, as the ships came to be known, provided for 120 beds and
saved the Company approximately £15,000 in capital expenditure. Plans were also
developed to build an on-shore brick-and-mortar “smallpox wing.” 525 As Figure 3.35
shows, two standard steel frame sheds were also put up near the river opposite the ships to
accommodate contact cases.
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Figure 3.35 Aerial View of the Abadan Isolation Hospital, circa 1926. It was located at
the southernmost corner of the Bawarda Tank Farm, some four miles downstream from
the Refinery. It consisted of two hospital ships and two standard steel framed sheds for
the accommodation of two classes of patients: European and clerical staff, and local
workmen.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36152

3.2.2.3 Sanitation and Public Utilities.

Similar to healthcare services, the first-class

personnel were the main beneficiary of the Company-sponsored public utilities. The
provision of modern amenities to European employees was a recognized element in the
framework of Company paternalism. As early as 1916, the frequent outbreaks of epidemics
in Abadan were attributed to the insufficient medical and sanitary infrastructure in the
Indian and Iranian quarters.526 As part of the medical re-organization plans in the early
1920s, along with healthcare arrangements, water supply and disposal of sewerage were
examined in a fresh light.
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Water Supply System
The provision of clean water supplies and efficient systems of drainage and waste disposal
were among the key factors in the development of colonial settlements.527 Following the
colonial examples and the prevailing antiseptic procedures, the Company, early on, put up
a purification system, including chlorination tanks, pumps, and distribution pipes, in the
Bungalow Area. For the Native Village, however, only a water pipe was provided that
delivered untreated water from the Shatt to multiple standpipes in select quarters. 528 The
Company used this service both as a means of labor control and to widen racial and ethnic
cleavages amongst the employees. There are records of clashes between different ethnic
groups over the accessibility to standpipes in the Native Village.529 Unlike the Bungalow
Area, manual labor rather than technology was utilized to deliver water to workmen. In the
village water carriers known as Bhishti were on the Company’s payroll and were tasked
with the delivery of drinking water to houses and shops.530
The water intake point for the Bungalow Area, the Refinery, and the Native Village
was near No.1 Jetty, where oil tankers called on the Abadan Port on a daily basis.531 As
operations and industrial activities associated with the Refinery intensified, the quality of
water in the Shatt near Abadan deteriorated to the extent that in 1923 the Refinery medical
officer warned that drawing water from the river for domestic purposes would be highly
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undesirable and could cause and contribute to the spread of water-borne epidemics, such
as cholera. In the medical officer’s view, the increased rate of pollution in the Shatt was
the product of several factors, such as the daily discharge of chemical pollutants from the
Refinery into the river, the increase in the rate of shipping and the floating populations, and
the rapid growth of riparian villages Above Abadan.532
Until the 1920s no particular water supply arrangements were contemplated for the
Abadan Village which by this date had a population of more than 7000.533 The salinity and
static nature of the sub-soil water made the local inhabitants rely on the Shatt’s water for
domestic and cleaning purposes. In fact, the river, historically, was the major source of
drinking water and irrigation for the region’s villages and date groves.534 Given the location
of the Abadan Village, it was greatly affected by the increased rate of pollution upstream.
The drinking water of the village was getting contaminated not only by the effluents from
the works and oil tankers but also by the sewer discharged from the Native Village into the
foreshore. The lack of access to clean drinking water and the insufficient medical services
were regarded as major reasons for the high rates of mortality in the Abadan Village in
1923 when a series of epidemics hit Abadan.
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In 1921, as part of the health and sanitation reorganization plans and in the light of
the increased contamination near the Refinery reach of the river, a water supply
sterilization scheme was proposed for the Bungalow Area. This scheme, the most
economical alternative among the three options proposed by the medical officers, was
based on the latest water supply practices on the Tigris River in Iraq. The plan called for
the addition of two extra settling tanks—for removal of silt, bacteria, and other impurities
from water—and one clean water tank—for chlorination and eventual distribution of
water— to the existing water purification system. The two other options recommended
new sources for water supply: the first suggested Abadan water should be drawn from the
Bahmanshir River as it had purer water and the second recommended relocating the intake
pipe to a point upstream from the Refinery. 535 While both proposals were rejected on the
grounds of procedure costs, they were later revisited in the wake of the epidemics in 1923.
The Chief Medical Officer suggested that the same water sterilization plan should
be implemented in the two “native” villages to prevent the outbreak of epidemics among
Indians and Iranians and to check the spread of infectious diseases to the Europeans. The
Refinery works manager prepared a plan for the installation of a water sterilization system
in the Native Village and the Abadan Village. The water distribution scheme included a
piping network that would carry water from the clear water tanks to five distribution centers
across the Native Village. From each center water would be pumped to multiple standpipes
in different areas. The plan also envisioned a main pipeline in the Abadan Village, from
which several lines with standpipes would branch.536 The latter program, however, never
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materialized. The British military base in Iraq provided the tools to materialize the water
scheme. In March 1922, the Company acquired Filtration and Chlorination plants from the
Disposals Board in Basra.537
Drainage and Disposal of Sewage
In the early years of operations, the sewage disposal systems provided to the British
employees were of primitive nature and seemed anachronistic considering the prevailing
practices in the colonial community. For instance, in the oil fields, depending on the
topography of land on which European residences were erected, stationary and mobile
privies on the model of the so-called “village closets”538 were built. For the quarters on the
hill, fixed latrines were erected at the back of each house. Lacking cesspits, such privies
were preferably placed at the edge of the hill to allow for a “natural drop” onto a low level.
This method, in which ground surface acted as a natural receptacle, was open-air and
displayed unpleasant scenes, particularly, in rainy seasons. For the staff quarters located
on flat terrains a portable latrine was provided which was looked after by an Indian
sweeper. It was an iron-framed structure covered with mats and positioned over a cesspit
in the form of a hole dug out in the ground. The shelter would be removed to a fresh location
on a regular basis, with the waste buried. 539
It is reasonable to assume that at the early stages of work similar kutcha provisions
were made at the Abadan oil camp. Archival records show that the Company Directors had

537

Dr. Young to Messrs. Strick, Scott & Co., April 16th, 1922, Abadan Township Reconstruction 1921 to
1928, BP Archives, ArcRef 68723
538
“Village Closets” were the traditional system of privies prevalent in British rural areas which were
predicated upon cesspits.
539
Dr. M. Young, 4th February 1910, “Special Report on the Disposal of Sewage at the Camp,”
Miscellaneous Papers Relating to Persia. BP Archives, ArcRef 63984

213

divergent views on the type of operation seats and the sewage disposal system to be adopted
in the first group of bungalows. James Hamilton called for the provision of “water closets,”
whereas Charles Greenway favored “commodes.” Commodes were regarded as
economical options, in terms of both the initial cost and maintenance, particularly in areas
where sewerage systems were dysfunctional or nonexistent. Perhaps these advantageous
qualities led Greenway to believe that commodes were “much safer” than water closets and
would pose “no evil consequences.” The Company first experimented with both systems.
However, eventually, a sewerage system was adopted for Abadan bungalows. In addition
to water closets, every bedroom was supplied with a “native-made” private bathroom.540
Therefore, each bungalow compound was equipped with a water flush sewerage
system which consisted of soil pipes and a septic tank built of bricks and cement mortar.
In the bungalows on the riverbank, this system allowed for a natural gravitation of sewage
into the Shatt. To handle the sewage of the bungalows located away from the river, several
20-foot deep concrete pits, known as sullage pits, were built across the Bungalow Area that
collected the waste from septic tanks as well as the graywater from hand basins, baths, and
kitchens. The septicized effluent was discharged periodically into the river by automatic
pumps.541 This system, however, proved inefficient over time. The far distances of septic
tanks from the bungalows, in combination with user malpractices, gradually got sewers
choked up. In 1921, it was decided to replace old septic tanks with cast iron tanks and
shorten the distance between receptacles and water closets.542 This had implications for the
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spatial layout of bungalows. In older bungalows bathrooms had to be relocated from the
center of the buildings to the enclosure to avoid the passage of drainage pipes the whole
length of the ceiling of the lower rooms— a provision which had proved to be both
uncomfortable and insanitary. Drainage connections also were fitted on the outside wall.543
In 1923, in the wake of the frequent epidemics that swept Abadan several sanitation
improvement measures were implemented in the Bungalow Area. It was realized that, due
to the low-lying nature of the ground and the high levels of sub-soil water, sewerage lifts
and effluent purification plants were required. For instance, the Company filled in the
concrete pits and built a sunken caste iron plate tank to collect all the waste water from
septic tanks. Furthermore, an incinerator was also built for the treatment of ordinary house
and kitchen refuse.
In the Refinery and the Native Village, a public latrine model based on the “pail
system” was adopted. It originated from a colonial prototype known as the “Crawford's
Latrine,” which was a dry-pattern type used in colonial India by the Bombay Municipality
when Arthur Crawford served as the municipal commissioner between 1867 and 1871. No
earth or water was used in the Crawford's latrine, nor any connection to a cesspool or
sewerage network was required; rather, the solid and fluid matters were collected in one
bucket and emptied by sweepers daily or more frequently, if necessary.544 The Company
had already experimented with this type of latrine in the oil fields.545
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The first single-pan iron latrines were positioned in a row at right angles to the line
of the foreshore south of the coolie lines. These public latrines were connected to an open
masonry drain which was regularly flushed by a standpipe, whereby discharging sewage
to the foreshore right above the Abadan Village.546 As the population of workmen
increased, additional public latrines were provided on the same model in different sections
of the Native Village. Moreover, a mixture of incinerators and pits were also utilized to
handle excreta and urine, respectively. This waste disposal system required a large pool of
sweepers. In the early 1920s, the Refinery medical officer rendered this system
uneconomical and “primitive” and called for the adoption of a centralized system of public
latrines built of “pucca bricks” and equipped with “automatic flushing arrangements” and
a septic tank model similar to the Bungalow Area. To rationalize his proposal, the medical
officer suggested that the considerable cost of the new system would be saved in the long
run on the wage of sweepers.547
Until the early 1920s the company did not concern itself with waste disposal
arrangements in the Abadan Village. In the Iranian quarters each residential compound had
its own cesspit and dry closet which was in the form of an outbuilding located at the corner
of each compound. More than 30 sweepers were in charge of handling the night soil. In
1921, the Refinery works manager rendered this system insanitary and called for the
provision of a “standard latrine” to each house which would be cleaned out twice a day to
make sure that the whole of village excreta is incinerated, and liquids buried.548 The
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Company also contemplated collaborating with the Sheikh to build water-carrying public
latrines in the village.549 None of these schemes materialized until 1924.
3.2.3 Policing the Oil Town: From the Arab Guard to the Security Department
Following in Burmah Oil Company’s footsteps, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company created a
system of policing to protect the Refinery premises, suppress riots, handle petty crimes,
and control the workforce. Soon after the construction of the Refinery was commenced,
the necessity of safeguarding the works came to the surface. Besides fencing the premises,
stringent measures were taken to protect the operations on the island. For instance, only
visitors with a valid “permit” were allowed to land at the site of the Refinery. Even highranking British officials, such as the Acting Consul for Khorramshahr, were not exempted
from this regulation. Outsiders were not allowed to photograph the operations either.550
Articles 14 &15 of the Abadan Agreement included stipulations as to how guards should
be supplied and recruited. The Company was required to employ from the local Arabs
picked by the Sheikh or his representatives, and in turn the Sheikh was held responsible for
the watchmen's misdeeds, capturing thieves, etc.551 In the beginning, a few Arab watchmen
were employed as day guards. At night watch dogs were deployed around the property. As
a result of the occurrence of night robbery attempts and in view of the increased volume of
goods stored on site, it seemed imperative to strengthen the security team. The Sheikh was
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asked to introduce nine men and one headman from his trustworthy ghulams.552 Trying to
economize on labor costs, the Refinery works manager used the Arab guards not only for
watching the refinery but also for running errands. However, the guards were prohibited
from taking up labor jobs. An Arab Guard who would obtain employment as a day coolie
was punished by a fine of fifteen days' pay.553 After the Sheikh opposed to this practice, it
was decided that a separate cohort of men be employed as day watchmen.554
As the workforce diversified, the Company decided to institute its own security
force and decided to look for men among non-Arab communities.555 Eventually, the
Company sought day guards from the Kurds of Northwest Iran. Seven Kurdish men were
recruited in August 1910 as farashes, thus relieving the Arab guards from day duties.556
Kurdish farashes were equipped with sticks and badges and, in the Company Manager's
words, “would have no executive power further than detection of theft and handing over
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culprits to the Sheikh's Arab guards.”557 Therefore, following the colonial model, the Kurds
were in charge of watch-and-ward, while the Arab Guard was responsible for the
maintenance of law and order.558
On the eve of the Great War, the security force at Abadan included 29 Kurds who
made up the Refinery Police Force and 30 Arabs from the Sheikh's ghulams who were in
charge of the safety of the oil establishment overnight. In April 1914, Company officials
raised the idea of obtaining Indian guards for the Refinery. This decision was the outcome
of the increased ethnic tensions in the oil camp in which Indian workmen were involved.
For instance, in February 1913 during a labor unrest, which came to be known as the Lur
Riot, a quarrel erupted between Bakhtiari and Indian workmen when a Bakhtiari coolie
was run over by an Indian driver. The Refinery management felt powerless during the
brawl as the Arab Guard failed to control the violence. A plan was devised to strengthen
the backbone of the ghulams in cases of emergency and to control the community of Lurs
numbering 1200. To avoid possible objections from the Sheikh, the recruitment of the new
force was justified on the pretext of disciplining more than 1000 Indian workmen whose
drinking and gambling habits had triggered complaints from local authorities. The Indian
Guard, which consisted of 37 sepoys from 4th Rajput Detachment, was deployed at the
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Refinery. This force, recruited from Punjabi Muslim veterans, was comprised of four ranks,
including Jamadar (Jemadar), Hawildar (Havildar), Naiks, and ordinary guards.559
With the Indian force onboard, the Refinery management consulted the colonial
practices to organize and determine the responsibilities of the three sets of guards. The
major challenge was to maintain law and order and efficiently carry out watch-and-ward
in a growing industrial camp which had become home to a mosaic of populations with
varied subjectivities. The new arrangements called for the collaboration of all the three
groups, while each security force had its own assigned posts and specific duties. The
presence of the Arab Guard was believed to have a certain “moral effect” in the oil camp.
The Guard’s main duties included patrolling the fences around the refinery at night, settling
the disturbances caused by Iranian and Arab employees, and maintaining law and order in
the Abadan Village. Kurdish ferashes served as gate-keepers during the day. The Indian
sepoys were responsible for patrolling between the gates, preventing Indians from passing
stolen articles through the gates or over the fence, and warding off ethnic tensions between
“native” groups. For instance, in October 1915, when the prevalence of firearms in the
Abadan Village became a source of anxiety for both the Company and the local authorities,
the Refinery Police was dispatched to disarm the residents. A group of Arab guards from
the Sheikh’s ghulams and a Jamadar from the Indian sepoys were on this mission. The
former team dealt with Iranians and Arabs, while the latter handled the Indian
employees.560 Following the colonial precedents, a European Inspector, vested with the
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vice-consular judicial power, was appointed to the head of the Refinery Police.561 In the
words of the Refinery works manager, “It will not be possible to subordinate satisfactorily
the Kurd[ish] Ferashes and Indian Police to any Asiatic…”562
Four outposts across the Refinery and one station in the Native Village near the
Main Gate were chosen for the deployment of the Abadan Police. As Figure 3.36 illustrates,
a second-class, fortified police station, a prevalent model in colonial India, was proposed
for the Abadan Police headquarters. However, unlike the typical police stations in India,
the Abadan Police building did not include such spaces as stable, store house, female lockup, and record room. Moreover, the Company draughtsman was tasked with changing the
proposed layout to suite local conditions.563 The station and four outposts were constructed
with local building materials and “native roofing” at a cost of £5,250. Initially, the
Company requested receiving a fifteen-percent interest on the costs of the police buildings
and the reimbursement of the whole expenses if Abadan became the British territory— a
scenario which in the minds of Company officials was not a “remote possibility.” However,
in 1916, the Company and the Government of India agreed to equally divide the expenses
of the establishment, wages and accommodation of the personnel, and the maintenance of
the buildings 564 A few years later, the 1916 arrangement was revised by the Government
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of India and the Company was obliged to cover three-fourths of the expenses of the Police
Department at Abadan.565

Figure 3.36 Abadan Police Station, circa 1921. Constructed based on the second-class
colonial buildings, the Police Station represented the industrial vernacular style in
Abadan in the post-war years.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 77523
In September 1915, due to the requirements of the War, the Indian Sepoys were
gradually withdrawn from Abadan and were relocated to Basra to join the Expeditionary
Forces in Mesopotamia.566 In light of this development, the idea of establishing an Indian
Police Force headed by a British Indian Inspector was coined. The Police Force was to be
quartered in the Native Village in the sarifas previously occupied by the Indian Sepoys
until proper police barracks could be erected.567 In the same year, following the cutting of
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the pipeline by local tribesmen, several detachments of the Indian Army were dispatched
to Khuzestan and deployed at pumping stations and other vulnerable points along the
pipeline. The goal was to safeguard the steady flow of oil from the Fields to Abadan. With
the cessation of the War, some military units were withdrawn while others were maintained
in sensitive areas like Ahwaz. In 1920, the outlook of a complete withdrawal of British
forces from the province coupled with the mounting nationalist sentiments in the region
caused some anxiety for both Company and British diplomatic officials. For instance,
Acting Political Resident in the Persian Gulf suggested that, among other measures, the
Company should construct unclimbable fencing and “blockhouses” at regular intervals
around all oil establishments, including the Abadan Refinery, to protect “delicate
machinery” and the lives of European employees against all probable threats.568
In the early 1920s a detachment of Indian Police named Qurawel under the
authority of the Iraqi Government was stationed at Abadan. Similar forces, called the
Mesopotamian Police, were sent to the Fields. In 1922, the Iranian Government objected
to the presence of such forces and considered this arrangement contrary to the terms of the
Oil Concession and against the spirit and letter of International law and called for their
removal from Abadan at once. In April 1923, as a result of the protest from the Iranian
Government, the Iraq Police detachment was withdrawn, and the Company began to
consider shaping its own police force under the British consular authority. The Security
Department was then established which consisted of 200 security guards under two
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European assistants. The nucleus of this establishment included 80 veterans of the recently
disbanded South Persia Rifles.
The new security forces were unarmed but uniformed, disciplined, and
administered on police lines. They were in charge of maintaining security in the Refinery
and the Native Village—areas that were within the Company’s territory. The Security
Department was also responsible for “the maintenance of order, the investigation of crime
and complaints, welfare of local employees, and the conduct of purely local affairs within
the Company’s limits.” The Company also funded the Sheikh’s armed ghulams who, with
the strength of 150, were providing security outside the Company’s territory, including the
Abadan Village and other parts of the island.569 In 1923, the Refinery Security Department
was divided into two branches, namely police and fire services.570 After the political
takeover of Khuzestan by the Iranian Government in August 1924, military GovernorGeneral of Khuzestan General Fazlullah Zahedi took in hand the security of the oil
establishments throughout the province.571 However, the Company police force was not
abolished until 1930 when it was taken over by the Iranian police.572
3.3 Spaces of Resistance and Confrontation
Control of oil production and labor was the outcome of the Company’s exercise of power
over space. While this capacity was most evident within the refinery’s premises, the
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Company’s influence beyond its legal territory was contingent upon building partnerships
with major political actors. Until 1924, to exercise social control and coercion in southern
Khuzestan, the Anglo-Persian had to nurture strong bonds with local chieftains and,
simultaneously, look to the British Government for diplomatic and military support.
Thanks to its absolute dominance over the oil camp, the Company pursued different
strategies aiming at social engineering and labor management. As discussed earlier, with
the help of various spatial tools, the Company blurred the boundary between working and
living realms, created a tripartite urban space, and designed segregated residential and
public spaces for different segments of the labor force. As Rasmus Christian Elling shows,
the systems of spatial coercion and social control instituted by the Company triggered
tension, violence, and inter-group animosity within the workforce.573 Paternalistic efforts
also created conditions of dependence for different classes of employees.
All this notwithstanding, oil laborers played active roles in both defining their living
and working conditions and creating meaningful spaces. There are also numerous examples
showing the agency of the labor force at the individual level. Local coolies, for instance,
were mobile. In 1917, due to the urgent demand and high wages in Basra, most coolies
who were already at work for the Company found better opportunities on the other side of
the Shatt. This caused acute labor shortage on the island to the extent that the Abadan
Refinery was one thousand men under strength in March 1917. The sharp reduction in the
number of manual laborers reduced the production of cased oil from 4000 to 2000 tins per
day. The Works Manager confessed that it would be impossible to stop local Arabs from
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moving to Basra and asked for the formation of a regular labor corps at Basra to supply the
required labor for the Abadan Refinery.574
Collaboration on a single product, namely crude oil and its derivatives, provided
workmen with a sense of engagement in a collective enterprise. Moreover, as Daniel
Walkowitz notes, company paternalism structured “a common set of experiences upon
which workers could draw and organize.”575 Working and living in the atmosphere of oil
fostered social relations among workmen that transcended the workplace, giving rise to
what labor historians term “occupational community.”576 For instance, Iranian and Arab
workmen gradually developed a collective experience of modern industrial life.577
Similarly, for British staff and Indian migrant laborers, everyday practice of working under
challenging conditions and in tough terrains or isolated places in southwestern Iran helped
forge a sense of community and of place. All this resulted in labor solidarity and a web of
mutual support and sentiments of shared space within the community of men engaging in
the same trade or living in the same line or in the same quarters. Emboldened by these
sentiments, oil workmen and local populations reacted to the Company’s paternalistic
efforts, spatial coercion, and social control in various ways. In what follows I will analyze
the dialectics of community reactions — which ranged from accommodation and resistance
to confrontation and unrest— and the Company’s responses, on different scales.
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3.3.1 Public Sphere and Anti-British Sentiments
Public opinion represented by the local press reveals both the spaces of resistance at the
societal level and the ways in which the general public viewed the Company and its activity
in Khuzestan. In the wake of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911, nationalist
sentiments gathered steam in Iran. One of the major demands of this movement was to put
an end to British and Russian interference in Iran’s internal affairs and to cancel
concessions already awarded to foreign parties. Quite optimistically, British officials in the
region always presented a rosy picture of the relationships between the Company and local
populations. For instance, in the official correspondence with the Government of India,
Acting Political Resident once portrayed the Company as the “friend of the people and
benefactor of the tribes,” and stated that the oil enterprise was viewed “favorably” by the
local population of Abadan and Khorramshahr.578 Despite such positive accounts, antiBritish and anti-imperial sentiments were rampant across the country and caused a great
deal of concern among Company officials in Iran and Britain.579
Nationalist opinion was always against the activity of the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company in Iran. One of the early oppositions appeared in Tehran Newspaper Junub (The
South) in late 1910. The article written by an anonymous author characterized the A.P.O.C.
as a political entity rather than a commercial enterprise which allegedly was hatching a plot

578

Arnold Wilson to the Secretary to the Government of India, October 25th, 1920.
‘Letter from Lt-Col Sir A.T. Wilson, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian
Gulf, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, Simla.’ [2r] (3/4),
British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/18/B364, in Qatar Digital Library
<https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100023463704.0x000004> [accessed 6 October 2018]
579
For instance, in 1924, Income Tax Bill which was before the Majlis (Iranian Parliament) and anti-British
demonstrations in the emotionally charged month of Muharram were major sources of concern for the
Company Managers in London. H.E. Nichols to the General Managers APOC., August 6th, 1924. AngloPersian Oil Company Limited: Confidential letter Book, No.1, BP Archive ArcRef 54496, P.875

227

to turn the Province of Khuzestan into a British colony. To substantiate this allegation, the
article claimed that, “…The Oil Company, in accordance with a political object, is
continuously bringing Indians and Europeans into [Khuzestan] under the pretext that they
are employés … the Company’s employés are all sepoys, soldiers, and officers of the
Army.” The article also called on the Iranian Government to strengthen its position in the
province and check the Company’s increased domination over the region. 580 Similar antiBritish criticisms were voiced on the other side of the Shatt. A Basra-based newspaper
severely criticized the Sheikh of Khorramshahr for allowing the Company to interfere in
the internal affairs of the province and exclaimed that, “Oh, People! The foreigners,
especially the English, if they enter your country, they will corrupt it and debase your
honor.” The article also warned against turning Abadan, like Dubai, into a British
protectorate.581
Anti-British feeling was revitalized in the public realm as a result of the AngloIranian Agreement of 1919, which would have provided the British Government with full
control over Iran’s military and financial affairs. Although this accord was never ratified
by the Iranian Parliament (Majlis), its ramifications marked the political developments of
the following decade.582 Moreover, the post-war nationalist feelings in the region also
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translated into anti-British sentiments. In 1920, the London management warned against
the spillover of the alleged Bolshevik-funded nationalism from Turkey and Iraq into Iran
as well as possible sabotage and incendiarism instigated by such feelings.583 Wary of being
viewed in the eyes of the public as a protégé of the British Government, the Company
began a campaign to portray itself as an independent commercial interest. For instance, in
1921 the Company appointed an agent in Tehran to make direct representation to the
Iranian Government and ceased the older practice of communication with high-ranking
Iranian officials through the British diplomatic channels.584

3.3.2 Spaces of Public Insurgency
Popular protests also offer revelations about the ways in which nationalist sentiments
translated into public resistance against the Company on the urban scale. There are multiple
examples of how local shopkeepers and homeowners in the Native Village defied the
Company’s exertion of power over the village's marketplace. Indeed, the bazaar was an
important social and economic institution, and like other social elements of the Iranian
city—such as the urban quarter, the guild, and the mosque— functioned as networks of
organization and mobilization capable of generating urban protests.585 The bazaar in the
Native Village served as a major public space for social intercourse and as a venue where
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local and national news circulated. The Company management, however, regarded the
bazaar as a scapegoat for the “chaotic” and “insanitary” conditions of the village. It was
also blamed for the increased living expenses and labor discontent.586
Historical documents in the Iranian National Archives and the British Petroleum
Archives reveal that Company officials in London, Khorramshahr and Abadan consciously
steered the village’s so-called “haphazard” growth. In the beginning, in exchange for a fee,
the Refinery management issued building permits for the construction of houses and shops.
The management only allowed timber structures for shops, and promised that in due course
permission for the construction of brick shops will be granted.587 In the post-war years, due
to the shortage of housing and rapid growth of population, the value of these structures
drastically increased, and they changed hands frequently.588 Besides Iranians and Indians,
Arab and Jewish merchants from Basra and other southern cities of Iraq acquired properties
and established businesses in the Abadan bazaar.589 After property values inflated in 19221923, new subdivisions were made, and the bazaar area became even more congested.590
In October 1923, as a result of the increased number of structures, the Company introduced
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a system of registration of property in the Native Village.591 In order to control food prices,
the Company also opened a provision store in the bazaar selling major staples— such as
rice, flour, sugar, dahl, and ghee— exclusively to Indian employees. A Basra-based firm
was also encouraged to open a shop in the Native Village on the condition that the
merchandise be regulated at the Basra rates.592
The bazaar was the place where the first nucleus of public resistance against the
Company emerged. For instance, in June 1915, Abadan bazaar prices increased relative to
prices at Khorramshahr. Besides the consequences of the War, the flow of foodstuffs to the
Village Bazaar was controlled by the Sheikh’s representative and, in general, merchandise
was more expensive at the Native Village than the Abadan Bazaar. To control the bazaar
prices, the Refinery works manager decided to introduce a fixed price list at lower rates
and to enforce the prices with the assistance of the Refinery Police. The works manager
believed that the Company had a right to interfere with the bazaar prices since shopkeepers
were occupying ground on the Company’s land. In reaction to this move, Abadan
shopkeepers threatened to close down the bazaar.593
Similarly, in 1916 shopkeepers reacted to the currency exchange rate imposed by
the Company. In this year the Abadan bazaar experienced periodical shortage of foodstuffs
due largely to the high demands of the crews from tankers and cargo steamers that regularly
berthed at the Abadan Port.594 Abadan also experienced inflation in the same year, which
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was attributed to the shortage of Kran (Iranian currency), which decreased the purchasing
power of Indian rupee. In the course of a few months, the exchange rate of rupee to kran
dropped from 4 to 3.35 and, consequently, the cost of living for the Indian labor increased
by 30 percent.595 This posed a new challenge to Company officials as they had to increase
wages of more than 4000 Indians to counterbalance the decrease in the exchange rate of
the Indian currency. Instead, the refinery management, in cooperation with the Sheikh
administration, artificially set the exchange rate at Abadan around 7% lower than the
average rate in the region. This aimed to keep the wages low and simultaneously strengthen
the rupee’s purchasing power at the Abadan bazaar. In response, shopkeepers threatened
to close down the bazaar. The Company, once again, was forced to succumb to the public
protest and readjusted the exchange rate at the market rate.596
Faced with severe public resistance, the Company initiated a campaign to
appropriate the entire Abadan bazaar. Since a major segment of the bazaar was located
within the Abadan Village, the Company tried to acquire from the Sheikh some 38 jareebs
(acres) of land along the Abadan’s Main Street. However, due to the increased rental value
of the bazaar shops, the Sheikh turned down the offer.597 The next step was to weaken the
pockets of resistance in the bazaar. With the rise in the market value of shops598 and under
the guise of lowering the increased price of foodstuffs, the Company employed different
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tactics to appropriate the shops and expel Iranian tenants and landlords from the bazaar
area in its territory. For instance, Iranians were not allowed to repair their houses or even
replace dilapidated timber shops with masonry structures. The Company was even accused
of setting fire to timber shops and instigating Indians and Iraqis to take over the properties
owned by Iranian merchants and shopkeepers.599 The legal battle to retake possession of
these shops took almost eight months. Dozens of complaints and petitions were submitted
to both Iranian authorities and British officials in Khuzestan. As a result of the public
opposition, the Company stepped back and returned the properties to Iranian landlords on
the condition that the owners pay twenty rupees per month as compensation for the interest
of the capital expended on the shops. One year later, the same owners were asked to pay
fifty-four rupees per month or move out.600
The Company also established the Sanitation Office and adopted the practice of
collecting ground rents and sanitary taxes in the Native Village. All groups of tenants in
the bazaar area had to pay sanitary taxes. Ground rents, however, were collected directly
from landlords.601 In November 1923, all the property was renumbered, and ground rents
and sanitation taxes were reassessed, resulting in a fivefold increase of rates.602 This meant
an additional charge of at least ₹2 (two rupees) per month for each household. Inhabitants
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were asked to pay the assigned amounts by the third day of each month.603 The Company
claimed that the new rates which averaged ₹5 (five rupees) per household per month were
less than the municipal and sanitation taxes levied in the Abadan Village and even less than
the actual costs of maintenance and sanitation of the Native Village. 604 However, as I will
show in the next chapter, the sum of money collected as rents and sanitary taxation was not
expended to improve sanitation in the Village; rather, the funds were later spent on
demolition of shops and houses, displacement of local inhabitants, and construction of new
residential quarters.
Local residents also accused the Company of favoring non-Iranian residents in
property tax assessment. Tax rates, ranging between four and sixteen rupees, were
allegedly determined by the nationality of landlords rather than by the size of houses or the
type of businesses.605 Telegrams and petitions streamed out of Abadan to Iranian officials
in Tehran and Khorramshahr, complaining about the Company’s discriminatory policies
towards Iranians. For instance, the heads of guilds, merchants, and shopkeepers submitted
complaints to the Khuzestan Agency of the Iranian Government (Karguzar) and claimed
that, “… if Abadan is under the sovereignty of the Iranian Government, the Company has
no right to ask for land tax.”606 Similarly, in three consecutive petitions to the Ministry of
Commerce, Agriculture and Public Works607 the residents' representatives questioned the
Company's legal rights to set up the Sanitation Office and police force, impose taxes, and
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intervene in Iran’s “national affairs.”608 As a result of public outcry and the political
pressure from the Iranian Government, the Refinery management agreed to reduce the new
tax rates by 25 percent.609
3.3.3 Spaces of Labor Militancy
Public protest on the scale of the oil establishment manifested itself in organization of labor
that culminated in a series of strikes in the early 1920s. Although there are references to
numerous labor unrests, or what the Company termed “riot,” since the inception of
operations in Abadan, only a few cases were discussed in detail in official correspondence.
In fact, the Company was never keen on acknowledging the heightened discontent within
the workforce. For instance, in April 1914 when the accounts of a labor unrest appeared in
Near East Journal, a Company Director cautioned that the local management should be
always in a position to censor any information not fitted for public consumption.610
However, in the early 1920s, two subsequent episodes of labor action found their ways into
the formal correspondence of Company officials and British diplomatic officers. These
incidents opened up spaces of resistance and confrontation within the highly controlled and
militarized space of Abadan and made the Company rethink its labor policy and
paternalistic programs.
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3.3.3.1 The 1920 Strike.

The Indian migrant labor is credited with introducing

industrial militancy and methods of collective bargaining into the Iranian oil industry.611
In December 1920, Indian workmen took the opportunity of the Managing Director’s visit
to Abadan and staged a strike. Approximately 3000 Indian laborers stopped work and
gathered around the Refinery office. In the act of protest, strikers squatted on the ground
and refused to resume work or even eat until evening when the Managing Director agreed
to their requests. The strikers asked for an eighty-percent increase in wages, better housing
conditions and medical services, pension, reduction of working hours, and more paid
holidays—among other requests. Iranian and Arab laborers followed suite and went on
strike on the following day and demanded similar benefits.612
Although the strikers’ demands, first and foremost, concerned low wages and high
living expenses at Abadan, the 1920 strike, which was the first sweeping labor unrest since
the beginning of operations, reflected the broader conflicts between the Company and
indigenous employees. This form of labor militancy was the product of both local and
global conditions of the time. Not only was this industrial action the outcome of
accumulated labor discontent and sufferings, it was also the result of Company’s
discriminatory paternalism and coercive labor policies of the previous years. Company
officials always endeavored to attribute the growing restlessness and dissatisfaction
amongst Indian and Iranian workmen to “cultural claustrophobia in an alien and not always
sympathetic environment” and the lack of familiarity with “industrial practices and
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discipline,” respectively.613 However, as discussed in the previous section, harsh working
and living conditions and unfair allocation of company paternalism were also sources of
discontent within the indigenous workforce.
Under clause 5 of the labor contract, Indian workmen were entitled to free
accommodation and free medical attendance.614 However, housing shortage and
congestion in the Native Village had forced many workmen to look for shelter either in the
Company’s bazaar area or in the Abadan Village. Moreover, the Company employed
coercive measures to keep Indian workmen at Abadan.615 For instance, in the early years,
due to low pay rates and tough working conditions, groups of Indian skilled laborers
deserted the works and moved to Khorramshahr, planning to return home. The Company
resorted to British authorities to prohibit the deserters from leaving Iran.616 During the War,
when better remunerative opportunities in Basra motivated Indian workmen to leave
Abadan, the Company used its political leverage to create legal and political barriers
against the departure and employment of its ex-employees in Iraq.617
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In the early 1920s, the Indian press made numerous allegations against the
Company. The Anglo-Persian was accused of maltreating Indian laborers by imposing
inordinately long working hours, instigating class hatred among workers, disregarding
social privileges of high-ranking clerks, and providing insufficient medical and housing
services.618 Under these conditions some Indian employees resorted to the general public
and the labor community in India for support: “There are thousands of Indian workers in
Persia. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company alone employed 90 percent Indians. There is no
restriction in the number of hours worked every day. Neither coal nor ice were supplied to
the workers until agitation was started. Workers die of sunstroke in summer and pneumonia
in winter as little is done to look to their wants and comforts. I request Indian labor to take
up the cause of their comrades in Persia…” 619
The Company was also accused of exploiting Iranian workmen.620 Local laborers
sent multiple petitions to the Iranian government and complained about low wages,
inadequate facilities, and insanitary living conditions at Abadan.621 Iranian and Arab
workmen also cried out about the preferential treatment of Indians and other classes of
labor.622 The Deputy of the Ministry of Public Works was sent to the region to investigate
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these claims. In response to the Deputy’s inquiry, the Company attributed the lower pay
rates of the Iranian workforce to their “lack of commitment” and “seasonality.”623
Despite Company’s centrifugal policies which aimed at effecting sectorial
cleavages amongst Indian laborers, the centripetal properties of oil created an entente
between all sects. The Indian migrant labor managed to overcome the perceived differences
between the Sikh, Hindoo, and Muslim groups and get unified around a common cause.
The preparation for the strike took place at the Sikh Lines and escaped the Company’s
constant surveillance. The Iranian workmen, however, failed to establish similar intragroup solidarity. This manifested itself in the manner in which the demands of each labor
group were accommodated by the Company. Indian artisans’ request for an eighty-percent
rise was approved, and other grades of the Indian labor were granted different benefits.
Iranian skilled and semi-skilled workmen, who numbered 1400 by this date, received only
a forty-percent increase, because, in the words of the Managing Director, Iranians “live on
local produce, and for other obvious reasons, their case in not analogous.” Even worse than
that, no rise was granted to Iranian unskilled workers.624 Therefore, the semi-organized
labor movement that led to the 1920 strike managed to foment intra-group relations only
within the Indian workforce and failed to establish inter-group bonds between Indian and
Iranian workmen.
To the Managing Director, the increased level of labor militancy at Abadan was the
outcome of several factors, such as the conditions of the War, the changed dynamics of
labor regimes in India, and the propaganda of agitators as well as “kaiserism” and the non-
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accommodating attitude of the Refinery management. To avoid future unrests, the Director
introduced a set of reforms. He replaced the Refinery works manager with a new
administration, adopted a “standard” scale of pay for the entire workforce, and called for
the reorganization of the medical system at Abadan—among other things. While sailing
back to London, H. E. Nichols wrote to the Board of Directors and after summarizing his
major accomplishments in Iran confidently claimed that no labor disturbances would arise
in Abadan as long as the cost of living would not increase. 625 Nichols’s optimism proved
wrong.

3.3.3.2 The 1922 Strike.

In less than two years, a second strike on a much larger scale

shook Abadan. In March 1922 more than 2,000 Indians from all jats and sects under the
leadership of a group of Sikhs and Pathans stopped work. Soon, Iranians, Arabs, and other
labor groups— except Europeans and Chittagonians— joined the unrest, and the total
number of strikers reached 4000. This industrial action affected different branches of the
Refinery and continued for a few days. Unlike the previous strike, the Company was more
prepared for this event and did not accommodate the workers’ demands. In the end, with
the help of the British military force and the local law enforcement, the Company managed
to quell the strike and repatriated more than 2000 Indians.
British diplomatic officers in the region and Company officials alike tried to give a
distorted account of the strike and its roots. Political Resident, for instance, stated that the
causes of the strike were political rather than economic and that it was organized by an
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experienced hand of Sikh agitators.626 The 1922 strike, however, had a progressive and
equitable cause. The goals were to increase wages for all laborers by eighty percent,
irrespective of grades, and to rescind the grading scale of pay established in 1921. In other
words, the workmen intended to upend the existing labor hierarchy by requesting that all
men be paid on an equal basis and the distinction between a workman and a cooly be
abolished. Besides the grievances about ill-treatment of laborers, the strikers complained
about the lack of amenities in the quarters, such as poor cooking facilities and inadequate
waste disposal provisions and water supplies.627
The laborers commenced the strike with posting pickets in front of the Refinery’s
main gate.628 As one of the few public spaces in the Native Village, the Cinema was used
for organizing the strike and for negotiating with the authorities. On March 19th, 1922, for
instance, the “Workmen’s Committee” met with Colonel Trevor, Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, at the Cinema Theatre to discuss the strikers’ requests. The 18-member
committee consisted of artisans from all trades including fitters, wiremen, painters,
caulkers, carpenters, masons, soldermen, and sweepers. Although the majority of the
leaders were Sikhs and Pathans, the committee also included members from other groups,
such as chittagonians and Chinese workmen. The square outside the Cinema became the
venue where thousands of workmen held congregations and displayed solidarity. The order
and arrangement of the rallies struck the Political Resident: “They [the strikers] were kept
in good order by their own police who wore badges of ribbon. A number of them wore
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large kirpans or swords. The strike leaders maintained very good order and appeared to be
convinced that they were indispensable and could get whatever they demanded.”629 After
attending one of the mass meetings that included more than 2000 men, the Company’s
works manager was shocked at the degree of order and control maintained by the labor
police.630
Not only did the laborers take the law into their own hands, they also used Abadan’s
major public spaces to express their presence and demonstrate their requests. During the
strike, mass rallies were held twice a day at different locations on Abadan’s main street
where the leaders publicly communicated the workmen’s messages to the Company
management and to other comrades. For instance, a group of Pathans holding banners and
playing drums walked in procession along the bazaar road from the Bawarda Tank Farms
to the Refinery’s main gate. This demonstration left a profound effect on the local
authorities. Believing that such behavior could demoralize Iranian and Arab laborers, the
Sheikh called for the dismissal of Indian strikers at once.631 The strike’s message resonated
with Iranian and Arab workmen and local residents of the Abadan Village. In order to
prevent a potential urban unrest, the Sheikh increased the number of Arab guards in the
Abadan bazaar.632
The strike took place at the time when the Company was experiencing a sudden fall
in crude oil production which necessitated the overhaul of several of the Refinery’s old
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benches. On the other hand, the level of fuel oil in the Tank Farm was tight. The
combination of these factors made the management consider resisting the strikers’
demands, and even dismissing all Sikhs and Pathans, and replacing them with local
workmen. The Company estimated that they could get at least 200 artisans from Basra and
Baghdad in Iraq and many more from central part of Iran to substitute for the Indian
strikers.633 Eventually, with the assistance of the British diplomatic and military forces and
the Sheikh’s guards, the Company managed to crush the strike and repatriated more than
2000 Indians, on the grounds of breaking their employment agreements. An evacuation
plan was prepared by a British military officer. The layout of the Native Village facilitated
the removal of workmen. During a night ambush, a military squad surrounded ten Sikh
Lines and removed all the Sikhs from the quarters and forcibly sent them back to India. In
a separate attack, all the Pathans living near the Bawarda Tank Farms were also repatriated
to India.634
The Indian strikers could engage all groups of the Indian migrant labor as well as
Iranian, Arab and Chinese workmen. Unlike the 1920 strike, this labor movement
transcended racial and class boundaries and established solidarity amongst different labor
groups. At first, Chittagoninas and contract-based laborers did not participate in the
strike.635 When it became evident that these groups were also wavering, the Company
shrewdly managed to buy them out by the promise of bonuses and increases of pay. In fact,
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it was important for the Company to prevent process men from joining the strikers at all
costs because this group numbering 1500 was in charge of all oil-refining benches. If they
had ceased to work, the whole refinery would have come to a standstill.636
The 1922 strike had tremendous outcomes. As a well-organized and non-violent
industrial action, it set an important precedent for future labor movements at Abadan. The
strikers were resolute, and yet did not resort to violence. They refused to return to India
unless they all leave together. Their behavior onboard and upon arrival in India debunked
the unruly image that the Company had painted of them. The inappropriate manner in
which they were treated and loaded to steamers at Abadan invoked a sense a sympathy
towards them among British officials in Karachi. 637 This event also led to the revision of
the Indian Emigration Act which ended the practice of indentured labor. The Government
of India reduced the maximum period of employment for the Indian migrant labor from
three years to one year, introduced standard Agreement Forms for clerks and artisans, and
granted employees the power of resignation, all of which raised the Company’s
objection.638
New circumstances called for a revision of the Company’s labor policy. For
instance, rather than relying on intermediaries, the Company began to recruit workmen
directly. As Chittagonians proved to be the most royal group during the strike, the
management planned to recruit the majority of the required labor for process work from
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Chittagong and opened a recruitment office in that province.639 This policy, however, was
modified after a year.640 The Company also employed more strict recruitment methods. For
instance, a tracking system was adopted to ensure that “ring leaders” and “troublemakers”
will be prohibited from future re-engagement with the Company. Under this system, a
“pass book” and an “identity disc” was issued for each Indian employee.641 In 1923, almost
5000 local workmen were discharged, and more than 6500 new men were engaged. During
the same period, the Company repatriated 1000 Indians and brought in more than 1200
new men from India. In addition, a cut in the standard of wages ensued. For instance, the
Company decreased the standard of wage for Chinese carpenters, reportedly “with their
own consent,” by 30 percent.642
In the light of the 1921 Coup d'état and the heightened nationalist sentiments, the
Company felt the pressure to increase the population of its Iranian employees. To enhance
its public image and address the shortage of labor, the Company launched a program to
train local populations for skilled and semi-skilled trades. Several workshops were opened
in the Fields and at Abadan to cultivate first-grade artisans.643 Replacement of Indian
artisans with locals or what came to be known as the “Persianization” of the workforce also
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aimed to show Indians that the Company was no longer dependent on them. As a Company
Director once put it, “…In the course of time, it should be possible to replace much of the
remaining Indian staff by skilled locals, but it will probably always be politic to retain two
classes of skilled labor rather than to become entirely dependent on one.”644 The
Persianization, or Iranianization, of labor, however, occurred at a very slow pace. In fact,
before 1924 when the new Iranian Government increased pressure on the Company to
replace foreign migrant labor with Iranians, this policy was implemented at a lower rate at
Abadan compared to Ahwaz and the Fields. In 1922 the total number of Iranian and Arab
employees spiked from 3,700 to more than 9,000 while the number of Indian clerks and
artisans dropped from 3800 to 2500.645 This had social implications for the Native Village.
The newly employed Iranian and Arab artisans populated the “lines” in which previously
the repatriated Sikhs resided.
All this notwithstanding, the Company did not intend to radically reshuffle the
existing labor hierarchy. It continued to supply the workforce in such trades as Fitters,
Boiler-makers, Turners, Electrical workers, etc. from India. Skilled Indian laborers were
recruited from Punjabi Muslims from the Lahore District. Semi-skilled laborers for such
trades as Durwans (gatekeepers), Telephonchis (Telephone attendants), Tael wallahs
(engine attendants), etc. were recruited from local Iranians and Arabs. These workmen
replaced Indians who were previously in charge of such positions.646 However, like other
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nascent industries, most of the local labor was coming from the impoverished rural poor
areas and turnover of labor was high. 647
In the wake of the strike, the company also employed a “Defense Scheme.” This
plan entailed reinforcing the Refinery’s critical infrastructure— namely the power house,
water pump, fuel pump, and temporary European hospital— in case of a labor unrest.648
The London management also recommended secretly training the personnel on the use of
fire arms without raising suspicions of the Iranian Government, the press, and the Majlis
as well as the British Government.649 The Cinema which was used by the strikers for
mobilizing laborers was also converted into residential quarters for the accommodation of
clerks and artisans.
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CHAPTER 4
HOUSING, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND TOWN PLANNING: URBAN
EXPERIMENTATION IN ABADAN, 1924-1933
This chapter gives an account of urban reformation in Abadan between the second half of
the 1920s and the early 1930s. This period witnessed the evolution of the Abadan company
town from a petro-scape into a bustling oil town with more than 70,000 inhabitants.
Abadan’s urban form during this period underwent drastic changes. In 1924, the town’s
sprawling growth coupled with inadequate urban infrastructure began to pose existential
threats to the security and operations of the Company. Besides labor discontent, regional
epidemics frequently visited the island with resultant mass casualties, particularly among
local workmen and indigenous residents. Moreover, quarantine measures hampered the
export of oil and trade of petroleum products through the Port of Abadan. The lack of
planning, poor sanitation, and housing shortage were blamed for the catastrophic
consequences. The Company was constantly pressed by the Iranian Government and public
opinion to enhance the living conditions of workmen. With a view to addressing these acute
challenges, Company officials, in collaboration with professional town planners,
architects, and engineers, formulated several urban reform programs, crafted development
plans, and launched multiple reconstruction campaigns that collectively helped reorganize
the spatial structure of Abadan. The social and physical planning introduced by the
Company was grounded in the premises of “model towns” as well as the “best practices”
in both India and the metropole.
This episode also marked a watershed between the Company’s old styles of
paternalism and the professionalized welfare policies. The proposed urban reforms
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included housing programs and plans for public amenities that, for the first time, targeted
the lower strata of the labor force and the impoverished residents of Abadan. Welfare
professionals were also consulted to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of paternalistic
services. However, discussions on the extent and scope of welfare programs revealed
contradictions in welfare paternalism. Grand visions and ambitious plans advocated by
reform-minded Company officials were usually rectified by senior managers on account of
economic concerns.
Change, as Margaret Crawford argues, is an inherent feature of company town.650
Therefore, it is important to locate the transformation of Abadan within the “dynamic of
capitalist development,” which was the process that created, altered, destroyed, and rebuilt
different parts of Abadan. Analyzing the physical form of Abadan within the broader
contexts of industrial restructuring, welfare paternalism, and labor history, in what follows,
I will show how Abadan’s urban form in this period was not only the product of urban
reformation introduced by the company, but also the outcome of the activities of multiple
social agents, ranging from Iranian officials to emerging urban merchants, Iranian oil
workers, and ordinary denizens of Abadan.
4.1 Scientific Management, Industrial Restructuring, and New Political Order
Re-organization of space in Abadan coincided with the restructuring of the oil industry and
the re-arrangement of political power in Khuzestan Province. As early as 1921, the wave
of nationalism, represented by the accession to power of Reza Khan, was at work to bring
Khuzestan back into the Iranian sovereignty. In the second half of 1924, the imbroglio
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between the Sheikh of Khorramshahr and the Iranian Government came to a head. Reza
Khan, then the Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief, launched a military campaign
to Khuzestan which eventually led to the downfall of the Sheikh. In January 1925, the
reorganization of political power in Khuzestan resulted in the gradual abolition of the
Sheikh administration and the strengthening of the military and political institutions of the
central government in the province. While military outposts were reinforced in major cities
including Ahwaz, Shushtar, Dizful and Khorramshahr, new military representatives were
posted at Abadan and the oil fields.651 The Iranian Government also appointed a military
Governor-General to the Province and a Deputy Governor and the chief of the municipality
(Rais-i-Baladiyeh) to Abadan. Moreover, due to the increased strategic importance of
southern cities, the capital of province was moved from Shushtar to Ahwaz.
The Government takeover of Khuzestan had also social and economic implications
for the province. New infrastructure and communication technologies facilitated the
integration of Khuzestan with the rest of the country. New roads were constructed which
served not only as a means of communication, but also as a tool for military control.652 The
introduction of motor cars into the region also opened up remote districts and connected
them to the towns.653 Also, aviation technology helped bring provincial cities in close
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contact with Tehran. In 1924, the German aviation company Junkers Luftverkehr AG
instituted the first national air service in Iran with direct monoplane flights between Tehran
and Khorramshahr. Removal of the Sheikh from power led to the disintegration and
dispersal of Arab tribal communities. The central government also managed to establish its
authority and direct control over Arab tribes by disarming the tribesmen and weakening
the influence of the hereditary sheikhs. These reforms led to Arab uprising in 1925.654 The
Provincial Director of Revenue was instituted in Khuzestan which introduced numerous
economic reforms, such as the date taxation or the prohibition of Indian rupee, which
reorganized the economic structure of Khuzestan.655
As the center of power shifted to the capital, the Company revisited its old policy
towards the Iranian Government and got more engaged in the “Persian affairs.”656 The new
policy was marked by the attendance of Sir John Cadman, then the Deputy Chairman, in
the coronation celebrations of Reza Shah in Tehran in April 1926, the first visit of a highranking Company official to the seat of the Iranian Government since 1911. The Company
also commemorated the Iranian Government takeover of the province by the erection of
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the statute of Reza Shah at Khorramshahr on the Abadan bank of the Karun River.657 In an
interview with the new Shah, Cadman promised to contribute to the development of Iran
by providing cheap oil, to share with the Iranian Government the Company’s public works
and road building experiences, to assist with the professional development of the Iranian
workmen, and to pursue Reza Shah’s modernization policy.658 The project of regeneration
of Iran and the discourse of modernity and progress promoted by the Shah and his
administration soon were embraced by Company officials. In fact, the Company launched
a publicity campaign to portray Iran’s oil centers as places where oil modernity manifested
itself. In crafting this discourse, references were made to the symbols of modernity in the
Metropole: Abadan, in particular, was pictured as a center of civilization replicating
“English modernity” embodied in sloping roofs, English-style port, English institutions,
among others,659 and Masjid-i-Sulaiman at night resembled Piccadilly Circus with the
exception of great flares in the distant background.660
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company also introduced administrative and technical
reforms to grapple with the emerging political and economic challenges in Iran and abroad.
In this period, the managerial doctrine of Charles Greenway, which was grounded both in
the colonial mercantilism and the imperial mentality of the pre-war era, gave way to the
pragmatic-globalist and neo-imperialist visions and policies promoted by the new
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Chairman, Professor John Cadman.661 The new Chairman’s vision picturing the Company
in an “impregnable position” vis-à-vis other competitors and providing an “ideal system of
service to the public” were pursued by implementing aggressive reforms and
reorganizational schemes which collectively aimed at elimination of time wastage and
unnecessary duplication of administrative work as well as enhancing productivity and
efficiency.662 Therefore, the 1921 system of triumvirate management gave way to the
centralized system of administration663; a system of budget and estimate was introduced664;
and the Company’s headquarters was relocated from Khorramshahr to Abadan.665 This
latter policy further elevated Abadan’s position among the Company’s centers of operation.
The growing importance of “scientific management” in industrial production also
captured the attention of Company officials and inspired the ongoing restructuring efforts.
In the beginning of the twentieth century, a comprehensive and rationalized system of
technical organization, informed by Frederick Winslow Taylor’s scientific management
movement, replaced the systematic management of the late nineteenth century
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administered by engineering professionals.666 The application of scientific knowledge and
methods to industrial problems was promoted by the British Government during the Great
War. In 1915, the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research was instituted as a
Committee of Privy Council. This Committee established the British Scientific Instrument
Research Association in 1918 to advance the application of scientific and industrial
research in all instrument-making industries.667 Prominent British statesmen like A. J.
Balfour also advocated the notion of scientific industrial production and manufacturing in
the postwar years. Like other British industries, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company joined the
conversation on the application of science to industrial production. This approach gained
momentum especially after John Cadman replaced Charles Greenway as the new Chairman
of the Company in 1927. In his lectures and interviews, John Cadman stipulated that all
operations of the Company were grounded in “scientific principles,” and that thanks to this
approach the landscape of the Iranian oil industry was unique among all oil-producing
countries.668 To prove his claims, Cadman in 1927 commissioned J. M. Williamson, the
secretary to the British Scientific Instrument Research Association, to visit Iran and
illustrate the ways in which the APOC was applying “science” to the process of extraction,
treatment, and distribution of crude oil.669 The main aim of this project was twofold: to
publicize the Company’s industrial activities and paternalistic programs in Iran with a
narrative that could be comprehensible by the general public, and to demonstrate that the
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Company was acting as the harbinger of modernity in Iran, with tremendous “civilizing
influence” transcending the areas of operations.
Company officials also equated oil modernity in Iran with scientific industrialism.
In an interview with The Financial News in December 1924, Sir John Cadman described
Abadan as a “modern city of considerable magnitude, with every convenience for comfort
and health and industrial efficiency.” However, oil modernity from Cadman’s point of view
was not limited to welfare amenities and industrial efficiency, it was also represented,
among other things, by good roads, fleets of motor cars, better connectivity of different
parts of the vast, decentralized oil infrastructure, and social transformations. Cadman
believed that the modern development that oil had brought to Iran— especially the promise
of secure and remunerative employment as well as consumption culture— encouraged
local tribespeople to abandon their nomadic lifestyle in favor of Western and industrial
modes of life.670
4.2 Popular Protest, Labor Organizations, and the 1929 Strike
Labor protest against the Company gathered steam in 1927 following the reorganization of
the political system in Khuzestan and when the number of Iranian workmen in the employ
of the Company reached a historic high. Emboldened by the nationalist feelings and
deprived of Company housing and other social amenities that first-and second-class
employees were enjoying, third-tier Iranian workforce in May 1929 staged a major
industrial strike at the Abadan Refinery.671 The roots of the strike could be traced in the
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accumulation of popular discontent about ill-treatment of Iranian labor and residents of
Abadan by the Company and in the increased influence of trade unions based on the Soviet
model. Two major Iranian newspapers as early as March 1927 began to put out critical
articles against the oil company. The prestigious Habl-al-Matin, published weekly in
Calcutta, and Hayat-i-kargar (Workmen’s Life), an incipient newspaper published in
Shiraz, circulated freely in Khuzestan, served as the pioneers of advancing the interests of
Iranian laborers and nationalist circles, and played a major role in enlightening public
opinion on the activities of the Company in Southwestern Iran.672
Hayat-i-Kargar was edited by a young journalist, by the name of Ahmadzadeh,
whose previous newspaper, Atash-feshan (Volcano), had been suppressed by local Iranian
authorities during the parliamentary election period in 1926, on account of its alleged
radical left-leaning views.673 Company officials became wary of this newspaper’s
influence on the lower ranks of the Iranian labor. As the Refinery Works Manager once
put it, “This newspaper is fairly widely read in Abadan, and whilst the more intelligent
Persians here easily realize that the articles are pure propaganda directed against the
Company by its enemies, there is no doubt but that when they are read by, or read out to,
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the less intelligent members of the community, they have a harmful effect.” 674 For instance,
in an article entitled “A.P.O.C. and Politics,” published on March 8th, 1927, Hayat-iKargar accused the Company of pursuing political objects in economic guise and called
on the Iranian Government to restrict the British enterprise’s political activities in the
province. The article stipulated that the Company has recruited a large number of British
military and political officers, and it has violated international laws. Referencing the
nationalist movements in the region, the article called for resistance against the Compony
to safeguard Iranian national interests: “Under what circumstance should the Persians
submit to such transgressions? No, they should not do so. Submission is a sign of weakness
and mental debility. On the contrary, the Persians should follow the example of other
nations who have recently risen against the universal oppressors and are making selfsacrifice in reaching their ends.” The article also charged Company officials with all sorts
of ill-treatment of Iranian workmen— in particular the disproportionately lower number of
Iranian employees relative to Indians— and called on the Company to change its policy
and comply with the Oil Concession.675
In another issue, Hayat-i-Kargar published the proclamation of the Labor
Association of the A.P.O.C. workmen with a view to alleviating the “miserable” conditions
of the Iranian labor at Abadan. The committee of workmen had suggested that at each
major industrial center, including Abadan, a Mixed Committee be formed and meet once a
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month to discuss and settle the disputes between the Company and Iranian workmen. The
Mixed Committee, which resembled the workers’ councils in Soviet Russia, was comprised
of two representatives of the Company, two elected representatives of the coolies, one
elected representative of the artisans, one elected representative of the clerks, and one
representative of the Iranian Government. The Labor Association also demanded enhanced
working and living conditions as well as sound welfare and pension policies for workmen.
For instance, the Association demanded shorter work hours in summer, a minimum wage
of 100 krans per month for coolies, abolition of recruitment of minors and abuse of
workmen—among other requests. Workmen also asked for housing for all laborers with
water, lights, fuel, and equitable access to medical and sanitary facilities, and requested
that the Company should not interfere in the workers’ private lives.676
The articles published in Habl-al-Matin also shed light on the grievances of
Abadan’s residents and reflected the anxieties of nationalist activists. For instance, the
article titled “The Life Blood of Persia” enumerated what the author characterized as the
“Company’s intrigues,” such as discharging and deporting Iranian workmen on account of
patriotism, bribing Iranian officials, establishing a secret service office, and usurping upon
the rights of residents. Revealing the nationalist circles’ disappointment at the Iranian
Government and the Parliament, the author pled to the Shah for help, “Oh! Thou our
crowned Father! Our bones have nearly been crushed by the persecutions which we have
received at the hands of the Company! We have no more strength to withstand the pressure
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any longer. Come thou to the help of a large number of laborers and shopkeepers, for the
present situation in these parts shows a very dark future.”677
Nationalist and communist groups in Khuzestan also joined the political campaigns
against the Company. This movement was spearheaded by the local notable and Majlis
(Iranian Parliament) Deputy for Abadan, Mirza Hussein Movaqar Bushiri and his
associates. This group, known amongst Company and British officials as the Bushiri circle,
had established the workmen’s clubs at Abadan. Company and British officials accused the
Bushiri circle of communist tendencies. However, commercial interests and rivalries could
have been the major reasons for Movaqar’s animosity towards the Company.678 During the
1929 strike, the Bushiri circle launched a nationalist and religious rally against the
Company, and adopted such slogans as “Down with the foreigners and unbelievers,”
“Khuzestan for the Persians” or “Let the sons of Darius enjoy the fruits of their land.” The
Bushiri circle also made alliance with local clerics who used the religious processions
during the holy Shi’ite month of Muharram to rouse local populations.679 British officials
believed that such propaganda was supported by both the Iranian Government and the
Russians.680
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The strike broke out on May 4 when a May Day demonstration by a group of
Iranian-Armenian employees evolved into a sweeping popular protest. The strikers
occupied the square in front of the New Refinery Gate and repeated the demands they had
raised earlier which included, among other things, an increase in wages, reduction of
foreign employees, and equal treatment of Iranian and Indian employees. Perhaps the
nationalist components of the demands precluded Indians, Iraqis, and chinses from the
industrial action. British and Company officials alike portrayed the strike as a Soviet
conspiracy and attributed the labor discontent to the Bolshevik propaganda.681
This labor unrest was rapidly repressed by local Iranian authorities.682 Unlike the
1922 strike, the Iranian Government, police, military forces, and secret services were
actively present at Abadan and played a major role is quelling the labor movement.683 In
the same year, Iranian workers of the southern segments of the Trans-Iranian Railway, who
were in the employ of the American Ulen Company, went on strike on three occasions.
Similar to the Abadan strike, all the labor actions were suppressed by the Iranian Police

681

As a first reaction, the British Minister in Tehran in a conversation with a high-ranking Iranian official
attributed this event to the presence of the Soviet Consulate at Ahwaz. To a senior British naval officer,
the strike was an ill-fated scheme organized by of a bunch of Soviet-funded agitators and executed by
dozens of Iranian surrogates who began to foment the seed of violence amongst the workmen and aimed
not only at “causing strikes and damage to the Refinery but also at creating general political unrest in the
province.” R. H. Clive to A. Chamberlain. May 16th, 1929. Coll 28/48 ‘Persia. Anglo-Persian Oil Company;
Relations with Persian Govt.’ [112r] (234/540), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers,
IOR/L/PS/12/3453, in Qatar Digital Library
<https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100076699144.0x000023> [accessed 30 June 2019]. See also:
The Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, to The Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station. June 30th,
1929. Coll 28/48 ‘Persia. Anglo-Persian Oil Company; Relations with Persian Govt.’ [91r] (192/540), British
Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/12/3453, in Qatar Digital Library
<https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100076699143.0x0000c1> [accessed 29 June 2019]
682
S. Cronin, 2010, p.699
683
Company officials in collaboration with British military and diplomatic officials in the region devised
different plans to step in should the Iranian government lost control of the situation. A fleet of the British
Navy was on alert upstream from Abadan to take action, if needed. “Extract from Senior Naval Officer.”
June 14th, 1929. Coll 28/48 ‘Persia. Anglo-Persian Oil Company; Relations with Persian Govt.’ [161r]
(332/540), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/12/3453, in Qatar Digital
Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100076699144.0x000085> [accessed 30 June 2019]

260

(Amnieh) upon the order of the Military Governor-General. The military detachment
remained in Abadan and quartered in the security barracks until the end of the year.684 More
than forty-five ringleaders were detained and sent to other cities, such as Dizful and
Khorramabad, with their families left behind. The Company also managed to control the
labor movement by discharging 4,200 men in Abadan and having them deported.
Similar to previous industrial actions, the 1929 strike had profound consequences.
The new labor conditions forced the Company to revisit its paternalistic policies.685 The
Company also established an intelligence service, which was in charge of screening new
employees and gathering internal information about the “feeling among the employees at
Abadan and at the Fields as well as in the province in general.”686 The occurrence of the
strike at Abadan was completely censored in the Iranian Press. Government officials,
however, began to make inquiries into the wage, welfare, and living conditions of Iranian
workmen at Abadan.687 The establishment of the Iranian Security Police was also one of
the outcomes of the 1929 strike. The resultant conflicts between this organization and the
Company’s intelligence service gave rise to heated conversations between Iranian and
Company officials in the following years.
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4.3 Flowers and Vegetables: The Paradox of Welfare Paternalism
“In earlier years, the Company accepted no responsibility for the comfort of its Persian
workmen in Abadan, and under the Sheikh of [Khorramshahr’s] rule … conditions had
become indescribable. Under the new regime, there are great possibilities not only of
rectifying the conditions of public health, but also of improving the efficiency of the
workmen, by establishing at small cost such facilities as will reflect credit upon the
Company’s organization in the eyes of the Persian Government and people. An Abadan
representative now sits in the Majlis, and the present member is an enthusiastic supporter
of the Company.” 688
4.3.1 Economic Rationality with a Dose of Social Welfare
In this period, the Company adopted a new approach to welfare services. As the Deputy
Chairman explained to the Board of Directors, in the early years of operations in Iran
Company-sponsored social services were driven by economic logic and geared mainly
towards the first-and second-class personnel. As discussed in the previous chapter, Iranian
laborers were excluded from Company paternalism. In 1924, however, the Company
changed this old policy and assumed responsibility for the welfare of the lower strata of
the workforce and, simultaneously, expanded the range of social services for Europeans
and high-ranking clerical staff. Nevertheless, social control and segregation by ethnooccupational status remained the cornerstone of Company paternalism. Several factors may
account for the incorporation of social rationality into the framework of Company
paternalism. First and foremost, in the light of the Government takeover of Khuzestan and
the emboldened nationalist sentiments, the Company was constantly pressed by Iranian
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officials and public opinion to improve the working and living conditions of Iranian
employees who made up more than sixty percent of the workforce.689
The growing importance of the notion of “human material” in industrial production
also contributed to the rethinking of old styles of paternalistic efforts. In fact, the
proponents of scientific industrialism viewed sociological and human factors as a critical
component of the application of scientific methods to the management of operations and
production of petroleum products. 690 As the first academic to become the chairman of a
global industrial enterprise, John Cadman was also a proponent of the application of
scientific methods to different operations of the oil industry, from extraction, management
of geological demarcation, production, and refining, to provision of social welfare service
to oil workers. For instance, during his visit to Abadan in October-November 1924,
Cadman introduced the concept of “mental relaxation” for the first time.691
Popular progressive reforms of the day, such as industrial betterment movement,
also known as welfare work, contributed to the formation of the professionalized welfare
methods. Unlike laissez-faire capitalists, industrialists that adopted the principles of
industrial betterment movement assumed a certain degree of responsibility for the wellbeing of their employees— though in exchange for increased loyalty.692 One of the
outcomes of the new approach to paternalism was soliciting advice from trained welfare
experts and appointing a welfare professional to administer social services. The Anglo-
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Persian Oil Company also embraced this model. For instance, welfare professionals were
dispatched to the Fields and Abadan to evaluate the needs of the personnel and give
recommendations for enhancing social services.693 In the early 1930s, a Welfare Office
was instituted with the task of provision of all welfare services, including educational
facilities, to employees. 694
The rhetoric associated with welfare paternalism stressed efficiency, productivity,
economy, and public health. Paternalistic programs were not regarded as “bountiful
largesse” of the Company; rather they were viewed as essential provisions for the welfare,
happiness, and spirit de corps of employees and designed to ward off a sense of “staleness”
and enhance performance of employees to increase industrial efficiency and
productivity.695 The Company-sponsored services and amenities were also intended to
serve as “models” to be replicated in different parts of Iran. In the words of a Company
propagandist, “If plague spots tend to spread, so do health spots.”696
All this notwithstanding, mixed views existed within the Company management
regarding the extent and scope of welfare paternalism. For instance, based on the
conviction that cholera might be caused by the greens obtained from “distant and obscured
bazaars,” Company officials in Iran called for planting vegetables under the supervision of
the Company to ensure the health of the staff and check the outbreak of epidemics.
However, the London Management favored growing of flowers, turfing the gardens, and
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beautifying the environment rather than supplying vegetables to employees.697 Senior
managers also tended to modify the progressive schemes proposed by reform-minded
officials or design professionals. In certain cases, the initial plans were re-evaluated
multiple times by the Production Department or by the higher management and different
elements were either rectified or removed. For instance, in 1924 the Deputy Chairman
questioned spending £750,000 on a rebuilding program, because, in his view, such colossal
expenditure did not have any direct revenue-earning value for the Company. Therefore, he
recommended finding a midway scenario with considerable reductions in capital without
jeopardizing the scheme’s major objectives.698 Similarly, in 1931 an ambitious medical reorganization scheme proposed by the Medical Department was completely overhauled by
the senior management.
Company paternalism in this period also shifted from an individual-centered
approach to the type of services that affected the broader terrains of the workforce. While
the general welfare services diversified and expanded, in particular for the European
employees, the Company rolled back on certain individual-level perks. This change in
paternalistic policy manifested itself in different realms, from domestic allowances to
medical services. For instance, as the Company expanded healthcare facilities, medical
allowances per employee was abolished. Chief Medical Officer put it, “…We no longer
undertake to give [individual] medical treatment, and the Doctors have no further need to
pander to anyone. If a man requires treatment, he can come and ask for it, but the Doctors
need not run after them, nor should the Office send any Doctors to give his verdict upon a
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case.”699 Similarly, allowances for messing allocated to the staff under the older
paternalistic system, which covered expenses for cooks, foodstuffs, etc., were revoked
when the Company built a central restaurant and canteen in 1926. Changing economic
conditions also resulted in further shrinkage of individual-level welfare services. For
instance, in the early 1930s when the global recession dampened the oil market, Company
officials considered dismissal of a large number of employees and made changes to the
grading and renewal of salaries and benefits.
4.3.2 Social Control and Professionalized Welfare Policies
The changes in the demographic composition of the European staff that had begun in the
post-war years continued into the 1920s and created new labor conditions that necessitated
a revision of paternalistic services. Between 1924 and 1926, the number of European
employees at Abadan drastically increased. In 1926, roughly 70 percent of the staff were
junior bachelors who were on their first three-year contract with the Company. The new
cohort demanded better working and living conditions and improved social services.
General dissatisfaction manifested itself in high rates of resignation, low physical and
mental health status, and reluctance in renewal of contract with the Company. In the wake
of the new labor environment, Company officials began to revisit welfare services to
improve “morale” and address the increased discontent amongst Europeans.700
In 1925, with a view to enhancing the organization and implementation of
paternalistic programs for the European employees, the Company picked two staff
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members to serve as superintendents of social welfare at the Fields and Abadan. Moreover,
a welfare expert was invited from India to assess the quality of social amenities in the
centers of operation. Upon visiting Iran and interviewing the staff, the welfare professional
prepared a report in which he identified several shortcomings that, in his opinion, required
immediate attention, including married housing, cinemas, orchestras, libraries, and
recreational and worship facilities. He also made several recommendations which were
mostly met with opposition from senior Company officials.701
The welfare expert recommended extending the existing reading facilities and
building new libraries with no membership fees. He also suggested that each library should
contain at least 750 books on all subjects. Company Directors agreed to provide “standard”
literary works as a permanent nucleus for the libraries at Abadan and the Fields and to
provide twenty-four new books per months through a subscription with The Times Book
Club in London. However, the Directors believed that considerable attention should be
paid to the choice of subjects. Eventually, the Company made a yearly subscription of £72
with The Times Book Club for a monthly provision of “modern fiction” as well as books
with topics related to Iran. Moreover, a membership fee was considered necessary to
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encourage readership and preservation of books.702 Based on these premises, a system of
libraries was instituted in the areas of operation and the Abadan Gymkhana Library opened
in November 1925.703
The welfare expert also recommended providing religious services to the European
staff. Unlike companies that used religion as a tool to cement stronger ties with employees,
the Anglo-Persian was not yet prepared to pursue this policy on accounts of diversity of
denominations amongst the European staff. As discussed in the previous chapter, it was
the policy of the Company to avoid polarization of the European personnel through
religious or social institutions. Moreover, the management was afraid of the intention of
Muslim clerics in establishing religious schools and appointing religious scholars
(mujtahid) to Abadan or the Fields. Muslim religious institutions were perceived as a threat
due to their capacity to mobilize workmen. This explains why Company officials in
retrospect regretted the approval of the Rangooni Mosque at Abadan. In the words of a
Director, it was “ill-conceived and a step which should never have been taken.”704
Despite Company opposition, a group of Europeans began to organize informal
religious gatherings on their own initiative. As a result of the increased pressure from the
staff, John Cadman officially recognized “religious needs” as one of the major components
of “social needs” and called for the establishment of religious institutions along with
facilities for married life in Iran. In his report to the Board of Director, Cadman even related
religious activities to the well-being of the staff. However, he stressed avoiding sectarian
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activities. In justifying this policy, Cadman made references to best practices in other parts
of the Empire. For instance, he alluded to how religious observance had worked out in the
British military forces.
As mentioned earlier, before 1924, the Company completely neglected the Iranian
workmen’s social needs. For instance, in the Fields, there existed four clubs for Europeans,
two clubs for Indian clerical staff, and one club for Armenians. However, no clubs were
provided to Iranian clerks, and they had to apply for membership to Indian clubs.705 In
1926, Cadman recommended providing spaces for recreation and social activities of
Iranian clerical staff.706 Plans were developed to build a club for Iranian clerks in the Fields
and to provide sports services, such as “pleasure ground” (entertainment grounds), for
Iranian employees at Abadan. In supporting their application to the Iranian Government
for acquisition of new land at Abadan, the Company’s agent in Tehran noted that, “The
Company now has many thousands of employees at Abadan, the great majority of them
Persians, and that is essential and in the interests of their welfare and health that an area for
their recreation should be allotted to them. Up to the present, no such area has been
available at Abadan, and it is urgently needed.”707 New football and hockey grounds were
also laid out for artisans adjacent to the new Artisans’ Quarters. 708
As a result of the new paternalistic policy, the Company expanded the range of
entertainment options for the first-class personnel. In 1924, for instance, a new golf course,
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six tennis courts and squash courts were built on the northwestern side of the Bungalow
Area. By 1929, sports activities such as swimming, rugby, association football, hockey,
golf, tennis, cricket, squash were played at Abadan. Certain outdoor games, such as soccer,
hockey and rugby, were played only in cooler months. To increase social cohesion among
Europeans, inter-departmental leagues, inter-center tournaments, trophies, and matches
were organized. Most games, however, were played among the staff members of the same
grade. At Abadan, teams were usually arranged according to certain characteristics of the
first-class personnel, such as marital status (Married vs. Single Golf Teams), departmental
association (Inter-Departmental Athletic Sports or Inter-Departmental Swimming Gala),
and nationality (England vs. Scotland football matches). Occasionally, similar games were
played between members of the second-class personnel. For instance, in 1929, the final
game of the hockey cup held in honor of the Chairman was played between Abadan clerks
and Fields Armenian clerks. The finale of the same tournament in 1930 was played between
the Abadan Athletic Club and the Field Unity Club, representing the clerical staff at
Abadan and the Fields, respectively. Very rarely, however, were inter-group matches
played between Europeans and the clerical staff. For instance, in 1929 cricket and tennis
matches were held between the Gymkhana Club and the Abadan Athletic Club. Within the
circle of the wives of the senior staff tennis and golf matches were played.709
The Company vigorously continued the policy of drawing employees to the Abadan
Gymkhana Club. After all, it was used a tool to socialize junior employees into the
corporate culture. New activities were organized to increase the rate of patronage. With the
presence of 13 staff wives at Abadan, dance party was held every alternate Saturday. The
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management also encouraged community organizations and amateur groups to play
musical performances.710 For instance, a Jazz Band consisting of 12 staff members
performed regularly at the Club. In April 1925, the area between the Gymkhana Club and
the river was turfed to provide a pleasant “rendezvous” during the summer months.711 New
extensions were also made to the Gymkhana Club. A cinema hall was added which was
equipped with a panatrope set and hosted a wide range of cultural nights, theatrical
performances, and events by community organizations such as Abadan Dramatic
Society.712 The Gymkhana Hall was large enough to accommodate more than 150 scots
who in January 1926 gathered to celebrate the annual supper of the Caledonian Society of
Abadan.713 Replications of popular plays were performed by local amateur groups at the
Club. For instance, “Tilly of Bloomsbury” and “A Little Bit of Fluff,” both popular British
comedies in the early 1920s, were performed by the Basra Amateur Dramatic Society and
the comedy play “The Dover Road” was performed by the Thespian Society of Abadan.714
In September 1926, a new club known as the Sailors’ Institute, was built in the Bawarda
neighborhood on the lines of the Abadan Gymkhana Club for the use of Europeans residing
in that area as well as the crews of the British Tanker Company.715
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In tandem with the expansion of entertainment amenities, the Company increased
its control over social activities through various mechanisms. For instance, the Directors
instituted an oversight body, known as the Executive Committee, to coordinate different
clubs and “side shows.” The Committee was chaired by the Assistant General Manager
and consisted of representatives from each club appointed by the Company.716 The
Company’s excessive control over social life at Abadan raised outrage among European
employees. Club patronage decreased to the extent that Company officials attributed this
to the comfortable conditions of bungalows. This trend also affected the libraries. For
instance, the use of the Fields library reduced by half in 1926. The Welfare Officer
attributed this decline to “non-arrival of fresh and regular supplies of new fictions” as well
as the excessive rate of membership. All this notwithstanding, the Company insisted on the
policy of control and segregation. For instance, Indian clerks were prohibited from using
the staff library on the grounds that this might further dampen the use of the library by
European employees.717
A welfare professional, who was sent to Iran in 1928 to evaluate the impacts of
social services, found out that British employees had developed “slight resentment”
towards the Company. The staff accused the Company of exercising control over leisure
activities and interfering with employees’ private lives. British employees also proposed
that the Club Committee be appointed by club members and the position of “club master”
be banished. Employees also expressed interest in establishing their own private clubs,
because the Abadan Club evoked “too much of the character of an institute.” In concluding
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his survey, the welfare expert made several recommendations to address major social needs
at Abadan. He also detected a decline of “morale” among the staff which, in his opinion,
was caused by the absence of a church and religious observance.718
Company officials, however, unanimously, believed that the time was not ripe to
relax control over the institutions of social welfare on grounds of security, procurement,
and management capacity within the staff. The Chief Medical Officer, for instance,
believed that the Abadan Gymkhana Club must not be left to employees without ex-officio
representatives of the Refinery management, since such experiments at the Fields Club had
allegedly failed.719 Other Company officials opposed the idea of sanctioning private clubs.
For instance, the ex-colonial officer and the Chief of the APOC Security Branch believed
that, “we want one homogenous unit in different centers, and not a number of unmixable
atoms.” Colonel Medlicott also called for bridging social gaps among employees by
introducing mixed sports tournaments and social events, such as “Paul Jones.”720 Similarly,
the Chairman also disagreed with “the idea of giving any encouragement to class
consciousness,” particularly amongst Europeans by sanctioning private clubs. However,
Cadman suggested a Club Secretary for social work and a Padre of “latitudinarian views”
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be appointed in Abadan and sanctioned the construction of buildings for religious
services.721 As a result, the Company approved the construction of a church room at
Abadan and recruited a chaplain from Basra to attend to the spiritual and religious needs
of the European personnel.722
4.3.2.1 Restaurant and Works Canteen.

In the wake of frequent epidemics and the

growing concerns regarding staff hygiene, the Company devised plans to extend its control
over food supply systems and to consolidate messing. In the early years, employees were
granted messing allowances for foodstuffs and cooks. As mentioned earlier, junior
bachelors dined together in bungalows and usually shared a cook, kitchenware, and dining
room. In the 1920s, Company medical officers rendered separate cooking arrangements
unhygienic and difficult to screen for quality control. 723 Moreover, junior bachelors living
in single rooms in Slide Valves always complained about the quality of service and cooking
and quarreled over dining schedule.724 These factors led the Company to contemplate
building a central restaurant on the site of No.2 Bungalow. The cost of the restaurant was
to be compensated through messing allowances. Designed on the lines of “English business
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houses,” the Restaurant opened in May 1926.725 To publicize and celebrate the
inauguration of “the finest step in social welfare,” an Indian regiment band was invited
from Basra to play music outside the restaurant, while more than 219 staff members
gathered to dine. 726
Upon erecting the central restaurant, the Company eliminated kitchens from all
bungalows and most dining rooms were converted into sitting rooms. The Restaurant
catered primarily for junior bachelor staff, but gradually was patronized by senior members
as well as crews of the Company’s maritime transport arm, the British Tanker Company.
Iranian and Indian clerical staff were also allowed to use the Restaurant. However, a clear
line was drawn between the first-class personnel’s dining area and the section where nonEuropeans were permitted to dine. The Restaurant provided two messing options: table
d’hote meals and a la carte system. The Works Canteen was also built on the same site to
serve the staff on shift duties. The Restaurant and Canteen collectively catered three meals
per day for more than 200 employees. The former also served private parties and special
events. The staff consisted of three European personnel including a manager, a French chef,
and an assistant chef, and 95 “native” personnel including 37 waiters, 25 cooks and cooks’
mates, and 33 kitchen, pantry, and lavatory boys.727
The food supply for the Restaurant and Canteen was under the supervision of the
Company Public Health Department. Foodstuffs, including fresh fish, meat, vegetables,
and produce, were provided daily by a local merchant, and dairy produce was supplied
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from Khorramshahr before the Company established its own dairy farm at Abadan. Tinned
and bottled foods, drinks, bread, and cigars were purchased from the Company Provision
Store. Tinned vegetable and foods were consumed only when fresh produce was not
available in sufficient quantities.728 The Restaurant project met some of its objectives. In
1928, two years after its opening, the Chief Medical Officer reported that there was a
marked reduction in cases of dysentery amongst Europeans. However, employees resented
that attendance at the Restaurant was compulsory and demanded flexibility with
messing.729 Moreover, contrary to the initial calculation, the Company did not save money
as a result of the centralization of cooking and messing system. In fact, due to high
overhead costs, the Restaurant and Canteen soon became money-losing institutions. In the
light of the Great Depression, Company officials began to reduce expenses associated with
social services. Plans were devised to turn the Restaurant into a self-supporting entity. For
instance, in 1931 Company officials cut the Restaurant and canteen staff in half, but
eventually had to cover the loss by increasing the servant allowance rate by £12.730
4.3.3 Model Schools and Technical Training
In the early 1920s, the Company began to subsidize several schools in its operation areas
in Khuzestan as well as in other major cities, such as Isfahan and Tehran. In the light of the
political restructuring in Iran and with a view to repairing its public image and securing
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political influence in Tehran, the Company decided to provide “model education
institutions” in Khuzestan. The Company’s new paternalistic efforts in providing
educational services took different forms after 1924. Not only did the Anglo-Persian
continue to financially support select educational facilities; it also planned to expand the
scope of educational services for its existing and prospective employees. Moreover, in
response to the request of the Iranian Government, the Company agreed to send a group of
Iranian students to Europe for further technical trainings.731
In January 1926, Company officials prepared an Education Scheme with a
maximum yearly Education Grant of £10,000 (equivalent to 51,000 tomans) for
educational development in Southwestern Iran. As in the case of other social welfare
programs, a British Supervisor, a trained expert in the field of education, was appointed for
the oversight of the Scheme. The Education Scheme was designed to remain in conformity
with the new education policies of the Iranian Government. Therefore, Company officials
submitted the proposed program to the Provincial Director of Education for review and
approval. Based on the agreement with the Iranian Government, the Company agreed to
provide funding and, while retaining representatives on the School Committees, left the
management of the educational facilities to the Iranian Director of Education.732
Almost half the Education Grant was spent on five schools in the Company’s
centers of operations—two at Ahwaz, two in the Fields area, and one at Abadan. At the
latter location, the Company was committed to contributing up to £800 per year to the
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State-run elementary school, Pahlavi School, which was built in Abadan Town after the
Central Government took over the political administration of Khuzestan. In early 1925, the
Abadan School accommodated roughly 150 pupils, of whom 35 were the children of the
Company’s Iranian workmen. The rest of the students were comprised mainly of the sons
of local merchants and government officials. Under the Education Scheme, the Company
agreed to finance the extensions to the school to serve up to 300 students and to cover the
tuition fees for 150 children of its low-paid laborers.

Figure 4.1 A view of Ferdowsi School, a model elementary school designed and built by
the Company in Bawarda, circa 1931. Classrooms were organized around a central
courtyard and were surrounded by an arched verandah.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36152

In the early 1930s, the Company erected a model elementary school, on the lines of
British primary schools, within its territory in the neighborhood of Bawarda to the south of
Abadan Town. The school was designed to accommodate up to 250 pupils. In order to draw
elite teachers and headmasters from major cities to Abadan, Company officials decided to
provide accommodation to the school staff. In 1931, plans were developed to build
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permanent housing for teachers, who were previously accommodated in a wooden
bungalow, on the model of second-class quarters.733 Two married and six bachelor-type
bungalows were built in the school’s compound at an estimated cost of £3000.734 The
Schools’ curricula were determined by the Iranian Government. For instance, a drill
instructor from the Iranian Army would provide students with regular physical training.735
The schools sponsored by the Company also promoted the Central Government’s rhetoric
of Iranian nationalism. For instance, the Deputy Chairman suggested that reading lessons
offered to Iranian students should “instill a Persian patriotism, and a pride in their own
country and its people.”736 Similarly, the new primary school at Bawarda was named after
the prominent Iranian poet Ferdowsi who had become a pivotal figure in the cultural
revitalization campaign promoted by the Shah and his administration in the 1930s.
Besides improving basic education, the Education Scheme also envisioned the
training of Iranian youths to turn them into skilled artisans and clerks. For this program,
however, the Company assumed direct control and acted independent of the Iranian
Government. In the aftermath of the Indian strikes in the early 1920s, the Company had
already launched the first round of apprentice training scheme. At Abadan, a workshop,
also known as the “Technical School,” was established to train fifty apprentice artisans.
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These men were selected from the local labor and were given instructions on how to use
basic mechanical tools. The Iranians trained under this program replaced Indian handymen,
the lowest grade of the class of artisan.737
In the late 1920s, based on the educational program proposed by a team of labor
specialists, the Company developed a “reconstituted scheme” to replace 500 Indian artisans
with Iranians. The scheme was designed to train skillful turners, electricians, and fitters out
of a homogenous group of Iranian youths. The targeted population aged between 14 and
16, earned an elementary education, featured sound physical body, and possessed some
basic mechanical skills. Since there were not sufficient young people in the locality who
would meet all these criteria, the Company had to widen its recruitment net. Besides top
graduates of Abadan elementary schools, apprentices were drawn from a larger pool of
youths from the interior. In 1931, around 95 apprentices who met all the basic
qualifications were being trained at Abadan. The Reconstituted Scheme envisioned the
training of up to 200 apprentice artisans through an intensive two-year learn-and-work
program, including one year of training at apprentice shops, followed by one year of work
experience in one of the Refinery departments. During this period apprentice artisans were
put under constant supervision of Company inspectors and department heads. After
completion of the training period, the apprentices were put on the respective department’s
payroll and became part of the Company’s labor structure. The scheme would cost £45 per
apprentice per year. Each apprentice was paid a stipend between four and six krans a day
which was equal or lower than the average pay rate for a manual laborer. The scheme also
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called for providing proper accommodation to each apprentice with “a minimum charge
for board and lodging.”738
The Education Scheme also included provisions for training existing and prospective
Iranian employees to fill clerical roles. In the early 1920s, the Company recruited from the
graduates of the secondary schools that it financially sponsored. However, the majority of
the recruits filled low-ranking clerical positions, such as tally clerks, telegraphists, and
telephonists.739 Following the increased pressure from the Iranian Government and with a
view to training Iranians to fill intermediate clerical positions, the company adopted the
same two-year training model that it used for artisan apprentices. Like other welfare
programs, economy was the main driving force behind the scheme. In fact, training local
clerks was cheaper than recruiting clerks from India. Moreover, the Company could brag
about its commitment to the Iranianization of the workforce.
The clerical staff consisted of six grades, including Office Boy, Boy Clerk, Junior
Clerk, Grade 1 Clerk, Grade 2 Clerk, and Grade 3 Clerk. The apprentices, or learner-clerks
as they were called, were recruited in the first three grades. They were taught English
instruction during working hours and arithmetic, bookkeeping, typing and shorthand at
night classes.740 The apprentices were required to have secondary education. Learnerclerks were mostly Armenians or younger sons of small property-owners with a large
family from Iran’s interior. In 1931, more than 300 pupils were under training for clerical
positions at Abadan. The major supplier of learner-clerks was the Stuart Memorial College,
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a Christian missionary secondary school in Isfahan. Since the 1920s, the Company made a
yearly contribution of £3500 to this school and in return nominated a group of students for
secondary education. In 1931, more than 100 graduates of the Stuart Memorial College
were employed as clerks and foremen by the Company. At Abadan alone, 30 Stuart College
alumni filled various clerical ranks. In the early 1930s, the Company ceased its financial
support and the practice of identifying nominees to the Stuart College on account of low
economic return. In fact, due to the relatively low salaries paid by the Company, the
majority of the graduates preferred to take government jobs in Isfahan or Tehran.741
Similar to the artisan training scheme, accommodation was a critical component of
the clerical training program. A housing type on the lines of a “hostel” was developed to
be erected in the New Artisans’ Village (See section 4.4 Abadan Township Reorganization
Scheme). It was a model of accommodation that would not raise the apprentices’ standard
of living, nor would put it too low. Several scenarios costing between £2,600 and £6,000
were reviewed by Company officials to house apprentice artisans and learner-clerks. Even
the conversion of the Slide Valves in the Bungalow Area into apprentice quarters was
discussed. At the end, it was decided to provide housing to thirty-two boys, who were
among the most destitute of all the apprentices.742 The Apprentice Hostel was designed not
only as an accommodation place, but also as a model educational center for training Iranian
youths for artisanal and clerical positions. Other than spaces for lodging, the Hostel
included other provisions, such as recreation and study room, dining room, classrooms,
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gardens, and football pitch. All daily activities of apprentices were under constant control
of an Iranian teacher appointed by the Company. Every daily activity in the Hostel had
educational purposes. For instance, collective gardening was part of the curriculum to
discipline the youths and nurture esprit de corps.

Figure 4.2 Abadan Apprentice Hostel, circa 1931. Top: Accommodation Block; Bottom:
Dining Block.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36152
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Company officials also planned to provide “Continuation Classes” for more than
200 Iranian clerks and artisans who had already finished primary schools and intended to
pursue the secondary-level education or learn technical subjects.743 In 1926, Continuation
Classes, conceptualized on the lines of Provincial Technical Schools in Britain, were to be
held at the Abadan Pahlavi School. Such classes would offer a wide range of subjects,
including Reading, Writing, Shorthand, Arithmetic, English, Accountancy, Typewriting,
and Elementary Engineering.744 At first, senior clerks were asked to teach night classes.
However, it was found that recruiting teachers would yield better results and could equally
be economical. In 1931, four teachers were recruited at 120 Tomans (1200 Krans) per
month. These men were tasked with teaching day classes in arithmetic, Persian, and
English to learner-clerks and apprentice artisans. The teachers were also responsible for
teaching night classes and supervising the apprentice quarters. The Company planned for
four types of night classes: classes in Persian for Europeans; commercial classes for clerks,
English for clerks, foremen, and apprentices; and Persian for apprentices and artisans.745
Yearly graded examinations in English were held for the clerical staff and apprentice
clerks. The Company also encouraged Europeans to learn Farsi. At major operation centers,
examinations on Persian language were held every year.746 To accommodate the increased
population of apprentices and employees in day and night classes as well as examination
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sessions, the Old Dispensary and the Old Labor Office were converted into the Educational
Center and were equipped with desks and blackboards.747

4.3.4 Re-Organization of Healthcare Spaces
The need for re-organization of medical spaces manifested itself in 1924 in the Fields and
one year later in Abadan. Following their visit to Abadan Island in October 1924, town
planning and public health specialists F. C. Temple and G. Wittet (See section 4.4) made a
trip upcountry to evaluate Masjid-e-Sulaiman from a sanitation standpoint. The advisors
called for reorganizing the Fields Hospital on the lines of the Tata Hospital at the company
town Jamshedpur in India. In particular, they stressed the major shortcomings at the Fields
Hospital, such as poor ventilation across the building, insufficiency of the wards,
congestion in the out-patient department, and inadequacy of bathrooms. Medical officers
launched a rebuilding program according to the recommendations of Temple and Wittet.
Since the Company’s Medical Department was controlled by a central management, the
experiences at the Fields Hospital set a precedent for the re-arrangement of the medical
spaces at Abadan and other centers. Prior to 1926, when a professional architect was
engaged to redesign the Company’s medical facilities in Southern Iran, the blueprints for
the medical buildings were prepared by the Refinery Civil Engineering Department based
on the sketches made by the Company’s medical officers.
The poor ventilation throughout the Fields Hospital was one of the first problems
that drew attention. In fact, hot stagnant air built up under the verandah roof was drawn
into the wards and was driven down by the ceiling fans on the patients. To address this
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problem, mechanical ventilation was added to the verandah walls. Furthermore, suction
fans and ventilators at the ceiling and floor levels, respectively, were installed to facilitate
the flow of air.748 The improvements at the Fields Hospital were based on the post-germ
theory and the latest medical practices of the day, which not only necessitated the
separation of aseptic and septic zones, but also called for the creation of specialized medical
spaces. For instance, in July 1924, the Fields Hospital was officially divided into medical
and surgery sections, with one medical doctor in charge of each branch. Furthermore,
standard medical principles of the day required that aseptic operating theatre be separated
from both the septic surgery room, which catered for the “mass of infected cases,” and the
out-patient zone, which was considered “thoroughly septic.” This had spatial implications
for the layout of the Fields Hospital. As a Principal Medical Officer put it, “the front room
in the out-patient [department] will be the medical out-patient room. The back one [will
be] the surgical out-patient room and [a third] room [will be reserved for] the surgery with
a door opening on [to] the verandah.” Moreover, latrines were relocated from inside the
hospital building to the outside and separated from the latter by a “covered way” which
ensured that the ventilated air from the septic environment would not adulterate the aseptic
atmosphere of the wards.749 The hand sketches prepared by the Principal Medical Officer
for the reorganization of the Fields Hospital are a testament to the subscription of the
Company’s medical officers to both the post-germ theory and the colonial pathological
conventions. As the experiment with the separation of Clean (aspetic) and Septic wards at
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the Fields yielded successful results, the Medical Department decided to replicate the same
model at the Abadan Hospital. Therefore, one section of the Surgical Block at the Abadan
Hospital was scraped, fumigated, and repainted. It was then barricaded off from the other
sections and was supplied with new equipment and separate staff. Only “straightforward
clean wounds” were admitted to the Clean Ward. Medical officers hoped the new ward
would reduce the recovery length of injury cases and prevent them from developing “cold
septic ulcers.”750
New specialized medical spaces and facilities were gradually added to the Abadan
General Hospital in response to the new requirements and the changed labor conditions.
For instance, up until 1925, the Medical Department relied on the pathological services of
the Baghdad Laboratory to examine specimens. In this year, medical officers called for
improving the pathological Laboratory and X-Ray facilities at both Abadan and the Fields.
Specially, laboratory facilities were considered critical in the diagnosis of such diseases as
malaria and dysentery with high frequency of incidence amongst the staff. In Abadan, a
pathological laboratory was built and equipped with the required apparatus for the
examination of the patients’ blood, urine, stools, and sputum. In order to further study local
diseases, plans were also developed to add a research room to the Laboratory with tools for
entomological work (study of local insects) as well as facilities for experimentation on
animals. Furthermore, new spaces had to be provided in the General Hospital to
accommodate medical specialists, such as surgeons, dentists, and ophthalmologists, and to
be equipped with requisite medical apparatus, such as sigmoidoscopes, laryngoscopes, etc.
Similarly, in 1928, a Mental Block was erected in the hospital compound. Medical officials
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also began to set new standards for the interior design of specialized medical spaces. For
instance, windows were eliminated in the surgical theatre as operations had to be carried
out under artificial lighting.
Simultaneous with piecemeal alterations, between 1926 and the early 1930s several
scenarios were proposed for the wholesale reorganization of medical spaces at Abadan. For
instance, in 1926, when “constructional rejuvenation” was in full swing at the Refinery,
the Chief Medical Officer called for the rearrangement of medical facilities. In Dr. Young’s
view, the Abadan General Hospital had failed to deliver efficient services on grounds of
misplacement, ill-conceived design, and poor construction. Despite its central location and
easy accessibility from the laborers’ quarters and Abadan Town, the General Hospital was
in close proximity to the works and to the major roads, which created unsuitable
environmental conditions for the hospital. In fact, the northerly winds exposed the General
Hospital to the odors, fumes, and dust arising from the Refinery. For instance, as soon as
the construction of the Hospital was completed, all the bathtubs turned black as a result of
the chemical combination of sulfur monoxide in the air and the lead ingredients of the
bathing facilities.751 Moreover, due to the high level of underground water and the lack of
proper insulation, the Hospital was always damp and the drainage network
dysfunctional.752 Medical officials also believed that different sections of the Hospital were
highly cramped and that the wards designated for the third-class personnel were not only
overcrowded, but also surrounded by an “unsightly” and “depressing” environment.
Statistical figures in 1924-1925 showed that around 1,600 cases were treated in the Abadan
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Hospital, of whom 76 percent were non-European, and out of more than 6000 patients
treated in quarters, more than 90 percent were “colored” employees. Moreover, more than
20,000 non-employees used medical services of the General Hospital in one way or
another. 753 The inadequacy of medical spaces at Abadan become more evident towards the
end of the 1920s. Statistical data indicated that the average occupancy rate at the General
Hospital was around 70 percent and that during the peak months many “colored”
employees and non-employees that required “indoor” medical services were not admitted
on account of insufficient accommodation.754
Spaces of Healing: Efficiency, Asepsis, and Race
The Chief Medical Officer’s proposal entailed construction of a “combined” hospital with
separate quarters for different classes of the workforce, and conversion of the existing
hospital into a municipal office and a public school. After examining different potential
locations, a site to the north of the General Hospital and in the vicinity of the Bahmanshir
River was selected. The proposed land was chosen as it offered several environmental
advantages in comparison to the existing site. In particular, owing to its distance from the
Refinery, the Bahmanshir River offered a much “purer atmosphere.” Moreover, the water
level at the proposed location was remarkably lower than the original site755 which was
considered a positive factor from the point of view of construction of foundations,
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insulation measures, and drainage of the site. The ample open land surrounding the site
could facilitate construction process and future extensions. Dr. Young also suggested that
a professional architect should be consulted for the new hospital project.756 Such reckoning
highlights a watershed in the evolution of hospital design at the Abadan Refinery and
reflects the collective awareness among medical officials regarding the importance of
architectural design in achieving efficient medical services. As a senior medical officer put
it, “every room in a hospital has its special purpose, for which its position and construction
have to be designed with care.”757
At first, George Wittet, the architect and co-author of Abadan Township
Reorganization Scheme (See section 4.4), was proposed. Wittet’s familiarity with Abadan
made him stand out amongst other candidates. Wittet suddenly passed away in 1926 and
James Mollison Wilson was selected for this task. Jas M. Wilson had served as Director of
Public Works under the British Mandate Administration in Iraq, where he had designed
several public institutions including the Basra Hospital. His service was continued after the
independence of Iraq and he became the consulting architect both to the Government of
Iraq and to the Iraq petroleum Company. Before his tenure in Mesopotamia, Wilson had
worked for the celebrated architect Sir Edwin Landseer Lutyens in Britain and in India. In
the latter context, he was part of the team that designed the British colony’s new capital,
New Delhi. His name had come up during the Cairo Conference in 1924 when Company
officials began to screen professional town planners with “common sense and experience
in laying out native buildings” for the reconstruction of the Abadan Village. Wilson was
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regarded as a suitable candidate thanks to his extensive experience in both India and
Mesopotamia. Furthermore, his prolific portfolio spoke to his ability to deliver high-quality
work under severe financial restrictions.758
Wilson was commissioned to develop a series of preliminary sketch plans and to
prepare material estimates for the combined hospital based on the instructions of the
Medical and Refinery departments. The spatial program developed for the new combined
hospital aimed to increase the efficiency of the building, at both medical and administrative
levels, and to incorporate the principles of the post-germ theory. Wilson’s design for the
new medical institution consisted of eight wards and provided for 180 beds in total. It
included a series of specialized medical spaces, such as X-Ray laboratory, pathological
institute, operating theatres, and heatstroke wards. Wilson also proposed using the Plenum
Ventilating System in the new hospital. However, Company officials suggested that rather
than using a cost-intensive mechanical system, “thick bricks” should be used in the exterior
walls to reduce transmission of heat from outside. Aseptic, nonporous construction
materials were also recommended for the interior. For instance, medical officials required
that wards, dispensaries, and other major spaces be covered up to seven feet from the
ground level with glazed tiling. Floors were to be covered with some type of water-proof
material from the family of “Ruberoid” or other impervious substances, such as
“Doloment.”759 To increase the efficiency of the nursing staff, a separate bungalow was to
be provided for the matron and nurses within the hospital compound. The new hospital also
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consisted of several accessory buildings, including separated Lines for clerks and local
workmen, medical store, recreation rooms for different classes of the workforce,
disinfecting station, garage, mortuaries, and dhobi house (washing room)— all to be
constructed out of the Company’s standard steel-framed structure.760
The idea of building a new hospital on the shore of the Bahmanshir River, or what
came to known as the “Bahmanshir Scheme,” was delayed as the Company’s application
for land acquisition faced considerable opposition from public opinion and some
departments of the Iranian Government in Tehran.761 In the meantime, Company officials
began to weigh other scenarios. In 1927, following the removal of the Company’s
headquarters from Khorramshahr to Abadan, Company officials sought new uses for the
offices and residential quarters in the former center. The London Management suggested
that the hospital compound could be relocated to Khorramshahr. Despite the environmental
merits that Khorramshahr could offer, medical and engineering staff opposed this proposal
on practical, structural, and financial grounds. For instance, the Chief Medical Officer
maintained that placing the hospital nine miles away from Abadan, given the physical
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barriers between the two centers, would not only depopularize the medical institution
among the Company’s local employees and the residents of Abadan, but also would put
patients in critical conditions at risk. The new arrangement also required additional capital
expenditure on motorized transportation and medical carrier services between Abadan and
Khorramshahr. Furthermore, medical officers unanimously believed that no rehabilitation
measures could adapt the Khorramshahr offices to the “highly specialized requirements of
the present-day medicine and surgery.”762
As in the first scenario, J. M. Wilson prepared a preliminary design for a hospital
compound at Khorramshahr. Wilson’s sketch plans had a symmetrical layout and consisted
of four blocks of pavilion-style wards for Third-Class personnel that surrounded a large
administrative block, the latter being a retrofitted version of the Company offices. Each
medical block, which was made out of the Company’s standard steel-framed structure,
consisted of two wards of 14 beds each. The hospital proper consisted of three wards for
medical cases, one wards for ophthalmic cases, and four wards for surgical cases. Side
wards were also provided for special cases, such as mental, female, and suspected
infectious patients. Medical officers provided textual and graphic comments on the
Wilson’s design. For instance, a senior Medical Officer suggested that an additional
“midway block” should be added to the “native wards” and that sterilizing rooms and
medicine

rooms

should

be

provided

in

the

surgical

wards,

among

other

recommendations.763
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Drawing on this scenario, medical officials proposed an in-between scheme and
suggested that medical services should be divided between Abadan and Khorramshahr,
with the latter turning into a “cottage” hospital accommodating Europeans, clerks, and
senior Iranian staff, and the former catering for Iranian artisans, wage-earners, and the
general public. In proposing the new scheme, Company officials inspired from the existing
medical system in the metropole. While general hospitals in Britain were erected in urban
areas to meet the medical needs of city dwellers, cottage hospitals were built in the
countryside to serve rural communities. In Iran, however, this model was modified to fulfill
new functions. Here, unlike Britain, racial motives were the major driving force behind the
scheme. The site of the Abadan Hospital was considered “perfect in dealing with the native
population.” As a Medical Officer suggested, “The environment does not affect [locals] as
it does our covenanted staff and possibly clerical staff, so that a move to [Khorramshahr]
would advantage the latter.” 764 Undoubtedly, Khorramshahr offered a more salubrious
climatic environment than Abadan. Under the guise of “the recognized practice in the
tropics,” the scheme was developed to further racial divide within the workforce and within
the medical staff. In addition to segregating the patients along ethno-occupational lines in
two distinct geographies, the proposed arrangement was intended to protect both British
staff and British patients against any possible contact with the Iranian medical personnel,
whose number was rapidly increasing in the late 1920s.765 In other words, this arrangement
was a reaction to the Iranianization of the staff within the Medical Department. Moreover,
under the proposed scenario, British nurses at the Abadan Hospital would only assume
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supervisory responsibilities, while, at the cottage hospital, “sisters” were to perform
conventional nursing duties and to look after patients with special needs, including
midwifery cases which were steadily on the rise.766 This scenario had its opponents among
Company officials. The Chief Medical Officer, for instance, warned that the apparent
distinction between Europeans and Iranians would cause political troubles for the
Company. Moreover, in Dr. Young’s view, this scenario meant reverting to the older model
of dual medical administration with predictable managerial challenges.767
4.3.4.1 Medical Program.

After

several

years

of

deliberations,

the

London

Management in February 1930 adopted the foregoing scenario as the core element of the
Company’s official policy on the reorganization of the medical system at Abadan. A
Medical Program was also adopted by the Board of Directors which consisted of four
components: reconstruction of the Abadan hospital for the labor on the same site,
conversion of the Company’s former headquarters at Khorramshahr into a cottage hospital
for Europeans and clerical grades, construction of an out-patient dispensary at Abadan, and
erection of an isolation hospital at Bawarda. The estimated cost for this grand scheme was
around £150,000. While the building program developed for the reorganization of the
medical spaces was spread over the course of four years, medical officials believed that the
new Out-Patient Department and the cottage hospital at Khorramshahr had to be given a
higher priority compared to other components.768
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Labor Hospital
Under the new Medical Program, the Abadan General Hospital was to be redesigned and
reconstructed on the same site at the estimated expenditure of £67,000. Not only was the
new Labor Hospital intended to provide medical services to Iranian and Indian workmen,
their families, and other residents of Abadan; it also aimed to serve as the base hospital for
the Company’s centers of operations in Southwest Iran, which in the early 1930s extended
from Kermanshah to Mishun. J. M. Wilson designed the new Labor Hospital compound.
Wilson’s sketch plan epitomizes the evolution of healthcare design at Abadan by
reinterpreting both the aseptic design features and the colonial-pathological conventions
that characterized the old General Hospital. As Figure 4.3 indicates, the new Labor
Hospital similar to the old General Hospital was conceptualized as a constellation of
individual buildings dispersed across the site. Wilson’s design, however, was grounded in
rational principles and showed a higher degree of order in organization of space and
alignment of buildings. It consisted of several major sections, such as the in-patient
hospital, or the main Hospital Block, the Out-patient Dispensary, the Administrative Block,
and the residential quarters for the medical and nursing staff. The hospital also included
several auxiliary buildings, such as animal house, medical stores, mortuary and
postmortem building, dhobi ghat (laundry), and servants’ quarters. The main Hospital
Block, which was placed at the center of the compound, was designed on the lines of the
pavilion-ward model and provided accommodation for 120 patients. It consisted of four
single-story, double-ward blocks, a patients’ dining room, operation theatres, heat stroke
wards, and a utility room for the cooling system. All the buildings in the main Hospital
Block were linked via “connecting corridors” to avoid exposing patients and staff to dust
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and heat. Out of the nine medical officers stationed at Abadan, Iranian doctors were to be
accommodated at the old Doctors’ Bungalow to the north of the in-patient department.
However, Wilson reserved a site to the west of the nurses’ quarters for a new Doctors’
Bungalow.769

Figure 4.3 J. M. Wilson’s sketch plan for the New Labor Hospital, May 1930.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 68938

Wilson employed a symmetrical layout to enhance the level of efficiency in the
new hospital. As Figure 4.4 illustrates, each medical block was comprised of two
symmetrical wards organized around the central entrance hall, providing for 30 beds in
total. The Duty Room, in which the shift nurse was stationed, was situated in the middle of
the block to maximize visual control over the patients. The Administrative Block, the utility
room, the dining room, and the water fountain were all centrally located to facilitate
efficient accessibility from different wards. Asepsis was also manifested through various
769
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design considerations. For instance, bathroom facilities were placed at either end of each
block and were separated from the aseptic environment of the wards by a “cut-off passage.”
Each block featured a 10-foot-wide verandah. A 30-foot distance was maintained between
the parallel blocks to ensure penetration of sun light and natural passage of air.
The whole compound was surrounded by expanded metal fencing. Wilson retained
the old Administrative Block as one of the major entrances to the compound. The whitewashed building, however, was to be rehabilitated to serve as the new research and
diagnostics center. As figure 4.5 shows, the building’s interior was modified, based on the
recommendations of medical officers, to accommodate the X-Ray department on the
ground floor and the pathological and bacteriological laboratories on the first floor. Wilson
initially intended to design a mechanical cooling system for the entire Hospital Block.
However, due to budget constraints, he was forced to limit the provision of cooled air to
the heat stroke wards and the operating theatre.770

Figure 4.4 Sketch plan prepared by J. M. Wilson for the Labor Ward, May 1930.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 53827
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Figure 4.5 Hand sketches by a senior Medical Officer to make the Administrative Block
fit for the Pathological and Bacteriological Laboratories (top) and the X-Ray Department
(bottom), March 1930.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 62403

Figure 4.6 Program of Work for the Reconstruction of the Abadan Hospital, May 1930.
Wilson proposed two alternative sites for the erection of a temporary hospital during the
reconstruction period. As the plan indicates, His preferred site was in the south of the
Hospital compound between the Labor Block and the Clerks’ Lines.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 53827
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Wilson also developed a detailed program of work for the reconstruction of the
Abadan Hospital. His proposed development plan called for erection of a temporary
hospital block for accommodation of Iranian laborers during the demolition and rebuilding
phases. The temporary hospital was to be constructed out of the Company’s standard steelframed structures and would provide four wards for accommodation of 92 patients. Wilson
proposed two alternative sites for the temporary hospital. As Figure 4.6 shows, his
preferred site was in the south of the hospital compound between the old Labor Block and
the Clerks’ Lines.
Staff Hospital
The Medical Program also called for converting the general offices at Khorramshahr, at
the estimated cost of £56,000, into a cottage hospital for accommodation of senior
European and clerical patients as well as the staff of the British Tanker Company. The plan
was to retain the steel structure of the former Company offices and implement appropriate
alterations to provide for “50 bed-cases in well-arranged wards.”771 J. M. Wilson prepared
an adaptive reuse plan for the building based on the instructions of medical officials. As
Figure 4.7 reveals, Wilson added three new wings to the existing structure, which
connected to the two-story building via the existing verandah, to achieve a symmetrical
layout and accommodate the hospital’s spatial program. As in the Abadan’s new Labor
Hospital, asepsis and the colonial-pathological conventions governed the design of the new
Staff Hospital. For instance, as Figure 4.7 illustrates, the verandah and cut-off passages
separated septic and aseptic medical zones. Moreover, similar to the old staff hospital at
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Abadan, the cottage hospital was spatially engineered to reinforce the hierarchy within the
first-and second-class personnel. It consisted of two separate sets of wards, kitchens, dining
rooms, recreation rooms, and mortuaries for Europeans and clerical staff. Unlike the new
Abadan Labor Hospital, however, the cottage hospital at Khorramshahr was designed on
the lines of small-size wards. As Figure 4.7 shows, the new Staff Hospital consisted of
single-bed and multiple-bed wards with a maximum of 5-6 beds in each room with no
constant gaze of the shift nurse. Each room included almirahs to store patients’ clothing.
The new Staff Hospital was also equipped with the Plenum ventilation system and with
separate lifts for service and patients.

Figure 4.7 Sketch plans prepared by J. M. Wilson for the conversion of the
Khorramshahr Offices into the Staff Hospital, May 1930. Ground floor Plan (Left) and
First Floor Plan (Right). Verandah and cut-off passages separated septic zones from
aseptic spaces and allowed for uninterrupted flow of air across the hospital.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 62403

Out-Patient Department
The increased daily congestion at the dispensaries was a common problem at both the
Fields and Abadan. The “morning sick parade” clogging up the entrance halls and the chaos
that ensued became a major source of anxiety for medical officials (See Figure 4.8).772 For
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instance, in October 1925, the average daily patients requiring medical attendance at the
Abadan General Hospital numbered 450. Throughout this year, more than 55,000 patients
were treated at the Abadan Dispensary, of whom more than 80 percent were non-European
employees.773 The dispensary at the Abadan Hospital located on the ground floor of the
Administrative Block was comprised of one small surgery room, one dispensary, and one
small consulting room, and could not meet the increased demand. To address
overcrowding, a second dispensary was erected in 1926 near the Refinery’s new Time
Office and Gate. It was built out of the Company’s standard steel-framed module and
eventually replaced the older dispensary at the Abadan Hospital. Staffed by one medical
officer, one compounder, one ward orderly, and one farrash, the Works Dispensary was
intended to keep laborers within the refinery and to expedite the immediate and rapid
attendance to the needs of more urgent cases.774 Its location also facilitated medical
examination of new local workmen prior to engagement.
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Figure 4.8 The “Morning Sick Parade” in front of the Main Entrance of the Abadan
General Hospital, circa 1926. As the picture shows, the number of patients seeking
medical attendance at the Abadan Dispensary was so high that the line extended into the
roundabout in front of the hospital.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36152

Abadan Dispensaries epitomized the Company’s discriminatory practices in the
delivery of basic medical services to different classes of the workforce. For instance, the
Works Dispensary was spatially engineered to reinforce the hierarchy among the secondand third-class employees. Consulting and examination rooms for clerks were separated
from the rooms in which Iranian laborers received medical services. Moreover, two
separate dispensaries were also constructed for the first-class personnel and Europeans:
one at Bawarda near the Isolation Hospital — which was under the charge of the Iranian
Port Health Officer and catered mainly for the staff of shipping companies— and one in
the Bungalow Area which was geared towards Bungalow residents and their servants.
Unlike Europeans and clerks who received medical examination at their quarters, Iranian
laborers and their families had to appear in person at the Works Dispensary and go through
an arduous and highly controlled procession to receive minimal medical services. A report
prepared by the Medical Department described the “method of work” as follows: “On
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checking in at the Time Office, [employee] receives his disc, showing his number. He then
proceeds to his work and reports sick to his Job Master who gives him a gate pass. The
gate pass consists of two portions, one of which he takes to the Time Office…The other
portion of the gate pass he takes to the Dispensary, where a clerk notes his name and
number and gives him his Dispensary Treatment Card. The cards are divided into medical
and surgical, and the queues are controlled by two Persian police[men]. The case is then
examined by a European Doctor, Assistant Surgeon or Sub Assistant Surgeon, the first
mentioned seeing all new cases and later cases which have been returned to duty.” Upon
initial examination, four scenarios faced the Iranian workmen: a large percentage of the
patients were marked “Duty” and were sent back to the refinery on account of malingering;
some were given “Medicine” and were sent back to work; and, some were given medicine
and were allowed to leave for “Quarters” until the following day, when they had to go
through the same procedure. Only three percent of the patients were sent to the General
Hospital for further treatment. This process continued until the word “Duty” was marked
on the employees’ Dispensary Treatment Card.775
Public Opinion also became sensitive about the shortage of medical services and
the Company’s discriminatory paternalism at Abadan. For instance, in 1927, a major
Iranian newspaper shed light on the ill-treatment of Iranian laborers at the Abadan Hospital:
“The Persians who go to the present Company Hospital for treatment, must stand around
like the Persian Jews of old [times], until such time as all of the Indians, Iraqis, and the
Jews have been attended to, and, then, if their Doctors’ precious time may permit, they
might cast an eye on them too.…Should a man receive a simple injury to the eye with a
775
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piece of iron, the doctor takes the eye out at once…the unfortunate man has asked why and
by whose permission they have taken his eye out, and what he should do in the future.
[Company officials] simply tell him to take 6,000 krans and clear out, because he is no
longer of any use to the Company. Anyone whose foot aches, the foot, [Company officials]
say should be amputated and so the operation is simply performed.”776
The chaos and inefficiency in the treatment of laborers raised questions among
medical officials about the logic on which the Works Dispensary operated. Statistics
showed the loss of more than 126,745 aggregate working days at the dispensary in the year
1929. Moreover, as the population of Abadan swelled in the late 1920s, the number of
outpatient cases exponentially increased. By 1929, the average daily outpatients at the
dispensaries had jumped to 1000. This figure reached 1200 in the first months of 1930
when the population of Abadan soared to more than 70,000. The increased loss of labor
due to the lengthy and ineffective medical services at the dispensary and the
disproportionately large number of out-patients compared to in-patient cases, led medical
officials to rethink the organization of the dispensary. The Chief Medical Officer believed
that a great deal of inefficiency was caused by putting the dispensary close to the Refinery
Gate and Time Office which, in his view, was the legacy of the “Nielson regime,” known
for its idiosyncratic paternalistic policies. Moreover, in the light of the 1929 strike at
Abadan, it was considered unwise to concentrate a large number of workers near the
Refinery’s Main Gate.777 As a result, Medical officials contemplated relocating the
dispensary to the hospital compound. At first, plans were devised to convert the old staff

776

Translation Made from Habl-al-Matin [Newspaper], “Don’t Trouble Oh Ye People of Abadan,” August
2nd, 1927. Correspondence from V: Soviet Activities, Organization, etc., BP Archive ArcRef 129909.
777
Dr. M. Young, The Re-organization of the Company’s Medical Services in Persia by M Y Young, 18th July
1930, BP Archives, ArcRef 68938, p.4

305

hospital into an out-patient department. After lengthy deliberations, it was decided that the
staff hospital did not have enough capacity to accommodate the growing number of daily
patients.778
Inspired by the Maude Dispensary at Baghdad, Company officials eventually
decided to design a new Out-patient Department at Abadan. Upon a careful examination
of the former institution, medical officers formulated a spatial program and drafted a rough
layout that in their view would satisfy the needs of the Company and avoid the
inefficiencies that they had observed at the Baghdad Dispensary. The proposed layout, in
particular, was planned to cut time wastage — the major rationale behind all the Companysponsored medical services. While the Baghdad Dispensary had a linear configuration, the
proposed Out-Patient Department at Abadan was organized around a large central waiting
hall with seating accommodation for 900 patients. The new dispensary was to play a pivotal
role in the reorganization of the medical services at Abadan. It was intended to provide
both curative and preventive measures and to screen and dispatch serious cases to the
General Hospital. Unlike the older Works Dispensary, the new Out-Patient Department
was staffed by four medical officers, each handling patients of the same illness category.
The older method of work was also modified to ensure “continuity of treatment” to the
workmen and to maximize the total number of patients that a medical officer could
“thoroughly” and “expeditiously” handle on a daily basis. To this end, each medical doctor
was put in charge of a special treatment section and was responsible to track each patient
throughout the treatment process.779
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Figure 4.9 Sketch Plan prepared by J. M. Wilson for the Abadan Out-Patient
Department, May 1930. Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 53827
J. M. Wilson was tasked with designing the Out-Patient Department based on the
instructions and visions of medical officers. As Figure 4.3 illustrates, Wilson placed the
new Dispensary at the northern corner of the Labor Hospital Compound with a short
setback from the adjacent roads. As Figure 4.9 shows, the Time Office framed the
Dispensary gateway that funneled the patients into the compound. A barrier separated the
entrance and exit passages. This rather narrow entrance served as one of the two access
points to the entire Hospital Compound. In fact, with the exception of heat-stroke cases
and visitors, who could use the entrance in front of the Administrative Block, the general
admittance of all patients was made through the Dispensary where facilities for changing
and storing cloths, bathing, and surgical dressing were provided.780 As the sketch plan
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shows, after going through the examination procedure, patients who required hospital
treatment were sent to the Disinfection Unit which was located on the opposite side of the
Dispensary. “Cleaned” cases then were taken through a “connecting corridor” from the
Dispensary to the main Hospital Block.
As Figures 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate, the proposed Out-Patient Dispensary included
medical and surgery departments as well as special treatment sections, such as dental,
ophthalmic, skin, throat and venereal— all organized around a central waiting hall. The
increased rate of eye and skin diseases among workmen was a direct consequence of
exposure to sulfur dioxide in the air produced by the Refinery. To expedite handling of the
sick, patients were divided into five categories based on the type of illness. Each patient
was given a distinctive colored pass and was guided by railed-off passages to the section
of the waiting hall dedicated to the respective illness category. Moreover, medical and
surgery rooms directly faced the central hall. Wilson avoided corridors and provided anterooms (small waiting spaces) next to every medical room. This arrangement was intended
to eliminate bottlenecks in the building and to streamline the movement and circulatory
flow of patients from the waiting hall to the examination and treatment rooms. Moreover,
to expedite the movement of the medical staff, doors were placed between contiguous
rooms.781 Nevertheless, as in other medical buildings, Wilson’s design recreated the
Company’s institutionalized system of control and segregation. As Figure 4.10 indicates,
different classes of the workforce were examined and treated in separate rooms.
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Figure 4.10 One of Wilson’s alternative schemes for the Abadan Out-patient
Department, July 1930. Natural ventilation, efficient lighting, and streamlined circulation
were achieved through symmetrical arrangement of medical sections around a central
waiting hall.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 68938

In

designing

the

new

Out-Patient

Department,

Wilson

followed

the

recommendations of medical officers, as long as such specifications did not jeopardize
architectural standards and functionality of space. For instance, medical officers had
suggested that 5.25 square feet be designated per person in the central hall for the purpose
of seating accommodation and that a 3-foot gangway be provided around the walls. Wilson,
however, decreased the seating space per person and, in order to facilitate circulation and
meet the architectural standards, increased the width of the gangway to 4.5 feet. Besides
efficient circulation, appropriate ventilation was another feature of Wilson’s design. The
latter objective was achieved through symmetrical arrangement of rooms and alignment of
openings. For instance, as Figure 4.10 shows, he aligned the doors and windows to allow
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proper ventilation across each room. Moreover, the central hall and surrounding medical
rooms were lit and naturally ventilated by clerestory windows. Ventilation was also
supplemented with a mechanical system including ducts and fans. Like other buildings in
the Hospital compound, the Out-Patient Department was also surrounded by verandahs
with an optimum height of 8.5 feet to protect the rooms against excessive sun radiation.782
All these design considerations attest to Wilson’s full awareness of the best design practices
in climatic conditions similar to Abadan’s.
Isolation Hospital
A fourth element of the Medical Program entailed construction of an isolation hospital
compound, at the estimated cost of £32,000, on a site near the Company’s old isolation
hospital at Bawarda. As Figure 4.11 illustrates, the proposed hospital consisted of two
sections: infectious diseases hospital and isolation encampment. The new Isolation
Hospital Compound was administered by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company Medical
Department in collaboration with the Iranian Health Authorities. Similar to other medical
facilities provided by the Company at Abadan, the proposed hospital was a segregated
institution with separate buildings for different classes of the workforce and for different
population groups.
The Infectious Diseases Hospital was situated next to the Bawarda Tank Farm
behind the existing Isolation Hospital. It was designed to play a central role in addressing
both sporadic and endemic diseases— such as smallpox, measles, dysentery, and typhoid—
which broke out frequently at Abadan. The Hospital was administered by the Company’s
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Medical Department and catered for the European and clerical staff and their families, who
in 1930 numbered 2000. One road separated the zones designated for infectious cases from
the areas where “contact” cases were accommodated. The former was subdivided into the
wards constructed out of mud covered Nissen Huts. The patients’ area included the wards
for first-and second-class employees in addition to other medical facilities, such as
disinfector building, refuse destructor, dispensary— among others. The Hospital also
consisted of quarters for the medical staff. A separate block was earmarked for smallpox
due to its “high degree of infectivity.”783 Moreover, as Figure 4.11 shows, male and female
contacts were accommodated in separate quarters. The whole area was enclosed by
corrugated unclimbable sheet fencing. 784
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Figure 4.11 Site Plan of the New Isolation Hospital Compound at Bawarda south of
Abadan, July 1930. It consisted of Infectious Diseases Hospital for the third-class
personnel and the general population administered by the Iranian Department of Health
(A), Infectious Diseases Hospital for Europeans and Clerical Staff administered by the
A.P.O.C. Medical Department (B), and Isolation Encampment for accommodation of all
classes of the workforce (C).
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 68938

In response to the request from the Iranian Government, the Company decided to
hand over the existing isolation hospital at Bawarda, with the exception of the hospital
ships, 785 to the Iranian Department of Health. Under the Iranian administration, the old
isolation hospital would serve as part of the Infectious Diseases Hospital for
accommodation of Iranian artisans, laborers and the general public. As Figure 4.11 shows,
it included two buildings providing 120 beds for infected patients and a shelter for 150
contact cases.786
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The second component of the new Isolation Hospital was the isolation camp, also
known as the “epidemic area,” which was located at the easternmost section of the
compound. The encampment was controlled by the Company and was intended to be used
during the outbreak of regional epidemics, such as cholera and plague. It was designed to
provide accommodation for different classes of the workforce. Therefore, each section of
the proposed isolation encampment was sub-divided into three fenced zones. It was decided
to put up sarifas for accommodation of 150 infectious cases and 500 contact cases. These
reed huts were to be burned down after the epidemics were gone. The Camp was also
equipped with kitchen, latrines, and basic facilities, such as water, electricity, and
drainage.787 In 1928, the Iranian Port Health Directorate took over the administration of the
quarantine station at Abadan.788 In the absence of a quarantine facility with appropriate
accommodation for the European staff, the Company decided to erect a quarantine station
near the site of the Isolation Hospital. The proposed quarantine station, which was designed
based on the standards adopted by the Iranian Government, provided accommodation for
the immigrants arriving at Abadan from the districts in which infectious diseases had
occurred. While the international quarantine code of the day recommended dividing
quarantine patients into two categories, Company officials created three classes of
immigrants similar to the three-tier system that governed the categorization of employees.
789
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4.3.4.2 Economic Depression and Suspension of the Medical Program. In 1931, in the
wake of the Company’s new fiscal policy following the depression in the global oil market,
the A.P.O.C. Production Department in London overhauled the 1930 Medical Program.
The layout of the Labor Hospital was re-evaluated, and some modifications were made to
minimize capital expenditure. For instance, it was decided to build only the north wing of
the main Hospital Block, as the Company was gearing up for a drastic cut in labor strength.
A Company Director also suggested that a special paint instead of tiling be used to cover
the walls which “could be made in any desired color and could be washed.” Moreover, the
main Hospital Block was redesigned as a combination of two-story buildings and the Heat
Stroke Block was rearranged such that it could serve as a conventional ward during the
cooler months. It was also decided to retain the old staff wards and convert it into
administrative offices, laboratory, etc. It was suggested that the medical and nursing
quarters should remain intact. The Mental Block, however, was to be dismantled and reassembled near the dispensary to serve as the Animal House.790
A group of senior officials called for more drastic administrative and medical
reforms to cut expenses. For instance, some called for medical staff layoffs or for
reconsideration of the quality of medical services. Some argued for formulating “standard
treatment,” based on the guidelines that were applicable to General Practitioners in the
metropole. The Principal medical officer advocated a revision in the Company’s policy of
offering treatment to non-employees. The employment of junior Iranian medical officers
was also regarded as a policy that could effect economy. The Company set the salaries of
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the Iranian officers on a lower scale than their British counterparts.791 In other words, the
Company used the Iranianization of the medical staff to its advantage. However, some
officials, including the Chief Medical Officer warned that, “Economy can only be regarded
as true economy if it does not interfere with efficiency.”792
Similarly, the layout and the spatial program of the proposed cottage hospital was
modified in the light of the Company’s new fiscal policy. For instance, the number of bed
cases was cut in half based on the data collected on the rate of occupancy in the old staff
wards at Abadan. Here, the application of science manifested itself in the form of evidencebased design. The statistical data compiled between 1928 and 1930 in the Abadan staff
wards suggested that the total number of beds occupied by Europeans and clerks never
exceeded 24, with the exception of peak periods when this figure reached 27. Based on this
analysis, it was proposed that the new Staff Hospital at Khorramshahr should provide for
36 beds for accommodation of medical and surgical as well as special cases. Moreover, a
new formula was invented for the allocation of beds and reinforcement of the labor
hierarchy: “two European patients for every clerk, and two medical cases to each surgical
case.” 793
In 1931, the Production Department also re-examined the layout of the dispensary.
Although the Department’s assessment suggested that the central hall was too large in the
wake of possible diminution of the labor strength, it was decided to approve Wilson’s final
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sketch plan.794 As Figure 4.12 shows, unlike other iterations, this scheme featured a much
larger entrance hall and a complete verandah. Furthermore, entrance and exist passageways
were separated to facilitate movement of patients. The original estimate for the building
was £19,000, but the Production Department managed to bring this figure down to £18,000
by replacing Terrazzo flooring, as suggested in Wilson’s scheme, by a cheaper material
called Sal Ferricite.795 The Production Department also approved the original plans
developed for the Isolation Hospital in the 1930 Medical Program.

Figure 4.12 Wilson’s final sketch plan approved for the new Out-Patient Dispensary,
1932. Unlike other iterations, this scheme featured a much larger entrance hall and a
complete verandah. Furthermore, entrance and exist passageways were separated to
facilitate the movement of patients.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 62517
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`
Figure 4.13 A view of the Abadan Out-patient Department from the Refinery looking
east, June 1932. Inspired by the environmental control strategies employed in colonial
buildings in India, Wilson used varied elevations for different spaces to facilitate
ventilation through clerestory windows and protect the interior against Abadan’s blazing
sun.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36152

In the wake of the renewal of the Oil Concession in 1933, the Company launched
an extensive construction program at Abadan. As part of this building program, J. M.
Wilson, in 1935, prepared a new set of plans for the reconstruction of the Abadan Hospital,
which included, among other features, a new staff hospital, new quarters for the nursing
and medical staff, and a new laboratory.
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4.4 Urban Reforms and Emergence of a Polycentric Oil City
Industrial restructuring takes place in space. As Margaret Crawford notes, “changing
location or reorganizing space creates new spatial settings that renew possibilities for
industrial growth and expansion.”796 In 1926, the Company launched a rebuilding program
at the refinery which came to be known as “constructional rejuvenation.”797 This program
was aimed at re-organizing the physical configuration of the oil installation which, at that
time, was reportedly comprised of “war relics and post-war improvisations.” Reorganization of the works included the re-arrangement of unloading facilities and handling
of stores, building roads and completion of railroad, improving older benches with
fractionating columns, and replacing distillates, among other things.798 Industrial
restructuring was not restricted to the production site. In order to enhance industrial
productivity and efficiency, the company introduced spatial reforms across the entire petroscape. This included multiple development plans and rebuilding programs that helped
reshape Abadan’s urban structure and turned it into a polycentric settlement. In the
following section, I explore the urban reformation and the subsequent spatial
transformation of Abadan during this period by analyzing the plans developed for each
section of the tripartite city.
4.4.1 Abadan Township Re-Organization Scheme
“I was horrified during my visit to Abadan by the filthy conditions that existed. Pools of
stagnant water on which floated greasy, oily substances met one’s eyes at every turn…I
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was struck by the extremely insanitary conditions of the whole place in general and the socalled bazaar in particular, especially the sheds and shelters occupied by Indians which
might justly be called hotbeds of disease.” 799

4.4.1.1 Challenges and Goals.

The need for improving public health at Abadan

manifested itself in the early 1920s. As discussed in the previous chapter, overcrowding,
inadequate healthcare facilities, poor sanitation infrastructure, and housing shortage
characterized the settlement abutting the Refinery. While on his tour of inspection at
Abadan in May 1924, Eissa Khan Feiz, the Iranian Imperial Commissioner to the APOC,
was shocked at “the lamentable lack of hygiene” in the Native Village and the bazaar area.
Unlike the Fields which between 1913 and 1924 had transfigured from a section of the
“Dante’s Inferno” into a neat place with clean air and no sign of oil in the environment,800
social and physical conditions in Abadan had deteriorated during the same period. In fact,
the Imperial Commissioner was instructed by the Iranian Government to visit the island
and investigate the complaints sent to Tehran regarding the state of affairs at Abadan. In a
bitter letter, the Imperial Commissioner criticized the Company for neglecting the “crying
evil” at Abadan and suggested that the sanitary arrangements at the Refinery should be put
on a par with the Fields.801
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The Imperial Commissioner’s visit to Abadan took place only a few months after
frequent epidemics hit the island and resulted in high mortalities among Indians and
Iranians.802 Between 1923 and 1924, various outbreaks of cholera, smallpox, plague,
typhoid, and dysentery were recorded in Abadan and other parts of Khuzestan. Company
statistics show that in three consecutive weeks in 1923, roughly 2000 people perished. This
number was equal to three percent of the total population of Abadan. While only three
Europeans died from the waves of epidemics, the Refinery Village and the Sheikh’s Bazaar
accounted for 10 percent and 90 percent of the total fatalities, respectively. Identifying the
Sheikh’s Village as the “hotspot of disease,” Company officials blamed the Abadan Village
for spreading the epidemics.803 Iranian officials, however, pointed the finger at the Indians
of the Company’s Village. For instance, the Imperial Commissioner claimed that plague
and cholera were not native to Iran yet imported by “Indians of lower classes who flocked
to Abadan for purposes of livelihood.”804
The investigations by the Company’s Chief Medical Officer, however, suggested
that poor quarantine measures at the Port of Abadan and inadequate healthcare provisions
in the Native Village and the Abadan Village were real causes of the severity of casualties.
The investigation revealed that cholera epidemic arrived in Abadan by a mail vessel from
India. Moreover, out of 947 cases of cholera infection, 883 patients died, the majority of
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whom either passed away before admission to the Isolation hospital or “refused treatment.”
While 64 cases of death occurred in the Company’s Village, fatalities in the Abadan Village
numbered 817. In fact, soon after the outbreak of epidemics, Company officials put the
Abadan Village “out of bounds.” The curfew cut off the village’s access to vital resources,
such as medical services, clean water, and food supplies, which might explain the
disproportionately higher rate of mortality in the Abadan Village than the Native Village.805
Overwhelmed by the sheer number of fatalities, the Company took immediate
actions to check the spread of epidemics. For instance, a municipal engineer was appointed,
and the medical staff was increased at Abadan.806 However, these measures did not make
a considerable impact and Company officials in Iran and London began to recognize the
need to develop a comprehensive plan for the improvement of housing and sanitary
conditions at Abadan. The comprehensive plan aimed to ensure that no menace would
threaten the continuity of operations at Abadan. After all, as John Cadman once put it, “the
economic value of good health conditions in such a country as Persia can hardly be
exaggerated.” 807 In fact, Company officials realized that frequent outbreaks of epidemics
would cause economic harms to the Company in terms of loss of labor pool, disruption of
daily refinery work, disconnection of communication and commerce with other ports and
cities, loss of employee efficiency due to the negative psychological impacts of epidemics,
and the tainted perception of Abadan that epidemics had fostered in public opinion.
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Moreover, signs of “uneasiness” were observed in high offices in Tehran and Iraq and even
in London. 808
4.4.1.2 Visions and Solutions
Palliative and Prophylactic Schemes
In the aftermath of the 1923 epidemics, Company officials took a series palliative and
preventive sanitary measures to check the spread of infectious diseases in Abadan. For
instance, following the outbreak of plague, medical officers launched an inoculation
campaign, and, reportedly, in one year vaccinated more than 4,500 people. Moreover, all
Company bungalows, coolie lines, servants’ quarters, kitchens, public latrines,
slaughterhouses, as well as a group of residential compounds in the Abadan Village, where
Company employees resided, were fumigated with sulfur and then limewashed with sulfur
dioxide. Company officials, in collaboration with the Sheikh administration, identified
more than 30 reed huts in the Sarifa Area in the Abadan Village, where infected patients
resided, removed all inhabitants and their belongings to the Quarantine Hospital, sprayed
the huts with fuel oil to catch fleas, destroyed the huts and buried them in the center of the
compound. As a result, open spaces were created in the middle of the Abadan Village.
However, resettlement in these areas were prohibited.
Company officials also launched a propaganda campaign in Abadan to raise public
awareness about the epidemics. Tindals, maistries (headmen), and the heads of the Abadan
Village were briefed about the causes and the spread of epidemics and were asked to
disseminate information among inhabitants. Posters in different languages were published
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in the bazaar. Guards were placed in the cemeteries to avoid burials without prior
examination of the corps or the approval of the Company Sanitation Office. Moreover, a
professional rat catcher with full equipment was recruited from India and traps with Barium
Carbonate baiting were installed across the plague-ridden area in the Abadan Village.
Between April and July 1924, more than 12,000 rats were destroyed. 809
Prophylactic schemes were also implemented to prevent the reoccurrence of
outbreaks. These measures included: anti-fly measures, food inspection in the bazaars and
the Company Provision Stores as well as soda water factories, construction of three new
incinerators in the Abadan Village and four new incinerators throughout the Company’s
Area, renovation of the butchery, construction of additional multi-seater water flush and
dry flush latrines, oiling of stagnant pools of water, and construction of concrete invert
drains as well as surface drains.810 Company medical officers claimed that these measures
enhanced public health in Abadan. The official figures provided by the Company’s Medical
Department showed a decrease in the rate of mortality from 524 in the first half of 1924 to
234 in the second half of the same year.811

The 1927 Cholera Epidemic
Despite the Company’s so-called sanitary measures in Abadan, another cycle of epidemics
hit the oil town in four years. In July 1927, cholera broke out at Bombay and Basra and
then spread to the ports of Khorramshahr and Abadan. It gradually spread to Ahwaz and
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began to threaten the oil fields. At Abadan alone, the epidemic affected 281 dwellers of the
Abadan Village, of whom 236 cases died.812 However, the statistics issued by the Company
indicated that minimal mortality had occurred in the Company’s territory. Contrary to the
various reports stating that the epidemic had commenced in the Company’s Area, the Chief
Medical Officer blamed Abadan Town for the spread of the disease. The Chief Medical
Officer noted that, “…Until Abadan Town has been thoroughly cleansed, I do not believe
that we shall be free of epidemics altogether.” 813 Regardless of the origin of the epidemic,
the outbreak of cholera at Abadan was a great shock to Company officials. Drinking water,
vegetables, and infectious cases from either Basra or India were regarded as the potential
causes of the epidemic.
To contain the cholera epidemic, the medical staff launched a “wholesale
inoculation campaign” at the Abadan General Hospital. 7000 doses of anti-cholera vaccine
were ordered from London. In attacking the epidemic, Company medical officers draw on
the experiences of the Colonial Government of India. Besides the conventional treatment
methods of the time, such as Essential Oils and Hypertonic Saline solutions, a new
medicine, knowns as bilivaccine was experimentally used. Developed by UkrainianFrench biologist Alexandre Besredka at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, bilivaccine was a
prophylactic anti-cholera vaccine which instead of hypodermic needle could be taken by
the mouth. At this time, bilivaccine had gained popularity among British officials in India.
It reportedly cut the spread of cholera epidemic in Pondicherry in India in the course of
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three weeks.814 Although it was intended to be used for the Europeans at Abadan, the
medical officers were instructed to first test it on the local population.815
The Cholera outbreak was contained in the course of three weeks at Abadan. The
Chief Medical Officer attributed this achievement to the efficiency of sanitary measures
taken at Abadan between 1924 and 1927. The story of how the Company managed to check
the spread of epidemics served as a good material for the Company propaganda machine.
At the Chairman’s suggestion, the account of the feat appeared in the A.P.O.C. magazine
The Naft. It featured photographs of three elements of the Company’s sanitation
infrastructure at Abadan, including the water installation at Bahmanshir (See section 4.4),
the Quarantine river boats at Bawarda, and the special canteen, “where food was sold
cheaply to the natives.”816 In reality, however, the medical staff failed to inoculate the
majority of workmen at Abadan and Ahwaz. In the words of a Senior Medical officer, “It
was difficult to arrange for all workmen to get off [work] for inoculations here and would
have been still more so to get them away three days running. Most of them would not have
carried out the three days treatment without supervision.” 817 It seems that a large portion
of the 26,000 vaccines provided to the Medical staff were used for inoculation of Europeans
and the Company’s tanker staff. Despite the instruction from London regarding the
continuation of inoculation, the Medical officers in Abadan reserved the remaining stock
of vaccines for a future outbreak.
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Following the cholera outbreak of 1927, Company officials introduced new
measures at Abadan. For instance, a water extension scheme was adopted to supply filtered
drinking water to non-European quarters. A proposal was also put forward by the Medical
Authorities to erect a slaughterhouse and a closed market in the Abadan Bazaar to control
the meat and vegetable supplies.818 The Company also instituted the Public Health
Department on the basis of the British Standards of Efficiency which were tailored to meet
the local circumstances and customs. It was headed by the Principal Medical Officer of
Health and staffed by three British Health Inspectors, five Indian Assistant Health
Inspectors and clerks, two Iranian apprentice Health Inspectors, and a number of “native”
sweepers and lime-washers. The Public Health Department was in charge of inspecting and
maintaining sanitary conditions in the Company’s territory and Abadan Village. It also
provided technical health-related assistance to the Abadan Municipality and to local Iranian
authorities. The Department’s scope of work included: general conservancy in the
Bungalow Area, in the Refinery, and in Abadan Township — such as sweeping the roads,
compounds, dry latrines, handling the refuse to incinerators, and cleaning septic tanks; food
inspection in the Company’s Store, in the Restaurant, and in the Iranian Bazaar; infectious
disease monitoring— such as inspecting ships and notifying authorities about cases of
infectious disease; anti-rat, anti-fly, and anti-mosquito measures; vaccination and
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inoculation of the staff; cemeteries and burials management; and, general inspection of the
Abadan schools, the bazaar, and shipping.819

Environmental Modifications
In the early 1920s, the insanitary environment in Abadan had caught the attention of
medical officers. Colonial practices and the principles of the post-germ theory underpinned
the improvement proposals. At first, medical officials focused on colonial-type
environmental control strategies at the intermediate level to enhance public health. For
instance, only three major sources of infection were identified in the Refinery Area and the
Abadan Village: public latrines, nullahs, and alleys. In the colonial settings, human excreta,
cleanliness of the urban environment, and waste disposal were regarded as the intermediate
environmental factors affecting health and morbidity.820 Therefore, as mentioned in the
previous chapter, medical officers recommended replacing the pail system in the Native
Village with a centralized system of public latrines built of “pucca bricks” with “automatic
flushing arrangements” and recommended adopting a septic tank model similar to the
Bungalow Area. Medical officers also suggested that the nullah (canal) running between
the Company’s Village and the Sheikh’s territory be dried and filled up, and called for
replacing other earthen canals and drains with brick sewers or pipes.821 Similarly, alleys in
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the Abadan Village were viewed as dumping grounds which were the “first danger spots”
during epidemic outbreaks.822
Moreover, plans were developed to institute a “Sanitary Committee” that would
convene at least once per month and propose recommendations to the Abadan Medical
Officer for the improvement of public health conditions at Abadan. The proposed Sanitary
Committee would consist of the Medical Officer, a Civil/Sanitary Engineer along with
representatives of different classes of employees, including a Senior Chemist, a Senior
Engineer, a Senior Indian Clerk, the Sheikh’s representative in Abadan (Sheikh Musa), and
two hand-picked members of the Indian staff from different ethnic groups (jat).823
Following the 1923 epidemics, however, the focus shifted to the roots of infections
and the means of contagion. Moreover, macro-level environmental reforms were
formulated. For instance, the Principal Medical Officer stipulated that achieving “efficient
sanitation” in five key areas—including housing, water supply, food supplies, sewage
disposal, and quarantine hospital— could remedy the causes of epidemics.824 For his part,
the Chief Medical Officer maintained that plague and smallpox were caused by the general
insanitary conditions, specially overcrowding, while cholera, typhoid, and dysentery were
water-borne diseases spread by infected water or vegetables.825 The transition from the
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intermediate to the macro-level environmental analysis also changed the manner in which
medical officers formulated plans for the physical and spatial reorganization of Abadan.
While in the early 1920s, medical officials entertained the idea of rebuilding the Native
Village on the same spot, after the 1923 epidemic, they provided a radically different
proposal. In their view, the soil and the Shatt were “a continual source of infection which
may eventually lead to epidemic diseases becoming endemic.” Thus, the ideal solution was
tearing down and rebuilding the Native Village on a new site “some distance away from
the river, in the desert.” 826
Medical officers regarded housing as a determinant of public health and suggested
that the rate of occupancy per room should be revised in the new quarters. For instance,
they suggested that in new Clerks’ quarters, only one man should live in each room, and
no more than 6 men should be allowed to dine together in a messing room; in new Coolie
quarters, no more than four laborers should be assigned to each room and better ventilation
than a single door should be provided. Furthermore, medical officials believed that kitchens
and bathrooms should be located at either end of each block. Moreover, it was
recommended new buildings be sufficiently spaced.827
Figure 4.14 depicts the earliest environmental modifications proposed in the Native
Village in the aftermath of the epidemics in 1923. As the plan shows, medical officers
envisioned the reconstruction of the Native Village and the Hospital on a new site between
the Abadan Village and the Bawarda Tank Farm. The palliative schemes also included a
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new water supply system and elimination of the nullah separating the Native Village from
the Abadan Village.828

Figure 4.14 Plan of the Abadan Refinery showing environmental reforms devised to
improve public health in Abadan, circa 1923. As the plan vividly indicates, the proposed
reforms included provision of a new water supply system from the Bahmanshir River,
elimination of the earthen waterways (nullahs), and reconstruction of the Native Village
and the Hospital on a site between the Abadan Village and the Bawarda Tank Farm.
Source: BP Archive ArcRef 70209

4.4.1.3 The “Omnibus” Scheme.

Based on the palliative schemes and proposals put

forth by medical officers, the Refinery Management devised a comprehensive plan in 1923
that entailed radical measures across Abadan. Similar to other Company-sponsored social
welfare programs, professional opinions were solicited on the proposed comprehensive
plan. In this case, Sanitation Engineer F. C. Temple and Architect G. Wittet, were recruited
to review the plan. The team of town planners had several years of experience in the
company town of Jamshedpur, the site of Tata Iron & Steel Company in Bengal in northeast
828
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India.829 The product of marrying the comprehensive plan with Temple and Wittet’s
recommendations was Abadan Township Re-Organization Scheme, also known as the
“omnibus” plan, which consisted of several elements including model villages, new
gateway to the Refinery, new market, a water supply scheme, sanitation reforms in the
Abadan Village, quarantine facilities, as well as plans for drainage, sewerage, and road
systems. The Scheme’s total cost was estimated around £750,000 with a three-year
implementation timeline.830
The Omnibus Scheme drastically reorganized the spatial structure of Abadan.
Besides addressing Abadan’s major public health challenges, such as housing,
overcrowding, clean water and food supplies, and general sanitation, the Scheme helped
imprint the Company’s ideal social order onto Abadan’s urban form. In other words,
Abadan Township Reorganization Scheme marked the culmination of social engineering
efforts that characterized the Company’s spatial practices and paternalistic programs since
the inception of operations in Abadan. Moreover, the Scheme made Abadan’s layout
comprehensible to Company officials and served as a new instrument of labor control.
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Figure 4.15 Map of Abadan showing urban reforms under Abadan Township ReOrganization Scheme, 1924. The reforms included, among others, demolition of the
Native Village, partial clearance and street widening in the Abadan Village, two “model”
villages, and a “model” bazaar.
Source: BP Archive ArcRef 70211

Figure 4.15 depicts the major components of the Omnibus Scheme. As the plan
shows, the Scheme called for the entire demolition of the Native Village and the partial
clearance of the Abadan Village. The demolition expenses were to be divided “on the most
advantageous terms” between the Company and the Sheikh. The plan also envisioned three
new model villages for the resettlement of clerks, artisans, and manual workmen.831
Abadan Township Re-organization Scheme also called for restructuring Abadan’s major
social and economic lifeline, the bazaar. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Abadan
Bazaar stretched from the Abadan Village to the Refinery Gate. Under the Omnibus
Scheme, the entire bazaar was demolished and relocated to a new spot and reorganized on
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new principles. In order to facilitate the transition, a new road network connected the new
model villages and the new bazaar to the new refinery gate.
Model Villages: Sanitation, Standardization, and Social Order
Aimed to improve employees’ living and working conditions, decrease labor turnover, and
deter unionization, model company towns were designed to alleviate the harshness of
industrial life through social and physical planning. As such, model company towns
marked the transition between the older styles of paternalism and the professionalized
welfare methods of “new” company towns. As Margaret Crawford notes, in model towns,
symbolic form and order would overshadow the “demands of industry” or regional
circumstances.832 Abadan Township Re-organization Scheme included two “model”
villages planned on “up-to-date” and “sanitary” principles for accommodation of roughly
10,000 inhabitants. The population density in the model villages was set at 80 persons per
acre which was less than half the population density in Abadan prior to the urban
reformation. 833
Each village was divided along ethno-occupational lines. Similar to model
company towns, these villages combined economic logic with some elements of social and
physical planning grounded in the Company’s desired labor hierarchy and a discourse of
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public health.834 The model villages were designed to accommodate all Abadan labor,
including Indians, Iranians, Armenians, and Iraqis who were on the Company’s payroll.
After much discussion, it was decided that free accommodation be provided to direct
employees, including clerical staff and skilled and semi-skilled workmen, who were
brought to Abadan from outside. The goal was to reinvigorate the existing labor order, to
exercise “complete control” over municipal and sanitary affairs, and to enforce evacuation
of quarters upon termination of employee contracts.835 The Iranian coolie labor and local
contractors were the only workforce groups that were excluded from the new housing
program.836
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Figure 4.16 Site plan of the New Workmen’s Village, 1933. The Village was designed to
accommodate roughly 9000 people and featured a uniform grid of roads and alleys. As
the plan shows, the rail line separated Artisans’ Married Quarters from Single Quarters.
The latter represented an “updated” version of older coolie lines.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 53924

The Omnibus Scheme envisioned a “model village” for accommodation of
approximately 7500 Iranian and Indian artisans and their dependents on the “untouched
ground” to the southeast of the Refinery. The New Workmen’s Village (No. 23 in Figure
4.15), or the Bahmanshir Village as it was later called, was surrounded by open land and
connected to the Refinery via one roadway. This ensured maximum control over the village
in case of strikes. As Figure 4.16 illustrates, the Village featured a uniform grid of roads to
minimize development costs. The general layout included a 25-foot-wide, electricity-lit
main street intersected by 16-foot-wide secondary roads. It consisted of roughly 300 lines
of dwelling units laid out in an orderly setting.837 A back-service alley was also provided
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in the middle of each block that served as an infrastructural conduit, accommodating
sanitary facilities, such as public baths, water fountains, dry latrines, and a “proper system
of drainage.” In order to break the monotony of the layout, block orientation changed
alternately. The layout also introduced a variety of “line and aspect,” which gave “relief to
the eye” and partially screened the back-service alleys.838 The New Workmen’s Village
was an enhanced version of old coolie lines and native houses erected fourteen years earlier
in the Native Village. However, unlike coolie lines which varied in layout and size, the
new “lines” were uniform and standardized. With a view to minimizing costs, expediting
construction process, and enhancing sanitation, a system of “standard shed” was adopted.
Standardization and rationalization of design and construction drew inspiration from
Fordism, the third wave of capitalist organization of production that characterized the
interwar era.839

Figure 4.17 Artisans’ Single Quarters under construction, October 1924. Artisans were
provided with the minimum level of housing standards. Each block was divided into ten
rooms measuring 10 feet by 20 feet and featured a door on one side and a window on the
other side, and no verandahs were provided.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 68331
838
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Each shed was designed as a standard “pucca brick” block, 120 feet long and 24 feet wide,
made of standardized steel framework and burnt brick, and partitioned from inside into
multiple housing units to accommodate various classes of employees.840 Bachelor and
married artisans were accommodated in separate quarters. As Figure 4.17 indicates, the
structure of each standard shed consisted of 10 steel trusses, 24 feet in width, spaced at 12foot intervals and supported on steel purlins and covered with 4 inches of mud. The floors
were raised 1 foot and 6 inches above the ground level and paved with brick or concrete.841
The standard shed became a new building prototype widely used in various Company
budget projects over the next decade. As Figures 4.17 and 4.18 illustrate, the standard shed
served as the bachelors’ artisan block. It was divided into ten rooms, 10 feet by 20 feet
each, accommodating 40 men. The shed also covered the living quarters in the married
artisan blocks which consisted of ten double-room units. In married quarters courtyards
were attached to the standard shed. Each courtyard, or compound, was screened by sevenfoot “purdah” wall. The latter component was provided to ensure privacy in married
quarters and was a reinterpretation of the Iranian traditional domestic architecture. Abadan
Township Reorganization Scheme also envisioned other amenities in the New Workmen’s
Village, including a primary school for 100 students, public water hydrants, public
cookhouses, a narrow gauge for refuse wagons to incinerators, and motors and pumps for
drainage (See Figures 4.19 and 4.20).842
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Figure 4.18 Layouts of Artisans’ Married Quarters (Top) and Artisans’ Single Quarters
(Bottom). The workmen’s quarters were made of the “standard shed.” As the plans show,
Married Quarters consisted of two rooms and a compound (yard) accommodating 10
families. Bachelor Quarters consisted of 10 rooms accommodating 40 workmen.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 53916

Figure 4.19 A view of Artisans’ Married Quarters in the New Workmen’s Village, circa
1935. Public water fountains were provided at regular intervals along the back-service
alleys. Water fountains became social hotspots as they were frequented by housewives
and children during the day.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 229351
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Figure 4.20 A view of a Back-Service Alley in the New Workmen’s Village, circa 1935.
The alleys served as infrastructural conduits accommodating the sanitary facilities, such
as surface drainage, water hydrants, bathing cubicles, and dry latrines.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 229351

The Omnibus Scheme also envisioned a smaller model village for resettlement of
approximately 500 Indian, Iranian, and Armenian clerks, foremen, and shift engineers on
a site near the Refinery’s new gate. Since the majority of the clerical staff at the time were
Indians, the Clerks’ Village was also called the Indian Lanes. As Figure 4.21 shows, the
Clerks’ Village was located off the road connecting the new Refinery Gate to the new
Market. The village framed the square facing the new Main Gate which was consciously
designed large enough “to avoid possible crowding at the Gate in normal times,” and retain
“a clear space around the Gate if labor troubles should ever arise.”843 The Village was
comprised of rows of “lines” made of the standard shed. Similar to the New Workmen’s
Village, single and married employees were accommodated in separate blocks.
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Figure 4.21 Site plan of the New Main Gate and Clerks’ Quarters. Designed to
accommodate approximately 1000 inhabitants, the Clerks’ Village featured a uniform
gridiron layout. Unlike the Workmen’s Village, sanitation infrastructure, such as surface
drainage, servants’ latrines and pump houses, lined the main streets.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 53924

Similar to other paternalistic programs, clerical staff enjoyed higher housing
standards than the third-class personnel. For instance, population density in single clerks’
lines was one-fifth of the density in single artisans’ quarters. As Figures 4.22 and 4.23
reveal, single clerks’ quarters consisted of eight units, accommodating 8 men. Each block
included two dining rooms, and walls were protected by verandahs. Married clerks’ blocks
were divided into five units. Each unit was designed as a self-contained residence
consisting of separate living, cooking, and washing quarters organized around a central
courtyard.
The housing types diversified over time. For instance, in 1931, European-type
bungalows were designed for accommodation of Iranian married clerks and assistant
engineers.844 As Figure 4.21 shows, in 1933, J. M. Wilson was also commissioned to
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redesign the clerical quarters and prepare plans for conversion of the bachelor quarters into
married types. Initially, dry latrines were provided in the village. However, in 1929,
following the 1927 epidemics all toilets were converted into a water-borne sewerage
system equipped with septic tanks.845 The Clerks’ Village also included servants’ quarters,
post office, cinema hall for Iranians, fire station, security barracks, church, the branch of
the Imperial Bank of Persia, athletic club, and Clerks’ Provision Store. In 1931, the
Refinery Management instituted the Township and Welfare Department to oversee the
provision and maintenance of housing, utilities (water, light, drainage, sewerage, etc.) and
social services in the Workmen’s Village and the Clerks’ Village.846

Figure 4.22 New Single Clerks’ block under construction, October 1924. Each block
consisted of eight rooms and two dining rooms, accommodating 8 men. Each room
featured two windows and one door opening onto a verandah.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 68331
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Figure 4.23 Layouts of Clerks’ Married Quarters (Top) and Clerks’ Single Quarters
(Bottom), 1924.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 53916

Despite all the “modern” amentias, the new model villages were not met with the
full approval of the workforce. For instance, a group of senior clerks chose to stay in the
old bazaar quarters rather than move to the new Clerks’ Village, partly because the new
quarters were not equipped with electric light and fans. Some clerical staff, including shift
engineers, demanded “more roomy accommodation.”847 The Company’s favorite labor
group, Chittagonians, were the only residents of the Company’s old village who refused to
move to new quarters. In 1926, after two years of negotiations, some relocated “by their
own consent” from the old Chittagonian Lines on the foreshore to the new quarters in the
New Workmen’s Village. However, more than 250 Chittagonians were still unwilling to
move out. 848
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Bahmanshir Water Supply Scheme
In Company officials’ pathological universe, overcrowding and poor housing conditions
would facilitate the outbreak of plague and smallpox, while pathogenic germs in drinking
water and vegetables were regarded as the major cause for the spread of cholera epidemics
and the infectious diseases from the families of typhoid and Gastritis.849 To address the
latter public health challenge, Abadan Township Re-Organization Scheme called for
providing a new water supply system from the Bahmanshir River. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, the Shatt was the major source of water supply for the Abadan Refinery
and the agricultural settlements on the western bank of the island. The constant discharge
of effluent, garbage, and sewer from the Refinery and the surrounding villages as well as
the leaks from the oil tankers increased the level of pollution in the Shatt. Moreover, heavy
chemicals, such as waste bleach liquor, from the refinery slowed down the self-purification
effects of the river, consolidated the pollutants within the vicinity of Abadan, and made the
water inappropriate for human consumption.850 As a result, Company officials began to
consider drawing water for both domestic uses and boiler feed from the Bahmanshir River.
Bahmanshir water was deemed less polluted than the Shatt because there was “no village
of importance on the eastern bank of the island.”851
The water supply technique proposed by Sanitation Engineer F. C. Temple shaped
the foundation of the Bahmashir Water Scheme. Temple’s methodology was predicated
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upon bacteriological and chemical analysis of water as well as the post-germ theory
guidelines which had yielded “excellent results” in India.852 In particular, Temple’s water
purification method was built on the experimental work proposed in the book Water Supply
in the Tropics by Colonel Clemesha, the Sanitary Commissioner in Madras.853 This method
suggested that water should be treated by sedimentation, filtration, and chlorination
processes prior to distribution. The apportionment of the treated water among the three
classes of the workforce shows how the factors of race and occupational status were played
out in the Company’s discriminatory paternalism. For instance, for each European
employee regardless of ranking the equal portion of 40 gallons of treated water per day was
allocated. For Non-European personnel serving the European community in the Bungalow
Area, including Indian and Iranian butlers, cooks, servants, and gardeners, half the standard
amount, namely twenty gallons per day, were assigned. For the Company Villages and the
Abadan Village, a ration of two gallons per head was designated, which “was less than half
the required amount, but better than nothing at all.”854
In January 1924, the Board of Directors approved the Bahmanshir Water Scheme.
Although the water scheme was presented as the first step in improving sanitary conditions
at Abadan, the refinery was the main beneficiary of the scheme. Almost sixty percent of
the one million gallons of water supplied through this scheme was used to feed the boilers,
twenty-five percent was dedicated to the Abadan General Hospital and the villages and the
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remaining fifteen percent was set aside for the European quarters. The disproportionately
low share of the Abadan Village and the Company villages with more than 30,000
inhabitants compared to the Bungalow Area with a population of less than 500855 is
astonishing. Moreover, the chlorination process was only implemented in the section that
fed the Refinery and the Bungalow Area.856 To execute the water scheme, the Company
leased from the Sheikh 4.2 jareebs (acres) of land, equivalent of 1800 feet frontage and
150 feet in depth, plus an additional piece 6.2 jareebs (acres) on the foreshore of the
Bahmanshir River.857 The India-based firm Paterson Engineering Company was selected
to undertake the water supply scheme.858 In the early 1930s, with an increase in the
incidence of renal colic disease among employees, Company officials began to study the
methods to enhance the quality of the Bahmanshir water. For instance, in 1931 Company
officials contemplated “bandalling” the Karun river. Bandalling was a technique used to
increase the flow of the water from the Karun River into the Bahmanshir River such that
the saltwater of the Persian Gulf at high tides would not reach the water intake area on the
Bahmashir river.859
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Public Garden: From the “Plague Spot” to the Healthfield
Company medical officials believed that the Native Village had accumulated plague germs
as a result of successive epidemics, and the best remediation was to wipe out the “hut-incompound” village.860 Building on this conviction, Abadan Township Re-Organization
Scheme called for the demolition of the entire Native Village as well as the northern part
of the Abadan Village. The cleared land was to be kept open— with the exception of the
eastern section designated for the extension of the General Hospital— and used as the
protective air space against the spread of fire and epidemics from the Abadan Village to
the Refinery area.861 The open land was to be naturally sanitized by the sun rays
“eradicating all the microbes and diseases.”862 Company officials conceived of this space
as a “hygienic zone” or “safety zone” which in their view was necessary for enhancing
health and sanitation at Abadan.863 Under the Omnibus Scheme a “drainage canal” was
also dredged to the south of this area that functioned as the “cordon sanitaire” between the
Abadan Village and the Company’s territory.
In 1926, the Native Village was evacuated, slated and then raised to allow for
natural drainage. This open land was reserved for football and hockey grounds and tennis
courts around the new Clerks’ Club.864 In 1927, in the wake of public outrage and political
consequences of destruction, demolition, and displacement in the Native Village, Company
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officials developed plans to convert the “hygienic zone” into a public garden. John Cadman
named it the Green Way Garden (Bagh-i-Sabz-Rah). The garden was intended to attract
the local residents of Abadan and also to serve as a green scenery for the General Hospital
and the new Clerks’ quarters. The public garden was scheduled to be officially inaugurated
during the Chairman’s visit in 1927.865 As Figure 4.24 shows, the Garden’s layout
consisted of a straight central lane intersected in the middle with a circular walkway. As a
public space catering for Iranians, the garden was first landscaped with indigenous species.
In the beginning, Tehran Poplars were planted which, given the climatic conditions of
Abadan, proved unsuccessful. In 1928, poplars were replaced by Cerus and Persian Lilac.
Moreover, Terminalia saplings were planted around the central circle. By 1928, more than
70 saplings of different species were planted throughout the Park.866 The turfing of the 28acre public Garden was completed in 1930 and trees and shrubs were planted from the
Company nursery which was supplied from India and Ceylon. In planting the public park,
the Company also experimented with manure and species which were not indigenous to
the region.867
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Figure 4.24 Aerial view of the Public Garden looking north, circa 1926. Replacing the
Coolie Lines and Native Houses of the early years, the Public Garden along with the
canal to its south served as the “Hygienic Zone” between the Abadan Village and the
Company’s premises.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 36152

4.4.1.4 Petro-Violence: Demolition, Rebuilding and Public Resistance.
“… I believe that the Company is trying to turn Abadan into a city like Masjid-i-Sulaiman,
where no one except the company owns houses, shops and estates… [The Company] aims
to retain a total control over the town…and tries to undermine the town by restructuring
it, by building new houses and a bazaar.”868
“…The Company and Sheikh Khaz'al are forcibly removing people and demolishing
houses and shops. Inhabitants are feeling insecure and agitated. We fled Abadan and took
refuge in Bushire, waiting for your urgent action. If you hesitate, all we have built in
Abadan over eighteen years will vanish…”869
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The process of demolition and reconstruction of the Native Village had considerable
political and social implications. In fact, Abadan Township Reorganization Scheme was
launched within the context of the new power dynamics that emerged in early 1920s and
gained momentum in later part of 1924, when the Iranian government officially occupied
Khuzestan and toppled the Sheikh’s regime. Given the changing political environment in
the region and the growing hostility between the Iranian Government and the Company,
the Omnibus Scheme turned into a highly contested urban reform program and came to
symbolize the power struggle over oil. Implementation of the Scheme also resulted in the
displacement of thousands of people. However, for their part, residents of Abadan played
a major role in politicizing the reforms by initiating protests, by resisting the Company’s
spatial coercion, and by staking claim to the urban space. In particular, Iranian inhabitants
helped incorporate Abadan’s urban affairs into the broader nationalist and anti-Company
campaign that gathered steam in the later part of the 1920s.

Public Opposition and Government Involvement
As discussed in the previous chapter, besides Coolie Lines and Native Houses—which
were built and owned by the Company — approximately 500 privately-owned houses and
110 shops existed in the Native Village. In order to keep the racial balance of the Village,
the Company never allowed any particular ethnicity to become the dominant group and, as
a result, Iranian, Iraqi, and Indian inhabitants owned approximately equal shares of the
building stock.870 In the beginning, the Company partnered with the Sheikh to initiate the
demolition process. However, because of the potential political consequences, both parties
870
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were hesitant to execute the plan.871 Eventually, the Sheikh employed an authoritarian
strategy. Ten-day eviction notices were served on the houses and shops located within the
Abadan Village’s demolition zone. Moreover, no promises of compensation were made.872
Even the Karguzar, who was opposed to the forcible eviction of people, was warned against
interfering in the matter on the grounds that the Sheikh was the sole proprietor of the entire
island.873
Unlike its counterpart, the Company's strategy was diplomatic. The Sheikh's
delegates, on behalf of the Company, began negotiating with the owners and promised to
make compensation for the expenses people spared on the buildings; however, the matter
of “pricing” caused disagreements.874 For instance, a house with a market value of 1800
rupees was priced at 300 rupees.875 As a result, the allegations of secrecy and deception
were made against the British corporation and people completely rejected the proposed
compensation formula.876 Once again the Company was accused of prohibiting the
renovation of buildings in order to pressure the inhabitants into selling their properties. The
residents' Representatives reported that the landlords were prevented from repairing 200
houses and 100 shops that were destroyed by the rain.877 The Company rejected the figures
as “grossly exaggerated” and “misleading,” claiming that only 12 small houses were
rendered uninhabitable by the rain and were beyond repair. Company officials also
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maintained that, for “sanitary” reasons, rehabilitation was not permitted and that those
buildings will be demolished as soon as the new model villages were completed.878 The
Company also allegedly prevented people from trading their properties, with a view to
dampening the market value of the structures. For instance, a resident filed a telegraphic
complaint claiming that not only has the Company restrained him and his brother from
selling their houses, it has also confiscated their properties and asked for a monthly
payment of forty rupees as the municipality tax.879
While no agreement was reached over the compensation mechanism, in June 1924,
six-month notices were served on 260 shopkeepers, merchants, and landlords in the Native
Village, asking them to evacuate their properties by the end of the year.880 This move
triggered a wave of public protest. Rumors were already circulating in Abadan that the
Company was developing plans to expel Iranians from the Native Village and build a canal
to separate the Refinery from the Abadan Village.881 The uncertainty regarding
resettlement options also placed people in a dilemma. The Karguzar reported that, “… what
will cause utmost hardship to the residents is [the question of] where they could reside after
leaving the Village. There is no available land close to the Abadan Village where they
could move to. Moreover, the Sheikh's guards prohibit any construction on empty lands
within the Abadan Village…”882
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Hundreds of complaints were sent to the Iranian officials in Khuzestan and Tehran.
Telegraphic circulars and petitions were also dispatched to the Majles (the Iranian
Parliament), the Prime Minister, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Public Works, as
well as to the Tehran Press. In Khorramshahr, the Karguzar was “inundated with
applications for support and compensation.”883 Iraqi residents of the Native Village also
petitioned the Iraq authorities against the eviction measures.884 In communicating with the
executive and legislative branches of the Iranian government, residents and their
representatives utilized religious and nationalist rhetoric to sharpen their argument and to
drag the Iranian Government into the quarrel. For instance, the shopkeepers stipulated that
“…if authorities do not step in, all the buildings owned by the Iranians will be demolished
and handed over to foreigners.”885 Frequent references were made to the Islamic
jurisprudence principles, such as the one that read, “people command their lives and their
properties,”886 to depict the eviction notices as an act of appropriation and to threaten that
they might resort to violent reactions.887
The inhabitants also accused the Company of “setting fire on the Islamic city,” or
causing serious troubles for the new government by planning to “destroy 1000 houses of
Muslims, Sayids and Shi'ites.”888 People also rendered the eviction notices “illegal,”
contrary to “acceptable conventions,” and detrimental to the dignity of the Iranian

883

T. L. Jacks, July 19th, 1924, “Note on an Interview between His Excellency Governor-General of
Khuzestan and Myself Following the Former’s Visit to Abadan on 21st of July 1924,” Abadan Township
Reconstruction 1921 to 1928, BP Archives, ArcRef 68723
884
“Local Conditions,” October 1924. General Manager’s Monthly Report, Abadan, August-December
1924, BP Archive ArcRef 5482
885
People’s Envoy to the Ministry of Public Works, 30 May 1924; IRA:240-15694
886
“ﻢƒﻢ و اﻧﻔﺴƒ”اﻟﻨﺎس ﻣﺴﻠﻄﻮن ﻋ• اﻣﻮاﻟ
887
Telegram from Residents of Abadan to Reza Khan, the Prime Minister. 7 Aug 1924 (16/5/1303); IRA:
240-15694
888
Telegram from the Resident of Abadan to the Parliament, 25 August 1924 (03/06/1303); IRA: 24015694

352

Government.889 People’s representatives warned Government officials of inaction:”…huge
unrest might ensue [in Abadan], consequences of which will affect both the Government
and the Company, and you will be held responsible for ignoring the cause.”890 With a
similar precautionary overtone the residents' envoy891 stressed the necessity of avoiding
the recurrence of the past “unpleasant crises,” such as the 1915 pipeline disruption or the
1922 refinery strike.892 In an act of defiance, residents and landlords sent the eviction
notices back to the Company along with a letter stipulating that, “…our affairs are handled
by the Khuzestan Agency [Karguzari] of the Imperial Government of Iran, and only the
latter has the authority to issue such notifications.”893
As a result of the public outrage, the Iranian Government and public opinion
became directly involved in the state of affairs at Abadan, and Abadan Township ReOrganization Scheme found its way into the center stage of the national politics.894 In
response to recurring petitions from the residents of Abadan regarding “maltreatment” of
Iranians by the Company, the Ministry of Public Works decided to institute a committee to
make “decisive arrangements” to alleviate the people’s grievances. A prominent resident
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of Abadan, who spearheaded the anti-Company campaign, was also appointed as the
Ministry’s agent at Abadan.895 The Ministry suggested that a commission consisting of the
inhabitants' representatives and the Company's delegates be formed at the Khuzestan
Agency (Karguzari) to arbitrate between the claimants and the Company and that until the
final verdict was reached no measure should be taken in terms of eviction of inhabitants or
demolition of houses.896 It was decided that the proposed commission be comprised of five
members, including representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Finance, Foreign
Affairs, and Public Works and the Company's delegate897—but no references were made
to the inhabitants or their representatives.898
Predicting an imminent defeat in the light of the increased involvement of the
Iranian Government in the conflict, the Company used different tricks to avoid the
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In a prompt reaction to the announcement, the general manager in Khorramshahr asked the A.P.O.C
representative in Tehran to officially protest against the “obstructive interference” by the Ministry of
Public Works in carrying out the works at Abadan. Company officials soon launched a campaign to avert
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Concession. Despite Company’s protest, the Ministry considered it necessary to examine the veracity of
complaints and find the truth by making inquiries from different sources. The Company always rejected
accusations as “unwarranted charges” and tried to convince the Iranian Government to disregard “wild
statements” made by “irresponsible busybodies” and get information about the developments at Abadan
only through formal channels, such as the Karguzar, the governor, and the Imperial Commissioner. T. L.
Jacks to W. C. F. Fairley, September 30th, 1924, Abadan Township Reconstruction 1921 to 1928, BP
Archives, ArcRef 68723
896
The Ministry of Public Works to W. C. F. Fairley, August 2, 1924 (11/5/1303); IRA: 240-15694
897
Karguzar to the Oil Department of the Ministry of Public Works, August 9, 1924 (18/5/1303); IRA: 24015694
898
In separate petitions to the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Interior, the inhabitants' representative
warned against the disastrous outcomes of any arbitration in Khuzestan, for “the influence of the
company is obvious, so is the authority of Sardar Aghdas [Sheikh Khaz'al].” He recommended that the
commission be held in Tehran where the company's delegate and the inhabitants' representatives were
present, and their claims be heard and judged by an independent jury. Mirza Mohamad Hadi Tehrani to
the Office of Prime Minister, August 10, 1924 (19/5/1303); IRA: 240-15694

354

proposed arbitration arrangement. T. L. Jacks, the General Manager, informed the
Karguzar that the commission was “unnecessary” on the grounds that the majority of
claimants will not eb able to produce legal proof in support of their rights to the land.
Rendering the majority of residents as squatters, this statement implied that only the
individuals with “valid” building permits or property deeds would be compensated and that
the Company was not willing to accept application for “ex gratia payments.”899 However,
the Karguzar reminded that in the Iranian culture occupation of land for a considerable
period of time would qualify people for compensation.900 The Minister of public Works
also argued that the practice of collecting rent and sanitation tax from people by the
Company implied that the occupants had a legal right to their properties.901

Khuzestan Revolution and Implementation of the First Phase
In the summer of 1924, when the political tension between the Iranian Government and the
Sheikh was escalating, the Company seized the opportunity to launch a grand demolition
program. 150 privately-owned houses and shops in the Native Village were earmarked for
evacuation and demolition within the period of three months. The process began
simultaneously in the Company’s Area and the Abadan Village by the Sheikh's forces. In
the first stage, 40 properties were identified as part of the immediate clearance area. Of
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these, 10 property owners accepted the compensation rates offered by the Company, while
the rest were “holding out in the hope of better terms.” 902 People who resisted and refused
to move out reportedly faced severe retribution or even imprisonment.903 Overall, 450
buildings were destroyed in the two neighborhoods.904 The displaced people in the Sheikh's
Bazaar did not receive any compensation. The Company, however, opted for a different
strategy. After leveling a large portion of the Native Village, the indemnification paid to
individuals ranged between five and fifteen percent of the properties' market value — the
amount still claimed by people to be more than 200,000 rupees.905 The Company's Iranian
secretary906 with the support of the Sheikh's delegates forced the property owners into
signing transaction agreements. Abadan’s supreme cleric (Mujtahid)907 and the Sheikh’s
son were also asked to approve the deals. It was even reported that fake deals were signed
without the presence of the actual owners.908
The Refinery Municipal Office handled the demolition work. The compensation
fees and other clearance expenses were paid from the Municipal Funds, the account in
which ground rents and sanitary taxes collected from the houses and shops in the Native
Village were deposited.909 For the demolition of properties, local coolies were recruited on
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“acquittance rolls.”

910

In the initial evaluation, company officials had assessed the

compensation, or what was termed the “equitable replacement value,” based on the
arbitrary estimate of “market value of building materials.” People were allowed to remove
the recoverable materials from their condemned buildings. In some cases, the Company
provided people with mats to expedite the process of evacuation.911 In addition, people
were assigned a plot for resettlement free of charge in the New Village (Shahr-i-Nau)
which was laid out by the Company to east of the Abadan Village (See Figure 4.15). The
site of the new village was owned by the Sheikh. However, the Company subdivided the
land, demarcated the plots, and laid out the grid of roads. No design restrictions we
enforced in the New Village. The Company also laid water lines, constructed dry latrines
and incinerators, and provided sweepers, whereby taking the sanitary matters of the village
in its own hands. It was hoped that the “easily accessible” water supply would motivate
displaced people to migrate to this new location. The new village was called Ahmadabad
after the Iranian Government takeover of Abadan.912
A group of displaced residents and Company employees, due to fear of prosecution
or losing their jobs, submitted to the unfair conditions. Some others desperately fled
Abadan and retreated in Bushire which was located outside the Sheikh's zone of influence.
In late October and early November 1924, as Prime Minister Reza Khan was gearing up
for the Khuzestan expedition to crack down on the Sheikh, telegraphic petitions from
displaced residents streamed to the Government departments and the media in Tehran,
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accusing the Company and the Sheikh of ill-treatment of people. For instance, a Kurdish
resident of Abadan claimed that the Company has pressured him to undersell his house.913
Another resident claimed that,” …the company has paid 40 tomans [120 rupees] for my
house, which I bought myself for 2000 tomans [6000 rupees], and acquired a consent letter
from my relative [on my behalf] by the use of torture.”914 In another case, a telegram signed
by six former inhabitants accused the Sheikh and the Company of forcible eviction of
tenants, obtaining properties by force, and imprisoning people who refused to cooperate.915
Some asked the Iranian Government to declare the transactions null, and warned that “if
you don't stop the Company, Abadan like the islands of Bahrain will separate from Iran.”916
There were also property owners who refused the compensations offered by the Company
for their houses. There were twenty-three houses owned by Iraqi Arabs and Jews from
Basra, 16 houses owned by Iranians, and two houses owned by Indians whose owners
refused the compensations offered by the Company.917
Petitions accusing the Company of misconduct appeared in the Tehran press, as
well. On November 3rd an inquiry made by the resident's Representative appeared in
Tajaddod (Modernity) Newspaper, giving an account of the situation at Abadan and
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chastising the Company for such behavior as forcible eviction of people from their
properties, confiscation of buildings, and destruction of homes before the expiry of
evacuation notices.918 The Representative had posed two questions to the Company:
“...first, which article of the Oil Concession justifies the confiscation of houses and shops
in a forcible and unwarranted manner? Second, why did [the Company] demolish the
buildings one month prior to the initial deadline indicated in the eviction notices?”919
William Fairley920, the acting representative of the A.P.O.C. in Tehran, strongly rejected
all the allegations, rendered them “unsubstantiated,” and urged the Ministry of Public
Works to publicly denounce such “hostile propaganda.”921 Fairley linked the outburst of
petitions to the residents' “anxiety” and lack of “clear understanding” of the mechanisms
by which Abadan Township Reorganization Scheme was to be implemented.922 He claimed
that no complaints were made in the course of the process after people were informed of
the economic benefits that the plan would offer.923 Regarding the confiscation charges,
Fairley maintained that all the houses and shops were bought under “mutual arrangement”
according to which the company “takes over the premises and makes the payment only
after the properties are evacuated.” Trying to gain the upper hand, Fairley criticized the
Ministry of Public Works for considering “unverified” petitions and reminded the ministry
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of Articles 3 and 14 of the Oil Concession specifying the guidelines for the land
acquisition924 and of the obligations of the Government to the undertaking of the
Concession, respectively.925
Removal of Sheikh Khaz'al from Khuzestan: A Turning Point
Reza Khan's expedition to Khuzestan — from November 1924 to January 1925 —which
forced Sheikh Khaz'al into submission, gave rise to a series of socio-political
transformations on the local and national levels.926 In the wake of the new political
environment in Khuzestan, the Ministry of Public Works revisited its old resolution and
pushed for the formation of a commission to reach a compromise between the Company
and the residents of Abadan along the lines set by “Article 3” of the Oil Concession.927 The
Company, however, did not intend to participate in any binding arbitration. Rather,
Company officials pursued the policy of “informal” and “friendly” collaboration with local
government agents. Moreover, a new transaction procedure was introduced under which
deed transfers required the approval of both the Military Governor and the Karguzar.928
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The Company insisted that all the deals in the past were fair and in the cases of disputed
transactions the Sheikh's delegates were to take the blame, and promised to deal fairly with
the remaining landlords and compensate them fully based on the real value of the
properties.

929

However, Company officials made no concessions to the claims of the

displaced residents. Since the Khuzestan Karguzar insisted that some people were forced
to undersell their properties, it was agreed that the Company's list of houses and the
amounts paid be compared against a similar list that the Karguzar was going to prepare.930
The Karguzar's roster turned out to be quite different from the list provided by the
Company. People claimed losses totaling 130,000 rupees, which was far greater than what
the Company was willing to pay. After hours of negotiations all agreed that an informal
“inquiry committee”— including the Khuzestan Karguzar, the British Deputy Consulate,
and a Company's representative—should be established at the Karguzari to meet with the
residents from the Company's Area and evaluate precisely the real damages the claimants
had incurred.931
A New Resolution: The Inquiry Committee
A three-member committee was formed at the Karguzar’s office in Khorramshahr and
began examining the complaints and compensation claims of people who had been evicted
from the Native Village. 139 displaced landlords were identified of whom 20 were Iraqi
and Indian subjects. People were asked to present any kind of legal proof describing the
buildings they used to occupy. In appraising the demolished structures, the committee
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relied on property deed (sanad) values. In the absence of sale documents, local masons
were consulted and the value of materials and labor for an average-sized room was taken
into consideration.932 A typical brick room was estimated at 175 rupees, and adobe and
clay rooms were priced at 88 rupees and 55 rupees, respectively.933 Overall, 97 individuals
were interviewed in seven weeks. Foreign subjects and Company employees, however, did
not show up in the hearings. The inquiry committee concluded that the Company owed the
displaced residents additional 18000 rupees (equal to 6000 tomans).934
At first, the Company agreed to amicably cooperate with the Karguzar and even to
revise the terms of agreements with the property-owners. However, this policy changed
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when the Karguzar announced the findings of the investigation.935 After almost one week,
T. L. Jacks, the joint general manager, claimed that Iranian landlords were not entitled to
additional compensation, and the Company could not be held responsible for any
misconduct on the Sheikh's behalf. Jacks also suggested that the dispute should be handled
in Tehran between the representative of the A.P.O.C. and Iranian officials.936 Accusing the
Karguzar of mixing personal interests with the investigation and of posing impediments to
prospective negotiations with Iranian property-owners, the Company used its political
leverage through the British Legation in Tehran to replace the Karguzar by another official
who would show more “consideration for the Company’s interests.”937 This campaign
eventually paid off and in July 1925 the new Karguzar was sent to Khorramshahr.938

Public Resilience in the Post-Khaz'al Era
Public opposition to the company's intervention in Abadan took momentum after the ouster
of the Sheikh. While the inquiry committee was meeting with the claimants at the
Khuzestan Karguzari, the Company began to recruit forces from the Military Governor to
collect “municipality” taxes from the remaining residents of the neighborhood.
Emboldened by the political reorganization in Khuzestan, the Iranian residents of the
Native Village stopped paying the monthly ground rents and sanitation taxes from January
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1925, which by May 1925 had amounted to ₹5000. People claimed that the Village was
within the Iranian territory and subject to the Iranian taxation law: “…Lands in Abadan are
public domain [now] and we pay taxes only to the Iranian Government or to the [Abadan]
Municipality. The company is not entitled to enjoy commercial interests other than oil in
Abadan.”939 With the introduction of property taxation (Mustaqilat) and other financial
reforms by the Iranian Government in 1925, residents of Abadan found solid excuse for
nonpayment of ground rents and sanitary taxes to the Company.940 The occupation of
public spaces, or bast, which was a traditional form of public protest in Iran, was also used
by the displaced. Having been informed of the Company's reluctance to pay extra
compensation, a group of former residents of Abadan took refuge at the telegraph house in
Khorramshahr, urging the Government to intervene.941 Claimants agreed to end their
occupation only when the new Karguzar made a promise to resume negotiations with the
Company on the following day.942 People also held daily demonstrations in front of the
Khuzestan Agency (Karguzari) and questioned the new Karguzar about their claims. There
were also reports of several attacks on British subjects in Abadan.943 Meanwhile, the
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residents' Representative kept pressing the Ministry of Public Works about the outcomes
of the inquiry committee.944
Tehran Commission
On the 2nd of August 1925 a new commission convened in Tehran to settle the tax and
compensation disputes in Abadan. It was comprised of F. S. Greenhouse, the acting
Company Representative in Tehran, Taimurtash, the Minister of Public Works, and the
representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior. As illustrated by the
contradictory reports given by British and Iranian participants, the commission could not
help eliminate the divergent views over the critical issues. According to F. S. Greenhouse,
the commission acknowledged that certain houses in the Company's Area had to be
demolished on grounds of public health concerns and that no further inquiries were deemed
necessary in the case of houses already been paid for and destroyed.945
The Ministry of Public Works, however, stressed the importance of finding a
solution to the claims of the displaced people as stipulated under “Article 3” of the Oil
Concession.946 Furthermore, the committee decided that the Military Governor should
consider the arguments of both sides and then propose a reconciliatory plan to soothe the
public resentment.947 In the case of the tax dispute, Greenhouse claimed, it was agreed that
the collected money was spent on the sanitary needs of the Native Village and the
commission recommended that the existing charges be continued, and in the case of refusal
on the part of residents, a commissionaire be provided by the Military Governor to collect
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the taxes.948 The Minister of Public Works, however, offered a different understanding of
the manner in which the meeting framed the tax dispute. Taimurtash stipulated that the
Company had to demonstrate documentary proof of ownership of the lands in the Native
Village before the representatives of the Military Governor begin collecting the ground
rents. As for the sanitary charges, the Company was required to report to the Ministries of
Interior and Public Works the total sanitary expenses of the neighborhood as well as the
fair share of the local residents to be collected by government commissionaires.949
Doom of the Petitions and the Final Phase of Demolition
Although the Ministry of Public Works formally briefed the ministries of Foreign Affairs
and War about the outcomes of the Tehran commission950, it is unclear why the Military
Governor of Khuzestan failed to work on a reconciliatory scheme—as stipulated by the
resolution. The case resurfaced when the new Minister of Public Works replaced
Taimurtash, who following the ascension of the new Monarch to the throne was promoted
to the Ministry of Court. The fact that following the Tehran commission no dossier existed
in the archives of the Ministry of Public Works on the final resolution of the disputes even
caused confusion for the commissionaire who was preparing a report on the case, leading
him to mistakenly assume that “Taimurtash has concluded the case and the complaints
were thoroughly dealt with.”951
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With the assistance of the new Karguzar and the Military Governor, the Company
proceeded “smoothly” and “satisfactorily” with the demolition of the Native Village.
Furthermore, thanks to the Tehran negotiations, the question of reviewing the claims and
compensations was technically shelved forever. Between August 1924 and March 1925, in
addition to 6 artisan blocks, 30 percent of the Company’s Village was leveled. The
compensation paid to owners amounted to more than ₹27,500.952 On average, 20 structures
were purchased and demolished per week. As of September 1925, almost 75 percent of the
village was demolished at a total cost of ₹175,000. It was estimated that a further
expenditure of ₹60,000 was required to compensate the owners of the remaining structures
including 121 houses, 7 masonry shops, and 42 cabin shops.953
In early 1926, the residents' Representative sought to seize the window of
opportunity opened up by the establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty and the changes in the
Ministry of Public Works. Urging the new Minister to review the “thick dossier” on the
case of conflicts in Abadan, the Representative called for follow-up actions on the
compensation scheme recommended by the inquiry committee. The Representative
maintained that due to the weakness of the Qajars the residents’ total losses that amounted
to 140000 rupees were reduced to 24000 Rupees.954 In response to the inquiry of the
Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of War claimed that no record about the case of
disputes existed in their archives, and as such no order was given to the Governor of
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Khuzestan to take actions.955 In the following months dozens of petitions were lodged by
the residents’ Representative to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Public Works
regarding the claims of the residents of Abadan which as archives show yielded no results.
On the last day of December 1927, the Representative pleaded Reza Shah to help break the
deadlock: “the remaining buildings on the western side of the town [in the Native Village]
have not been purchased by the Company and were left in the state of abandonment…since
petitions achieved no results, people have asked the Government to award them the
ownership of their properties…so that no one would prohibit them from trading or
renovating the buildings.”956 When asked about the residents' claims, the A.P.O.C.
representative in Tehran suggested that the Ministry of Public works should discuss the
matter with the local government authorities in Khorramshahr who approved the
demolition of huts, as they were viewed as a source of infectious diseases, and also assisted
with the compensation scheme. “But it is of course difficult to consider claims submitted
some years after all claims have been settled,” the representative stipulated.957
4.4.2 Improvements to Abadan Town
Since the early 1920s, the Company developed plans to relocate the entire Abadan Village
to a new site in the middle of the island within a safe distance from the Refinery. Such
schemes looked implausible due to the high rebuilding costs and the initial compensation
rates estimated for more than 500 mat huts. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the
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Sheikh derived large amounts of tax revenue from the Bazaar and different attempts by the
Company to take it over from him were not successful. In the end, the Managing Director
decided that instead of rebuilding the Abadan Village, the Company should take charge of
its sanitation.958
Not only did Company officials view the Abadan Village as a public health threat,
they were also worried about the Village’s fast expansion in every direction, in particular
towards the Central Stores and the Bawarda Tank Farm. The Company’s land acquisition
strategy in the 1920s was also aimed at containing the Village within its existing limits.
The proximity of the Sheikh’s Village to the Refinery was also regarded by Company
medical officials as a risk factor in spreading epidemics. Therefore, various growth
management strategies were contemplated to protect the oil establishment. Moreover, the
increased Bazaar prices were blamed for the mounting workforce discontents and the
demands for higher wages. In the wake of the 1923 epidemics, drastic reforms were
prepared to protect the Refinery against the “incursion” of the Abadan Village. Inspired by
the colonial conventions, the Chief Medical Officer suggested that a wall be constructed
between the Abadan Village and the Company’s territory.959
The idea of using a physical barrier between the Refinery Area and the Abadan
Village morphed into a plan to create an open buffer zone between the two entities. A
tentative agreement was made between the Resident Director and the Sheikh, whereby the
Company agreed to design a model township south of the Abadan Village and to lay out
major roads. Plans were also developed to build “standard” housing units for the new
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village at the Sheikh’s expense.960 In return, the Sheikh agreed to tear down ramshackle
shops and buildings in the Abadan Village and remove the bazaar to the new location. He
intended to turn the new township into an Arab Village, similar to a settlement that he had
laid out in Ahwaz a few years earlier.961 As part of this arrangement, the Company had
planned to acquire the cleared land in the Abadan Village and use it as a “neutral zone” or
“safety zone.”962 Palliative schemes were also developed to improve public health in the
Abadan Village. For instance, the Sheikh agreed to allocate ₹1000 per month to the Abadan
Municipality for enhancing sanitary conditions and to hand over the management of public
health in the Village to the Company.963 Similar to the Native Village, a European Sanitary
Inspector was appointed to the Abadan Village.964
Drawing on these efforts, Abadan Township Reorganization Scheme recommended
several improvements to Abadan Town. Tackling overcrowding was one of the tools that
Temple and Wittet proposed to check the outbreak of epidemics and enhance public health
at Abadan Town. The colonial town planners proposed that no more than 10 houses per
acre should be allowed in the town. As a result, Abadan Town had to grow outward in
specified directions.965 As early as August 1924, evacuations were carried out by order of
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the Sheikh as part of the plans to improve sanitary conditions in the Town. 966 Older
cemeteries within Abadan Town were closed and existing cemeteries, such as the Christian
cemetery, were raised two feet to allow for efficient drainage. No more burials were
allowed within the limits of Abadan Town.967 Furthermore, Abadan’s foreshore within 30
yards of the river was cleared, and hutments and cattle were removed from this area.968 The
other urban reforms introduced in Abadan Town included a new model market, a “modern”
municipality, a new township, road widening, and new urban infrastructure. As I will
discuss in this section, interventions in Abadan Town became a political venue on which
power struggle over oil manifested itself.

4.4.2.1 Model Bazaar.

As discussed earlier, the Omnibus Scheme called for the

reorganization of the Abadan Bazaar. As Figure 4.15 illustrates, the site of the new bazaar
was selected with a view to diverging Abadan’s center of gravity from the “insanitary lower
section of the Sheikh’s Village” to a site close to the new road connecting the “model”
villages to the Refinery’s new gate. For the Company such an urban artifact, designed for
the sale of “foodstuffs,” was “as important as the provision of a good water supply.”969 The
new bazaar was deemed necessary for relieving congestion, improving sanitation, control
of prices, and prevention of profiteering in the town. Moreover, the new bazaar was also
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conceptualized as a model market aimed at socializing the locales into consumption culture
and modern ways of life. 970
In the beginning, the bazaar project was part of a larger sanitation package
developed in partnership with the Sheikh. As part of the land purchase agreement between
the Sheikh and the Company in March 1924, the former party agreed to spend £11,000 on
the construction of the new bazaar and other sanitary improvements to the Abadan Village.
In return, the Company agreed to contribute £3,000 to the construction of the bazaar and
spend up to £100 per month on the sanitation efforts at Abadan. The Company also agreed
to supply purified water to the village, provide street lighting, and surface the major
roads.971 Although by October 1924 the site designated for the bazaar had been leveled by
the Sheikh administration and the construction materials were ordered by the Company,
the political restructuring in Khuzestan put the project on hold.972 The undertaking was
further delayed as Company officials decided to wait until the demolition and
compensation disputes were completely resolved.973
In late summer 1925, the bazaar project returned to the Company's political agenda
— perhaps for several reasons. First and foremost, the rearrangement of the food supply
system in Abadan seemed inevitable in the wake of the massive demolition of shops and
the disruption of the old monopoly system under the Sheikh administration. In fact,
Company officials feared that the acute shortage of major food staples in winter could
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cause further labor discontent and agitation in Abadan.974 Moreover, cost of living and rate
of manual labor were also believed to be tied to the bazaar prices. Company officials hoped
that the transfer of power and the abolition of monopolies would lower the cost of living
for Indians and local employees and eventually cut the rate of coolie labor. In June 1925,
only a few months after the introduction of the new regime in Khuzestan, food prices at
Abadan dropped to a level equal to the rates at other major cities in the region. Despite a
momentary decrease in food prices, new factors began to counterbalance the changes. For
instance, in the early 1925, the Ministry of Finance introduced a five-percent property tax
at Abadan. At the same time, the Iranian Parliament passed a new law authorizing the
monopoly of tea and sugar by the Central Government.975 At the local level, factors such
as crops failure, military looting, and Arab tribal disturbances following the Sheikh’s
removal to Tehran as well as new dates taxation were reported to have had adverse impacts
on food costs.976
Under these circumstances, the Company decided to get permission from the
Iranian Government to build the new bazaar on its own initiative. However, the application
for the construction of the bazaar was overshadowed by the politics and the deep public
resentment surrounding the demolition and rebuilding of Abadan and turned into another
contentious urban reform program. In August 1925, Greenhouse, the Acting
Representative of the Company in Tehran, wrote to Taimurtash, Minister of Public Works,
stressing the necessity of erecting a “big new bazaar” before the onset of the cold weather,
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when “the danger from diseases would pose serious consequences.”977 He also stressed the
urgency for a bazaar in light of constant public requests, suggesting that the Anglo-Persian
was willing to undertake the project at its own expense on conditions to be mutually
arranged between the Iranian Government and the Company.978 To retain a total control
over the management of the new market, Company officials considered setting regulations
on sanitation, overcrowding, types of businesses, and provision of foodstuffs. Furthermore,
it was decided to charge rentals at ten percent on capital expenditure and grant “first
refusal” to the shopkeepers displaced from the old bazaar.979
The Company also submitted to the Ministry of Public Works a plan and a proposal
for the construction of the new bazaar.980 As a Company propagandist put it, the new
market was designed as “solidly built rows of shops with open fronts, of the general
[Iranian] type” and marked “a great advance, in solidarity and cleanliness, on ramshackle,
makeshift bazaar buildings frequently to be met with in the East.”981 The architecture of
the new market contrasted with the configuration of the old Abadan Bazaar. As Figure 4.25
shows, the proposed market featured a grid of fifty-foot-wide roads and forty-foot-wide
alleys and consisted of eight blocks of shops. The bazaar was designed based on the
sanitary principles in the colonial setting that ensured the provision of air, light, water, and
“pucka” drainage. Unlike the “ill-ventilated and dark” alleys in the old bazaar, the new
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bazaar compound was surrounded by open land on all sides to facilitate the flow of air and
maximize the penetration of sun light. Inspired by traditional Iranian bazaars, each block
was comprised of a central “covered way” lined with two rows of shops. Each shop
included a rear yard facing an alley. As in the model villages, the alleys functioned as
conduits of sanitation infrastructure. In the new market, each alley accommodated a tenseat latrine on one end and washing facilities on the other. It also accommodated surface
drains which connected to the drainage channels that ran around the bazaar compound. In
order to facilitate supervision and maximize air circulation, the meat, vegetable, and
poultry shops were located in separate stalls at the southern end of the market.982

Figure 4.25 Initial site plan of the “model” bazaar in Abadan Town. Inspired by the
colonial practices, the new market was designed to maximize circulation of air and
facilitate sunlight penetration. It also connected to the sanitation infrastructure network,
such as water, surface drainage, and waste disposal systems, which were provided for
Abadan Town.
Source: Iranian National Archives, IRA: 240-29099
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Negotiations began between the Company Representative in Tehran and the
Ministry of Public Works to develop a contractual agreement. Greenhouse tried to assure
the Minister of Public Works that the Company had no vested interest in the bazaar, yet
wished to help people and provide accommodation for the “poorer classes of shopkeepers
including meat, fish, and vegetable sellers.”983 Based on the recommendation of the
Minister of Public Works, the Iranian Council of Ministers passed a ruling on October 5,
1925, whereby granting the Company the permission to construct the new bazaar under
specific circumstances.984 For instance, the land was considered state ground, and the
Company was required to pay ground rent and Mustaqallat (property) taxes to the Iranian
Government; the architectural and technical documents for the bazaar compound and the
shops were to be approved by the Military Governor; and, the Company was required to
devise a consistent system of monthly rental for the new shops which would not exceed
seven percent profit on capital expenditure.985
The Representative of the Company called for modifying some of the articles,
which in his views conflicted with the Oil Concession, and demanded clarification on the
financial terms.986 Other Company officials in London and Khorramshahr regarded the
Cabinet Ruling provisions unacceptable, threatening to abandon the scheme altogether.987
The Minister of Public Works agreed to revise some articles. For instance, since the land
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was State property (Khaleseh), the Minister agreed to grant it to the Company free of
charge. Moreover, he accepted to increase the allowable interest on expenditure to eight
percent, and the tenants were required to pay for electricity, water supply, and sanitation
fees. 988
The Council of Ministers discussed the revised agreement in their first meeting
following the coronation of Reza Shah on December 15, 1925. Prime Minister Ghavam
suggested that the new conditions in the agreement be approved by Arthur Millspaugh989,
the Administrator General of Finances.990 In particular, the Ministry of Finance was sked
to appraise the commercial value of the land that the Company was seeking to acquire free
of charge.991 In August 1926 a delegation from the Ministry of Finance was dispatched to
Khuzestan to investigate firsthand the activities of the Company in both Masjid-i-Sulaiman
and Abadan. Following the visit to the region, the chief of the commission992 stipulated
that per Article 3 of the Oil Concession the Company was not entitled to gratuitously be
granted public domain lands for economic purposes other than exploitation of oil.993
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Moreover, the sense of mistrust surrounding the Company's activities in Abadan
overshadowed the bazaar project. Local shopkeepers viewed the rent calculation formula
proposed by the Company with suspicion. Faced with fierce public opposition, Company
and Iranian officials were forced to find alternative paths to build the new market. In early
January 1926, the office of the A.P.O.C. in Khorramshahr and the Provincial Director of
Finance in Khuzestan began to seek applications from potential local developers.994
Eventually, Mirza Hussein Movaqar Bushiri, a local merchant, notable, and Parliament
Deputy for Abadan, approached the Provincial Director of Finance with a proposal to build
the new bazaar at Abadan. The local merchant had planned to build the bazaar in four
phases. The Provincial Director of Finance, however, rejected the proposal, insisting that
the new market should be built in its entirety at once. Encountering a new deadlock in the
execution of the bazaar project, the Company decided to finance almost half the cost of the
project estimated approximately at ₹75,000 (equal to £5600). The Company also withdrew
its application to build the bazaar on its own right.995
In August 1926, the Public Domain Administration issued an order authorizing
Mirza Hossein Movaqar to take steps for erection of the new market.996 However, the
obscurities surrounding the content of the development proposal and the form of finance
raised concerns among Iranian officials. For instance, Mirza Movaqar agreed to build the
bazaar based on the Company's proposed plan, while keeping the rents at the “present”
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rates. The Director of Internal Revenues997 argued that unlike the initial agreement with
the Company “the mechanism of rent calculation vis-à-vis the capital expended is not clear
in Movaghar's proposal.” This was problematic, the Director maintained, because “rents of
shops in Abadan could get as high as twenty-five Tomans per month.”998 Eventually, Mirza
Muvaqar succeeded in securing the permit from the Government to build the new bazaar
that was initially conceived by the Company. In October 1926 the second block of the
bazaar was under construction.999
4.4.2.2 The Creeks. In the midst of the negotiations with the Iranian Government
regarding the new bazaar, the Company began to dig a canal across the recently cleared
land on the northwestern end of the Abadan Village.1000 As discussed in the previous
section, this canal was to serve as an element of the cordon sanitaire or the “safety zone”
separating the Abadan Village from the oil establishment. This undertaking was not
without a precedent in Abadan. In fact, the Company had built a similar creek in spring
1924 on the southern side of the Abadan Village next to its major depot, Central Stores
Area. This straight conduit, which came to be known as the Central Stores Creek, was 300
cubits1001 (450 feet) in length and ran perpendicular to the Shatt. At high tides, the Shatt
would flow into the Creek, enabling sailboats to navigate through it and deliver goods along
the western border of the Central Stores Area.1002 In other words, this waterway served as
a complementary transportation mode to a network of railroads crisscrossing the Central
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Stores Area. Perhaps Central Stores Creek was also considered a technical solution to the
problem of the island's natural drainage system which in the company's view was
dysfunctional due to the town's position on lowlands.1003 Figure 4.26 shows how the
construction of this canal and the creek dredged in 1925 on the northern side curtailed the
lateral expansion of the Abadan Village and Bazaar and delineated the southern and
northern edges of the Village.

Figure 4.26 Formation of the northern and southern edges of Abadan Town by the
creeks. Left: Map of Abadan with the southern creek under construction in 1924. As the
map shows, this watercourse was labeled as “New Cut.” Right: Map of Abadan with the
northern and southern creeks completed in 1931.
(Source: British Library)

Soon after the Company launched the construction of the second canal in November
1925, it became evident that the projected course of the conduit — which was to replace a
wall temporarily demarcating a segment of the Company's eastern border and the Abadan
Village — would coincide with a row of makeshift structures that, in the light of the 1924

1003

T. L. Jacks to the Karguzar, 20 August 1924; IRA: 240-15694

380

demolition work, had mushroomed on the western periphery of the Village. The builders
of these huts and shops were a group of displaced residents from the Company's bazaar
who due to the lack of better options had resettled along a strip of land in an area known
as Sibeh Mohammad. T. L. Jacks, the Company General Manager, called on the Ministry
of Interior and the Military Governor of Abadan to forbid the growth of such settlements
and prohibit the issuance of building permits unless they could make sure that the given
property was not in the Company's territory. To this end, the Company appointed a survey
engineer to collaborate with Iranian officials and demarcate the boundary between the
Company's properties and the Abadan Village. The General Manager also warned that the
structures erected in that area should be removed, for “the vibration from the mechanical
equipment used to widen and deepen the creek might cause physical and mortal damages
to these shaky settlements…”1004
In winter 1927, only after the construction of the northern creek and its suspension
bridge was completed did Iranian officials begin to speculate about the implications of the
canal projects for the Abadan Village. Criticizing the waterways for blocking the growth
of the town and restraining its inhabitants, the Karguzar accused the Company of
undertaking the canals without due permission from the Iranian Government and of
funding the construction from Iran's oil royalties.1005 The Chief of the Abadan Municipality
also expressed his disapproval of the creeks for making the town with 25,000 inhabitants
restricted and overcrowded. The canals, the Municipality Chief stated, coupled with the
Company's policy of prohibiting people from settling beyond the waterways had caused
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fierce competition for land inside the town.1006 Calling for the resettlement of the
population beyond the existing city proper, the Municipality Chief urged that the
Company's further appropriation of land in Abadan should be stopped.1007 The Provincial
Director of Finance, however, suggested that the land lying to the east of the town was not
“owned” by the Company, and was available for the future growth of Abadan Town.1008
4.4.2.3 Re-Organization of the Abadan Municipality.

The practice of tax collection

by the Company motivated Iranian officials to push for the establishment of an organized
municipality1009 in Abadan. This idea was first introduced in July 1925 by the Minister of
Public Works Abdolhussein Taimurtash through a letter to the Minister of Interior:”…the
money, which is charged [by the Company] as sanitary and land taxes […] and spent on
the cleaning and the hygiene of Abadan, is actually the municipality tax which due to the
lack of a functioning municipality is collected and consumed by the Company.”1010 The
Ministry of Interior called on the Military Governor of Khuzestan to initiate a plan for the
reorganization of the Abadan municipality. In October 1925, a committee of local officials
created a structure for a municipality of fifty-four staff with a monthly budget of 750
tomans (7500 krans).1011 The committee put the Abadan Municipality in charge of the
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maintenance of sanitation, drainage, and public health in Abadan Town and other
indigenous villages, including Ahmadabad (Shahr-i-Nau) and Braim. A budgetary chart
was also drawn up for the illumination, sanitation, and administrative departments. The
illumination department was responsible for the upkeep of 250 kerosene-lit street lamps
across the town and surrounding villages.1012 The sanitation department, the largest in
terms of the number of employees and the assigned budget, was administered by a medical
doctor, for whom a monthly salary of 100 tomans was proposed. 1013 The proposal for the
reorganization of the Abadan Municipality and the appointment of an Iranian medical
doctor 1014 to the head of the Sanitation Department at the Abadan Municipality coincided
with the appointment of provincial medical officers by the Iranian Government. This policy
was the direct reaction to the mounting concerns regarding the public health status across
the country at the time.1015
Instituting a proper municipality along “modern lines” at Abadan Town was among
the objectives of Abadan Township Reorganization Scheme. In May 1926, Company
officials complained to Iranian authorities that the municipality had failed to reorganize its
structure and secure the required budget to administer a booming town of 25,000. The
Chief Medical Officer regarded the unskilled labor and the population of Abadan Town as
the “crux” of hygienic challenges and called for securing the cooperation of the Iranian
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authorities to check the spread of epidemics.1016 To this end, the Company Resident
Director approached the Iranian Government Treasurer-General to ask for a special budget
for the Abadan Municipality. He also called for the reorganization of the municipality
“with strict regulations for the maintenance of public health in the direction of housing,
lighting, drainage, and the disposal of refuse.” In fact, like other towns in Iran, Abadan
drew its main revenues from Navaghel Taxes — duties levied on the means of
transportation per the Municipality Act of 1907.1017 However, Abadan by 1926 had become
so extensive that these revenue sources could not cover all the expenses required for
sanitation and upkeep of the town. 1018 In tandem with the political restructuring across the
country and the increased demand for popular municipality, a new Municipality Bill was
proposed by a group of deputies in the Majles. The bill, which was passed in May 1930,
gave the administration of municipal affairs to elected bodies, known as Municipal
Councils. The bill included provisions that not only addressed urban issues related to
sanitation but also allowed Municipal Councils to levy taxation, whereby ensuring the
financial independence of municipalities. The proposed taxes included Occupation Tax, a
ten-percent increase in property tax, and additional shares of the already existing Road Tax
(Navaghel).1019
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Concerned with the recurrence of epidemics and doubtful about the fate of the New
Municipality Bill, the Company proposed to offer financial and technical supports to help
improve public health in Abadan Town. For instance, Company officials offered to
contribute £2,000 to the yearly budget of the municipality (Baladiyeh) until the institution
would become a self-sufficient entity. In fact, by providing this “subvention,” the Company
hoped it would be relieved from larger expenses, including the obligation of provision of
housing to the Iranian unskilled labor. The “subvention,” however, was contingent upon
covering the balance of the budget by the Iranian Government, which was approximately
£3700. The Company also suggested to build public latrines and incinerators free of
charge, provide and manage refuse bins, and provide fire service and quarantine services
in case of outbreaks.1020 Company officials also prepared a new budget for the Abadan
Municipality and proposed a list of required personnel, facilities, and responsibilities. The
Company’s proposed structure for the Abadan Municipality consisted of five departments:
administration, sanitation, public health, lighting, and building.1021 Moreover, one of the
Company’s Sanitary Inspectors, an Indian Muslim, was assigned to the Abadan

1020

A. T. Wilson to The Ministry of Interior, May 7th, 1926. Abadan Township Reconstruction 1921 to 1928,
BP Archives, ArcRef 68723
1021
The administration department consisted of the Chief of the Municipality, an accountant, a secretary,
a general inspector, an inspector for slaughterhouse and butcheries, an inspector for food staples, a
servant, and two farrashes (errand-runners). The Sanitation Department consisted of a deputy sweeper,
thirty sweepers for Abadan Town, six sweepers for the Ahmadabad village, six sweepers for the Braim
Village, four sweepers for public latrines, and four coachmen. The lighting department consisted of two
lightmen for Abadan Town, two lightmen for the Ahmadabad Village, and one lightman for the Braim
Village. The Public Health department consisted of one physician, two nurses, and one compounder
(pharmacist). The building department consisted of one head mason. A. T. Wilson to The Ministry of
Interior, “Proposed Budget for the Abadan Municipality,” May 7th, 1926. Abadan Township Reconstruction
1921 to 1928, BP Archives, ArcRef 68723

385

Municipality. The Inspector had the same authority in Abadan Town as did the Refinery
Sanitary Department in the Company’s territory.1022
However, the proposed municipality budget and organization chart were not
immediately approved by the Iranian Government. In fact, government officials treated the
Company’s proposed contribution according to paragraph 13 of Article 70 of the
Municipality Act which authorized “subscriptions” under certain circumstances. To meet
the requirements of the law, a special commission, comprised of representatives of the
ministries of the Interior Affairs and Finance, was formed to scrutinize the suggestions
proposed by the Company. Acknowledging the Company’s interest in enhancing public
health and sanitation at Abadan, the commission approved the British enterprise’s technical
support provided that all the public facilities built by the Company be handed over to the
Abadan Municipality. The Commission also outlined the mechanism by which the
Company could contribute to the Abadan Municipality’s budget. This had to be paid to the
Provincial Revenue Department through a designated subscription account.1023 Following
this guideline, the provincial Director of Finance approved a temporary budget for Abadan
Town and an account was established at the Imperial Bank of Persia for the disbursement
of money.1024 The Company’s contribution was spent on different urban projects. For
instance, in 1928, it was spent on three projects: the dead ablution place, the
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slaughterhouse, and the metaling of the taxi road between the petrol filing station and No.9
Jetty. 1025
4.4.2.4 Beautification of the Town: The Case of New Streets
“The Company destroyed a large part of Abadan Town two years ago…and after lodging
dozens of petitions and complaints [the Company] refused to pay even a penny as
compensation for the demolished houses…Now under the pretense of laying out new
streets1026 the Company aims to destroy another section of Abadan and make a handful of
miserable people displaced and desperate…”1027
The Omnibus Scheme called for eliminating the “tortuous gulleys” and widening and
straightening of roads and alleys in Abadan Town in order to facilitate circulation of air
and penetration of sun light.1028 In 1924, certain thoroughfares in Abadan Town were
opened up by the Sheikh Administration.1029 In 1925, the Company designed two new
roads in Abadan Town under the guise of enhancing public health. The first road was 60
feet wide, running parallel to Abadan’s main street and old bazaar road—which was called
Khiaban-i-Pahlavi, or Rah-i-Pahlavi under the new regime. The second proposed road
would run perpendicular to the first one and terminate in the old bazaar road. In the words
of the Refinery Assistant General Manager, the two proposed roads were mainly designed
to “clear very congested and insanitary areas” in Abadan Town. Moreover, the first road
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was intended to shorten the route between two sections of the oil establishment, namely
the Refinery and the Bawarda Tank Farm, and decrease the transportation costs for the
Company. The construction of the new roads became a major conversation topic in Abadan
in the years 1926-1927 and turned into another controversial urban reform program.
However, unlike previous programs, the Company shrewdly managed to throw this urban
renewal project into the realm of local politics and rivalry. As a result, the road building
project morphed into a major tug of war among local Iranian officials.
In the midst of the negotiations with the Iranian Government regarding the new
bazaar, and while the construction of the northern creek was underway, rumors spread
about cutting a street through Abadan Town. Unlike the A.P.O.C.'s former urban reforms
in Abadan, public opinion was divided on this so-called city-beautification scheme.1030 The
disagreement over this project not only demonstrates a shift in the town's socio-political
structure; it also signifies how oil development framed larger quarrels between two major
forces in the Iranian society: one that advocated for westernizing reforms and one that was
more interested in retaining the status quo. Greeting the project with anguish and suspicion,
Abadan's heads of guilds and merchants did not hesitate to break the news to the capital. A
telegraphic petition was lodged on October 4, 1926, from Bushire not only to government
and parliamentary officials but also to the Tehran press. The local traders and businessmen
were convinced that the Company was trying to strip “urbanity”1031 off Abadan which, in
their view, could have had a devastating impact on the town and its economic vitality.1032
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The protestors also criticized the Central Government for granting to the Company 4 pieces
of land in Abadan which reportedly were required for construction of a cemetery, a
hospital, a park, and new public recreation spaces. 1033
Soon after calling upon the Military Governor of Khuzestan to investigate the case,
the Ministry of Interior received a new telegraphic petition in support of the project.
Dispatched from Khorramshahr, the petition was signed by a group of inhabitants
comprised mainly of artisans who arguably were either directly or indirectly linked to the
Company. In providing a strong counterargument to the first petition, the artisan faction
went beyond the condemnation of Abadan's bazaar-based circle, calling the opponents of
the scheme “enemies of national sovereignty…who do not want to see the prosperity of
Abadan… those who make fake claims on behalf of other inhabitants.” Denouncing the
accusations made against the Company in the first petition, petitioners claimed that the
construction of the new street would be carried out under the joint auspices of a
municipality commission, the provincial Government, and other “dignitaries,” and would
bring “salvation, progress, and prosperity” to the town. The proponents of the project also
maintained that a “wide street,” which would be named after the new monarch and funded
by the subsidies of the Ministries of Finance and Interior, was to replace a handful of “mud
huts” and “straw shacks.” Moreover, the supporters claimed that “no one would be forcibly
displaced,” that a local mason appointed by the landlords would appraise the structures,
and that a “good” location free of charge would be provided to the people.1034
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The records from the Iranian National Archives include a third letter, signed by an
unknown group of people who identified themselves as Inhabitants of Abadan and
probably engaged in the draft of the first petition. Inhabitants of Abadan accused two local
outcasts, whose names among others appeared under the second petition1035, of
orchestrating the campaign of support for the street project. Inhabitants of Abadan claimed
that the two men, acting as secret agents of the Company, began negotiations with the
landlords, disseminated disinformation, and crafted a fake statement on behalf of the
inhabitants. Inhabitants of Abadan believed that the Company was the real mastermind
behind the project, and that it bought off the local officials in the same way as it bribed the
former governor of Abadan and “wreaked havoc on the residents' lives.” Inhabitants of
Abadan even offered some specifics about the bribery of officials, maintaining that of a
total amount of £2800 assigned by the Company for the destruction of houses, £1800 would
be paid to the Military Government of Khuzestan and £1000 would be divided between the
Chief of the Municipality and the Provincial Director of Finance.1036
Similarly, Government officials also did not share the same view on the urban
renewal project. While the Karguzar opposed the project, the Military Governor of
Khuzestan was in favor of it. Endorsing the statements of “notables” and “dignitaries” in
the second petition, the Military Governor of Khuzestan also rejected what he termed the
“groundless” accusations made in the first “spurious” petition, including the contention
regarding the involvement of the Company in the street project. Nevertheless, the Governor
confessed that the Company agreed to offer technical assistance upon request. While
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promising to offer fair compensation to individuals “one-by-one,” the Governor also stated
that the “filthy” huts and mud houses would give way to an “honorable” street.1037
With repeated representations at different ministries at Tehran, the Company could
secure the approval of the Iranian Government. For instance, the Ministry of Interior
favored the street project and the demolition of mud huts— though with the owners'
consent. The Ministry was convinced that the cleaning of streets and sanitation of the town
was an imperative for controlling contagious diseases in Abadan.1038 The Ministry of
Public Works also supported the project on condition that the municipality carried out the
whole undertaking and the Company only partook in logistics and technical aspects.1039
The proposed urban renewal project in Abadan resonated with most Iranian officials as it
echoed the broader urban modernization schemes being carried out by the Iranian
Government in major cities and towns across the country. The state-led urban renewal
policy involved overlaying new urban layouts and street patterns on traditional city centers,
expanding older cities, and constructing new ones. The Central Government provided
detailed guidelines and standards for new urban spaces, such as streets (khiaban) and
squares (maydan), and for remodeled sections of cities across the country.1040 When John
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Cadman, Chairman of the Company, visited Tehran in February 1929, he was impressed
with “the great development” with road-making that had taken place in the capital since
his last visit in 1927.1041
Although Tehran finally approved the street project in Abadan, local authorities,
fearing public backlash, were hesitant to carry out the work.1042 In order to address the
concerns of inhabitants, the Ministry of Public Works suggested that a commission
including the representatives of different government departments be formed to monitor
the process of land acquisition.1043 Eventually, the Provincial Administration Council was
established under the auspices of the Military Governor of Khuzestan to “meticulously deal
with pricing of properties” and ensure that landlords receive just treatment.1044 The project
expenses were to be divided between the Company and the Abadan Municipality. The
Company agreed to cover fifty percent of the total compensation and construction costs
estimated to be around 64,000 krans and also to provide financial assistance to the
Municipality in the form of a six-month zero-interest loan in the amount of 13,000 krans.
The Abadan Municipality was to incur the remainder of the estimated expenses.1045
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Despite public protests, the Abadan Municipality executed the first road project,
which was described by a Company official as a “fait accompli.”1046 It entailed demolition
of 110 sarifas, 110 mud huts, 93 sun-dried brick houses, and 3 burnt brick houses. By
September 1927 the demolition of the structures and construction of the road was
completed, only a bridge over the Arusiyeh Canal and surfacing the road remained to be
done. The work was entirely carried out by the Abadan Municipality with the support of
the Company’s Iranian engineering staff.1047 The second road connecting the new road to
the Main Street was constructed in the following year and surfaced with macadam. To
enhance the sanitary conditions, the bazaar roads in Abadan Town were covered with fuel
oil.1048 A new extension was made to the Ahmadabad Village to accommodate the residents
displaced by the proposed roads. The Company laid out plots and roads with water
fountains to facilitate the process of resettlement.1049
4.4.3 Model Villages for Manual Laborers
By the end of the 1920s, the population of Abadan exponentially grew and reached near
the neighborhood of 70,000. Out of approximately 12,500 third-class salaried employees,
2,500 were accommodated in Abadan Township, namely the Artisans’ Village and the
Clerks’ Village, with the rest living in Abadan Town, in the Ahmadabad Village, and in a
group of smaller villages around the Refinery. With the exception of Abadan Township,
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all these settlements were under the jurisdiction of the Abadan Municipality and fell
beyond the Company’s direct control. As discussed earlier, in 1924, the Company assumed
responsibility to accommodate Iranian clerks and artisans. However, Company officials
considered building housing for Iranian unskilled laborers an “uneconomic provision.” The
Chief Medical Officer explained the rationale behind this policy as follows: “Men of this
class are drawn from a floating population, and with some exception, remain on our wage
roll for uncertain periods…Some of them are already settled in scattered outlying areas,
and would not move into Company’s quarters in any case…Moreover, the majority are
married and, at a moderate estimate of three to each family, we should have to provide
accommodation not for 3,500 but for over 10,000 people.”1050
In 1930, one year after the Iranian workmen organized a major strike, Company
officials developed a comprehensive plan to reorganize the scattered indigenous
settlements surrounding the Refinery and to provide housing for unskilled laborers. For the
Company, concentrating employees in a one settlement entailed many disadvantages with
respect to “unwieldiness, control, sanitation, and efficient provision of necessary services.”
As a result, it was decided to re-settle the lower strata of the Iranian workforce in separate
villages around the Refinery. As Figure 4.27 shows, the comprehensive plan envisioned
new model villages on four sides of the Refinery to house roughly 10,000 employees. This
arrangement even further fragmented Abadan’s spatial organization and set the stage for
the formation of a polycentric settlement. Designed to accommodate approximately 2,500
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people, each village consisted of 300 self-contained residential units with a potential for
extensions up to 900 units.1051

Figure 4.27 Map of Abadan showing the arrangement of new model villages (villages AD) proposed for the accommodation of the lower strata of third-class employees, 1930.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 53874

4.4.3.1 The New Braim Village.

One of the model villages designed for the

accommodation of Iranian third-class laborers was the new Braim Village, Village A in
Figure 4.27, placed near the old Braim Village to the northwest of the Refinery. Similar to
Abadan Town, the Braim Village witnessed drastic growth between 1924 and 1927, and
soon became a source of apprehension among Company officials. Located to the west of
the Bungalow Area, Braim accommodated more than 2,000 people — approximately 400
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households— who were mostly bungalow servants and Refinery artisans. Company
officials viewed this village as “the most congested and unquestionably the most
insanitary” of all the indigenous settlements surrounding the Refinery. A Company report
described the village as follows: “The dwellings consist chiefly of mud and mat hovels so
crowded together on either side of a narrow lane and in a very restricted area that this
village being adjacent to the Bungalow Area is a constant menace to the health of [the]
European community.”1052

Figure 4.28 Layout of the old Braim Village, 1932. Similar to Abadan Town, the
Company dredged a creek on the northwestern side of the village to contain its expansion
towards the Bungalow Area. This increased the incidence of population and exacerbated
public health in the village.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 62792
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As early as 1927, the Refinery Civil Engineering Department developed plans to
enhance sanitary conditions in the Braim Village. Like the improvements made to Abadan
Town, reforms in Braim included controlling the outward growth of the village, building
roads, reducing population density, and implementing other sanitary measures. For
instance, as Figure 4.28 illustrates, on the pretext of facilitating transportation of
construction materials, a canal was dredged to the northwest of the village to contain its
expansion towards the Bungalow Area. In 1929, new roads and a main drainage line
(culvert) were built in the Village and a power line was installed in the main street.1053
As part of the 1930 comprehensive plan, Company officials decided to clear the
entire village and resettle its inhabitants in a new model village on a “fresh site.” As in
other urban reforms in Abadan, the Company justified the reconstruction of the Braim
Village on account of public health. However, rather than improving the well-being of its
employees, the Company’s actual plan was to remove the village from the locality and
annex Braim to the Bungalow Area. To this end, Company officials collaborated with the
Abadan Municipality and local Iranian authorities to implement different phases of the
project, such as property acquisition, compensation agreement, and demolition of the old
village; however, the Company was solely responsible for payment of compensation and
any other expenditure associated with the relocation of inhabitants.1054
Similar to previous urban reforms, reconstruction of the Braim Village faced severe
public opposition. Simultaneous with public protests, several fire outbreaks occurred in the
old village in 1928-1929, two of which destroyed at least 100 sarifas. In a petition to the
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Shah, residents of Braim accused the Company of setting fire to the mat huts to expel
people from their homes.1055 The Company, however, attributed the frequent outbreaks of
fire to external factors, such as the inflammable material used in the construction of huts
or the vindictive act of some rogue characters.1056 For instance, the General Manager
described one of the incidents as follows: “The fire occurred as a result of a primus stove
being knocked over by a woman, and on account of the inflammable nature of the dry date
fronds, [the fire] soon spread to surrounding sarifas. There was a strong wind blowing at
the time, and had it not been for the fact that a mud wall divided the area of the fire from a
number of adjacent sarifas, the extent of the damage would have been considerably
greater.” As a result of this particular incidence, more than 26 families – all Company’s
Iranian employees – became homeless. To gain political benefit from the incident and uplift
its public image, the Company agreed to distribute 320 tomans, equal to £64, among the
sufferers in proportion to their losses.1057
In April 1929, in response to the Company’s request, the Iranian Government
issued a decree and authorized the British enterprise to re-establish Braim on a new site
and demolish the existing village on condition that duly compensation be paid to individual
owners. Upon receiving the permission, the Company started negotiations with the owners
and inhabitants of the Braim Village.1058 In November 1930, the Company leased the land
for the new Braim Village from a local sheikh, who was residing in exile in Basra, in the
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amount of 11,000 krans, equal to £220.1059 To impress Iranian officials, the Company also
formulated a paternalistic program to build the “Anglo-Persian Club” on the site of the old
Braim Village to encourage “a spirit of co-operation and good fellowship” between Iranian
and British staff. Neither the rhetoric of public health nor the promise of welfare
paternalism could convince the Iranian Government to overlook the loss of tax revenue
from the Braim date gardens which amounted to 3,000 krans. After several rounds of
negotiations, the Company reluctantly paid compensation to the Iranian Government to the
extent of 10 years’ tax revenue from the date gardens in Braim.1060
The first stage of the construction of the new Braim Village, estimated to cost
around £6000, consisted of site preparation efforts, including marking out the new site,
filling ditches and leveling bunds, purchase of palm trees, and construction of new
roadways and water mains. The second stage entailed evacuation of the old village and
payment of compensation to the owners of structures. Unlike the strategy adopted a few
years earlier in the Native Village, Company officials decided to build new homes and rent
them to workmen.1061 As Figures 4.29 and 4.30 show, the New Braim Village was designed
on the site leased by the Company on the northern side of the Braim Canal. For the first
time, Company officials developed a long-term vision for the future growth of a planned
settlement. The new Braim Village was to be constructed in three phases, providing in total
up to 900 houses.
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Figure 4.29 Model Village A (left) and the indigenous Braim Village (right), 1930.
Designed on a site acquired by the Company in 1930 to the northeast of the Braim Creek,
the New Braim Village was planned with provisions for future growth in three stages.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 53874

Figure 4.30 Layout of the New Braim Village, 1930. It consisted of 45 residential blocks
organized within a grid of 40-foot-wide roadways, providing in total 900 residential units.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 53874

400

Figure 4.31 Layout of the residential compound in the New Braim Village, 1930. The
living quarter was made up of a living room, a bedroom, and a kitchen, and was to be
constructed out of a standardized structure.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 53874

As Figure 4.30 illustrates, the new village consisted of 45 residential blocks
organized within a uniform grid of 40-foot-wide roadways. Each residential block was
composed of a central 10-foot-wide “back lane” lined with 20 residential plots. Back lanes
fulfilled the same functions as did alleys in the Clerks’ and Artisans’ villages. As Figure
4.31 illustrates, each plot, measuring 42 feet by 32 feet, was conceptualized as a selfcontained “walled compound.” Each residential unit consisted of two separate quarters —
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the living quarters on one side and the lavatory and bathroom on the opposite side — with
a yard in the middle. The living quarter included a bedroom, a living room, and a kitchen
and was to be constructed out of a standardized structure. Similar to quarters built for
Iranians in Abadan Township, the internal arrangement of residential blocks, in particular,
the separation of the private realm from the public sphere by a solid “purdah” wall was a
direct interpretation of indigenous domestic architecture.
Four standardized sanitation systems were designed for the new Braim Village.
Similar to other model villages, plans were developed to deliver purified drinking water
from the Bahmanshir River to the water supply tanks in the Services Area at the center of
the village. Here, water was pumped to three elevated tanks, 60,000 gallons each equal to
the village’s one-day requirement. Two tanks were used for settlement of sediments and
chlorination and one for distribution of the water. Therefore, the tanks collectively
contained the village’s water supply for three days. The water would flow by gravity from
the Services Area through distributing pipes across the village. The water supply system
would connect to the lavatory-bathroom unit in each compound which was equipped with
a water standpipe fitted with a “self-closing spring tab.” The washing quarter would also
connect to the buried cast iron sewerage pipe in the back lane. The latter would be
discharged into the Village’s main sewage line running down the main streets to the
sewerage and disposal station located in the Services Area. A surface drainage network
made of precast, semi-circular channels would also run in the middle of each back lane and
would constantly be flushed with water pumped direct from the central pump house. This
system also connected to the Village’s main sewage line and eventually discharged into the
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disposal station. The combined effluents would then be treated and pumped into the
Shatt.1062
In order to further effect economy and apply the principles of scientific
industrialism, the Civil Engineering Department studied two standardized structures — the
Nissen Hut and the Mud Brick Hut— for the living quarter of residential compounds. The
Nissen Hut, a product of the Fordist concept of mass production, was a prefabricated, semicylindrical steel-framed structure designed by Major Peter Norman Nissen, AmericanCanadian military officer of the British Expeditionary Force, in 1916. Originally intended
to be used as a military barrack, this portable structure gradually proved to be a versatile
shelter to accommodate different functions during and after the Great War. In the early
1930s, the Nissen Hut was used extensively as an economical prototype for labor
accommodation in the oil company towns across the Persian Gulf region. For instance,
Nissen Huts were erected to house oil men and drillers in the Kuwait Oil Company’s Bahra
Camp and in the oil camp of the Bahrain Petroleum Company.1063
At Abadan, the Refinery Civil Engineering Department constructed three
experimental prototypes, including two Nissen huts and one mud brick hut. Besides
analyzing the construction costs for each alternative, the Civil Engineering Department
carried out systematic research on the heat insulation properties of each structure and
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surveyed “local opinion” about each model.1064 Data was also collected on the internal
temperature and on the compatibility of each type to local domestic culture and life style.

Figure 4.32 Experimental Nissen Huts erected at Abadan, 1930.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 53874

The initial findings suggested that despite the combined advantages of the Nissen
Hut model, it was not perceived as an ideal dwelling by local population. The estimated
cost of completion of the first stage of the new Braim Village, which entailed construction
of 300 houses, made of Nissen Huts imported from England was 25 percent lower than the
cost of a village built entirely of mud brick huts. 1065 Moreover, the Nissen Hut type had
other advantageous properties, such as simplicity of erection, portability, low maintenance
cost, fire proof construction, internal cleanliness, and ease of fumigation during the
epidemics. However, the internal temperature recorded in this model was beyond the
acceptable threshold. Overall, locals favored the mud brick prototype due to its similarity
to vernacular houses. More importantly, the latter had a flat roof providing sleeping
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accommodation at night during the summertime— an important feature of indigenous
dwellings.1066 Similarly, in other oil camps in the Persian Gulf, Nissen Huts were met with
dissatisfaction. For instance, at the Bahra camp in Kuwait to the southwest of Abadan, the
shade temperature in Nissen huts reached around 118 degrees Fahrenheit, forcing the
Kuwait Oil Company to abandon this model for midday use.1067

Figure 4.33 A cross-section of the experimental hybrid model, 1930. This model aimed
to merge the advantages of both the Nissen Hut and the Brick Hut. It was comprised of
the Nissen Hut insulated with mud brick. It also included a flat roof with a low “purdah
wall” that could be used for outdoor sleeping in summer nights.
Source: BP Archives, ArcRef 53874

To build an ideal model, the Civil Engineering Department erected another
experimental hut that included some characteristics of the two alternatives. As Figure 4.33
shows, this hybrid model was constructed out of the Nissen Hut insulated with mud brick.
It also included a flat roof with a low “purdah wall” that could be used in summer nights.
Nevertheless, the hybrid model showed no considerable difference in internal temperature
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compared to the conventional Nissen Hut. As the experimental buildings in Abadan did
not yield fruitful results, Company officials began to make inquiries into the successful
experiments across the Empire. For instance, they studied the barracks erected for British
troops in Haifa which were made of corrugated iron and whitewashed plaster. This model
had reportedly yielded good results as it cooled down very quickly at night.1068
The New Braim Village never materialized. The reconstruction process coincided
with the depression in the global oil market caused by over-production of oil and
overbuilding of tankers— which led the Company to roll back on its capital expenditure
and postpone construction projects in Iran for an uncertain period.1069 Until 1934 virtually
no Company housing was erected for Iranian manual laborers.1070 In this year, a new
residential township was designed by James Mollison Wilson at Bawarda to the southeast
of Abadan Town. Aiming to address the widening social divide at Abadan, the Bawarda
Township envisioned mixed housing.1071 The layout of the new model town, largely
inspired by Lutyen's town planning practices in New Delhi and Hampstead, was designed
along Garden City and City Beautiful ideals.1072
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